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RISK ATTITUDE AND FRAUD DETECTION: A 
MALAYSIAN CASE 
 
Nahariah Jaffar*, Norhazlin Ismail**, Ong Hway Boon***  
 
Abstract 
 
Fraud is an important issue in many countries such as in the United States, United Kingdom, 
including of Malaysia. Malaysian Approved Auditing Standards, AI 240 “Fraud and Error” was 
established to provide guidance on the auditor’s responsibility to consider fraud and error during the 
audit of financial statements. The auditors are required to appropriately assess fraud risk during the 
planning of the audit work so that they can provide reasonable assurance that any material 
misstatement in the financial statements has been detected. If the external auditors are not able to 
detect fraud, this may expose them to litigation.  The present study aims to examine whether risk 
attitude has an effect on the external auditors’ ability to detect the likelihood of fraud. An 
experimental approach is adopted by sending case materials to audit partners and audit managers 
attached to auditing firms operating in Malaysia. The result shows that means difference exists on the 
ability to detect the likelihood of fraud between the external auditors who are risk averse and those 
who are risk taker.  
 
Key words: External auditors, fraud, fraud detection ability, risk attitude. 
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1. Introduction 
 
For the last twenty to twenty five years, Malaysia 
has not been spared of the occurrence of cases of 
fraudulent activities in its public companies. 
Examples of these include the Bank Rakyat, 
Bumiputra Malaysia Finance (BMF), Pan Electric 
Group of Companies, Perwira Habib Bank, Deposit 
Taking Cooperatives (DTCs) and Cooperative 
Central Bank (CCB) cases (Ali, 1994). KPMG 
Malaysia (2003) in their Fraud Survey 2002 Report 
stated that from 168 responses from chief 
executives of public listed and top private 
companies in Malaysia, 50% of them had 
experienced fraud in their organization. Forty 
percent of the companies claimed that they had 
suffered losses between RM10,001 and 
RM100,000 over the past years (i.e. a period from 
January 2001 to December 2002) due to fraud, 33% 
above RM1 million, while 12% reported incurring 
losses of RM10,000 and below1.  
In the United States, Mitchell (1997) in his 
article stated that the “Report to the Nation on 
Occupational Fraud and Abuse” showed that losses 
from fraud caused by managers and executives 
                                                           
[1 ] KPMG Malaysia  Fraud Survey Report 2009 stated that 
financial losses due to fraud ithin the range of RM10,001 and 
RM100,000 accounted for 20% of the fraud incidents reported. 
This, however, is still considered as low. 
were 16 times greater than those caused by non-
managerial employees. KPMG Malaysia (2003) 
reports that in the Malaysian scenario, non-
management employees caused 56% of financial 
losses due to fraud, while employees in the 
management category caused 18% of financial 
losses due to fraud. 
Vanasco (1998) contends that fraudulent 
financial statements are of great concern not only to 
the corporate world, but also to the accounting 
profession. He adds that such events will 
undermine the credibility of auditors in their 
reporting function and erode public confidence in 
the accounting and auditing profession. Public 
accountants undoubtedly contributed to the recent 
corporate frauds by certifying financial statements 
that ultimately proved to be fraudulent or at least 
defective (Ribstein, 2002). Zeune (1997) states that 
independent auditors detect only 5% of fraud. As a 
result, the public may question why auditors are 
unable to detect fraud during the conduct of the 
annual audit. The recent collapse of Enron shed 
some news and somewhat threw unfavourable light 
on the role that external auditors play in the 
detection of fraud (Thomas & Clements, 2002). 
Although fraud may not be well documented in 
Malaysia, this issue could not be taken for granted 
because what happened in other countries, for 
instance in the US, could happen elsewhere. 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 8, Issue 2, Winter 2011, Continued - 2 
 
248 
Furthermore, the country should be concerned 
about the response to KPMG Malaysia’s (2003) 
survey that showed the occurrence of fraudulent 
activities in Malaysia. The issue is made more 
important based on the findings by KPMG 
Malaysia’s (2003) survey that external auditors 
only detected 4% of the fraud incidences2. 
Many researchers suggest that personality 
may affect job performance. Very few studies in 
the ability to detect fraud (Pincus, 1984; Bernardi, 
1994 and Zimbelman & Waller, 1999) had 
examined the effect of personality factor on the 
ability to detect the likelihood of fraud. 
Nevertheless, those studies present inconclusive 
results. Selto and Cooper (1990) state  that risk 
attitude may affect decision making. It is ironically 
to note the former Arthur Andersen case, in which 
a $7 million fine levied against Arthur Andersen 
because of its mishandling of Waste Management a 
few months before the Enron scandal broke did not 
provoke Arthur Andersen to significantly change 
its ways (Ribstein, 2002). Risk attitude, being a 
personality trait itself, had never been specifically 
investigated in the fraud detection literature. Hence, 
the present study takes the first attempt to examine 
the possibility that the external auditors’ risk 
attitude might have affected their ability to detect 
the likelihood of fraud.   
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
Development 
2.1 Detection of Fraud 
 
Review of the literature shows that factors 
examined by studies on the ability to detect the 
likelihood of fraud can be categorized into several 
dimensions: audit task, personality, cognitive 
factors, auditor’s ethical status, auditor’s 
characteristics, audit firm’s characteristics, audit 
firm’s roles, auditor’s roles and fraud risk 
indicators.  
Analysis of the literature shows that very 
limited studies on ability to detect fraud (Pincus, 
1984; Bernardi, 1994; and Zimbelman & Waller, 
1999) had investigated the effect of the external 
auditor’s personality on his/her ability to detect the 
likelihood of fraud. Nonetheless, no study 
investigates the risk attitude of the external 
auditors. Hence, the present study takes the first 
attempt to examine the effect of the external 
auditors’ risk attitude on their job performance, 
particularly in detecting fraud. The present study 
will contribute to the literature through providing 
evidences on the fraud detection ability of the 
external auditors in Malaysia. Notwithstanding the 
importance of the other eight dimensions which 
were investigated before, personality, in particular 
                                                           
[2 ] KPMG Malaysia (2009) fraud survey for the period of 2007-
2008 reported that external auditors detected 8% of the fraud 
incidences in Malaysian companies. 
risk attitude, is the focus of the present study 
because it is a fundamental aspect of the external 
auditors and might influencing the external auditors 
in performing their task. Thus, the present study 
suggests that personality factor, i.e. risk attitude, 
may affect the external auditors’ ability to detect 
the likelihood of fraud.  
 
2.2 Studies on personality factors in 
accounting literatures 
 
Accounting literature offers some studies on the 
impact of personality traits on various issues such 
as auditors’ behaviour (DeCoster, Rhode, Gaines 
and Murphy, 1971; Choo, 1986; Rasch & Harrell, 
1990; Tsui & Gul, 1996; Donnelly, Quirin & 
O'Bryan, 2003), auditors’ judgment (Lehmann, 
2001), job exhaustion (Law, 2003) and managers’ 
opinion (Hartmann, 2005). These studies offer 
mixed results concerning the effect of the 
personality traits on the dependant variables 
concerned. In terms of a specific personality trait 
which is risk attitude, many studies in business 
literature had examined risk attitude within the 
context of capital market issues (e.g. Ross, 2004; 
Frutos & Manzano, 2002) and tax judgment (e.g. 
Kaplan & Reckers, 1985). In accounting literature, 
Helliar, Lonie, Power and Sinclair (2002) have 
examined the attitude to risk by Scottish chartered 
accountants and considers whether their risk-taking 
attitudes are similar to or different from those of 
other business managers in the United Kingdom. 
As mentioned earlier, in fraud detection 
literature only Pincus (1984), Bernardi (1994) and 
Zimbelman and Waller (1999) examined 
personality factors. The present study analyzes the 
effect of specific personality of the external 
auditors which is risk attitude on their ability to 
detect the likelihood of fraud. The attempt taken by 
the present study is essential because only Pincus 
(1984) finds that personality factors (that are field 
independent, narrow category width and ambiguity 
tolerant) have direct effects on ability to detect 
fraud. Hence, the present study may offer empirical 
evidence concerning the possible influence of 
personality, specifically risk attitude, on the 
external auditors’ ability to detect the likelihood of 
fraud within the context of developing country. 
 
2.3 Expected Utility theory 
 
Expected Utility theory by Savage (1954) provides 
a methodological framework for the evaluation of 
alternative choices made by individuals, firms and 
organizations. Utility refers to the satisfaction that 
each choice provides to the decision maker. Thus, 
utility theory assumes that any decision is made on 
the basis of the utility maximization principle, 
according to which the best choice is the one that 
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provides the highest utility (satisfaction) to the 
decision maker.  
Within the context of the present study, it is 
expected that the continuation in providing services 
to the existing audit client or retention of existing 
client would be the utility of the external auditors. 
Hence it is perceived that the external auditor 
would try to produce unqualified audit report to 
satisfy the audit client and subsequently may 
prolong (retain) the engagement with the same 
audit client. Thus, the external auditor who is risk 
taker will carry out less extensive audit tests 
eventhough various fraud risk indicators exist and 
thus will be not able to detect the likelihood of 
fraud. On the other hand, the external auditors who 
are risk averters would do extensive audit tests 
given high fraud risk indicators exist and thus able 
to detect the likelihood of fraud. The present study 
proposes that risk averters are more able to detect 
the likelihood of fraud compared to risk takers. 
Hence, the present study hypothesizes that:  
H:  External auditors who are risk averters are 
more able to detect the likelihood of fraud 
compared to those who are risk takers. 
 
3. Research Method 
3.1 Research design 
 
An experimental approach is utilized in the present 
study. There is one independent variable that is risk 
attitude, which is manipulated as risk-aversion and 
risk taking.  
 
3.2 Research instrument 
3.2.1 Case material 
 
The present study uses case material which is 
developed by modifying those of Zimbelman 
(1996), Brief, Dukerich, Brown and Brett (1996), 
and Moet (1997). A case study of high fraud risk 
scenario is developed for XYZ Manufacturing Bhd. 
and the subjects are required to assume that they 
are involved in the audit this hypothetical company.  
 
3.2.2 Sample  
 
Practicing independent auditor registered in 
Malaysia, designated as audit partner or audit 
manager who are attached to the auditing firms 
operating in Malaysia is the sample group of the 
present study. There is no database, however, 
available regarding the numbers of audit partners 
and audit manager in Malaysia. Database of 
auditing firms operating in Malaysia was obtained 
from the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) 
website. As at May 2006, the MIA website 
indicates that there are 1370 firms registered with 
MIA. The present study distributes the research 
materials to all these auditing firms. Since the 
actual total population of audit partners and audit 
managers attached to the auditing firms operating 
in Malaysia is unknown, therefore the present study 
used all auditing firms operating in Malaysia as 
perceived population. 
 
3.2.3 Administration of the research 
instrument 
 
The research instruments were mailed directly to 
the auditing firms. The cover letter stated clearly 
that the research materials must be attempted by 
audit partner or audit manager of the firms. A pilot 
test was conducted with 30 audit managers drawn 
from the sample firms in the study. The feedback 
from the pilot testing required no amendment of the 
research material. Hence, the instruments are 
validated since the results of the pilot test show that 
the case is realistic. 
 
3.3 Variables of the study 
3.3.1 Dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable is the external auditors’ 
ability to detect the likelihood of fraud. This 
variable is measured on a 7-point Likert scaling 
ranging from extremely unlikely to extremely 
likely, by asking the subject: “Based on your 
judgment, what is the likelihood that the 
management of XYZ Manufacturing Bhd. would 
fraudulently misrepresent the financial statements?. 
An answer “likely” and above indicates that the 
management fraud is considered to have been 
detected.  
 
3.3.2 Independent variable 
 
The independent variable is the risk attitude. It is 
measured by following the methodology adopted 
by Helliar et al. (2002). The subjects are given with 
a scenario concerning financial decision and they 
are required to choose one option (i.e. Option A or 
Option B). The subject is considered as a risk 
averter if he/she choose option A and a risk taker if 
he/she choose option B. 
 
4. Results and Discussion  
4.1 Response rate 
 
The response rate of the present study is 
approximately 6%. Although this rate is low and 
may not be representative of the population, the 
sample size is considered adequate for research that 
is experimental in nature 3 . Roscoe (1975) states 
                                                           
[
3
 ] Early-versus-late tests have been conducted  and  the  results  
shows  that  the  responses of the late response  subjects  are  not  
statistically  different  from  the responses of the early response 
subjects. Thus, should the response rate be greater than 6%, as 
per obtained by the present study, the results of the present study 
would not be significantly different, since a non-response bias 
does not exist. 
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that a sample size larger than 30 and less than 500 
is appropriate for most research. The final reporting 
sample is shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Response rate 
 
 N % 
 
Research instruments distributed 
Less: Non-replied research instruments 
            Research instruments received 
Less: Research instruments rejected  
             Usable research instruments   
 
 
1370 
1277 
93 
13 
80 
 
100 
93 
7 
1 
6 
 
4.2 Hypothesis testing 
 
Since there is only one independent variable which 
is nonmetric and one dependent variable which is 
metric, thus t-test is used to test the hypothesis 
(Sharma, 1996). An independent sample t-test was 
conducted and the results are presented in Table 2. 
The independent sample t test evaluates the 
difference between the means of two independent 
groups, i.e. risk aversion group and risk taking 
group. Since the variances of the two groups are 
different and the sample sizes are uneaqual (i.e. risk 
aversion group = 68; risk taking group = 12) thus, 
data on equal variances not assumed is used. The 
result shows that there is a significant different, p = 
0.089, in the means of the external auditors who are 
risk averters and those who are risk takers. Thus, it 
can be concluded that risk attitude does have a 
positive effect on the external auditors’ ability to 
detect the likelihood of fraud. Hence, the 
hypothesis of the present study is accepted.    
 
 
Table 2. Tests of risk attitude effect on the ability to detect the likelihood of fraud 
Group statistics 
 
 Risk 
attitude N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Risk 
aversion 
68 5.5441 .96867 .11747 Ability 
to detect 
fraud Risk taking 12 5.0000 .95346 .27524 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
  Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
  
  
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
  
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference Lower Upper 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.250 .618 1.798 78 .076 .54412 .30264 -.05838 1.14662 Ability to 
detect 
fraud 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
1.818 15.289 .089* .54412 .29926 -.09269 1.18093 
• Significance level = 10% 
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4.3 Discussion  
 
Risk attitude has an effect on the external auditors’ 
ability to detect the likelihood of fraud. The findings 
corroborate with the Expected Utility Theory in that 
the decision/judgment made by the external auditors is 
on the basis of the utility maximization principle, 
according to which the best choice is the one that 
provides the highest utility (satisfaction) to the decision 
maker, that is the external auditors, that is the ability to 
retain the audit client by issuing an unqualified audit 
report. The findings also support Pincus (1984) that 
personality has an effect on the ability to detect the 
likelihood of fraud. The present study concludes that 
the continuation in providing services to the existing 
audit client or retention of existing client would be the 
utility of the external auditors. Thus, the external 
auditors who are risk takers would carry out less 
extensive audit tests eventhough various fraud risk 
indicators exist and thus will be not able to detect the 
likelihood of fraud. This is because their aim is to 
retain the engagement with the same audit client by 
producing unqualified audit report to satisfy the audit 
client. On the other hand, those who are risk averters 
would be very careful and highly consider the fraud 
risk indicators that exist and perform extensive audit 
tests and thus able to detect the likelihood of fraud.   
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The results of the present study has conformed to the 
literature that personality, that is specifically risk 
attitude, affects job performance, specifically to the 
present study in terms of fraud detection. Future 
research may be conducted to investigate the effect of 
risk attitude on the performance, i.e. ability to detect 
the likelihood of fraud, of another group of auditors, 
i.e. internal auditors..  
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THE IMPACT OF STRATEGY AND ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS 
ON CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
 
Johan Hough*, Retha Scheepers** 
 
Abstract 
 
Large companies create new businesses as an innovative way of solving challenging problems but also see 
new internal ventures as a way of increased entrepreneurial behaviour and sustained differentiation. 
However, strategic leadership is crucial to develop an organizational environment needed to increase the 
entrepreneurial orientation and motivation in established businesses. This paper focus on strategic 
leadership and selected salient organizational factors that aid in the development of corporate 
entrepreneurship (CE). A cross sectional telephone survey of 315 South African companies indicated that 
strategic leadership of an enterprise is crucial to create the right environment and develop and support 
organizational structures and CE. Strategic leadership which encourages autonomy and provides rewards for 
entrepreneurial behaviour creates a supportive organizational structure to strengthen corporate 
entrepreneurship. 
 
Keywords:  strategic leadership, corporate entrepreneurship, organizational structure  
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1. Introduction 
 
When established companies try to develop new 
ventures and businesses, they can succeed by finding 
the right balance in setting strategy, operating the 
business and designing the organization (Garvin & 
Levesque, 2006). A firm commitment to building the 
CE capability and a supportive organizational climate 
is also needed for an organization to become 
“entrepreneurial” (Fahden, 1998; Mokoena, 1999). 
However, a certain kind of leadership is necessary to 
create and support this entrepreneurial orientation. 
Strategic leadership has been put forward by various 
authors as an approach to establish an innovative 
environment conducive to build organizational, human, 
social and structural capabilities (Hitt & Ireland, 2002; 
Goffee & Jones, 2000; Bennis, 1997; Ireland & Hitt, 
1996). 
Many business executives concur that the ability 
to drive business growth and implement new, 
innovative ideas are some of the top priorities of 
organizations in the twenty first century (Drucker, 
2002; Rigby, 2003; Planting, 2006; Morris, Kuratko & 
Covin, 2008).  However the management of innovation 
and corporate entrepreneurship (CE) is complex, 
challenging and filled with risk (Ahmed, 1998:30). The 
implementation of innovation and CE cannot be 
achieved by paying “lip service” to the ideal of 
increased innovative activity (Hof, 2004).   
This paper aims to achieve this objective by 
firstly reviewing the CE, strategic leadership and 
organizational climate literature, secondly examining 
the relationship between a supportive organizational 
climate and the CE capability and formulating research 
hypotheses; thirdly by reporting the research design 
and results and finally by examining the implications 
for managerial practice. 
 
2.  Defining corporate entrepreneurship 
(CE) 
 
Corporate entrepreneurship (CE), generally, refers to 
the development of new business ideas and 
opportunities within large and established corporations.  
In most cases, CE describes the total process whereby 
established enterprises act in an innovative, risk-taking 
and pro-active way (Zahra, 1993; Dess, Lumpkin & 
McGee, 1999; Bouchard, 2001).  This behaviour has 
various outcomes, such as the new products, services, 
processes or business development.  CE may be chosen 
as a strategy to result in increased financial 
performance.  It also leads to other non-financial 
benefits, such as increased morale of employees, 
collaboration and a creative working environment 
(Hayton, 2005).  It may result in “new” organizations 
being created as “spin-out ventures” (Hornsby, 
Naffziger, Kuratko & Montagno, 1993; Altman and 
Zacharckis, 2003) or it may involve the restructuring 
and strategic renewal within an existing enterprise 
(Volberda, Baden-Fuller and Van den Bosch, 2001).  
CE is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. Corporate 
venturing, intrapreneurship and strategic renewal are, 
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therefore, different components of CE (Hisrich and 
Peters, 2002; Covin and Slevin, 1989).  In this study, 
the authors propose that CE be regarded as a process 
through which both formal and informal initiatives are 
encouraged, aimed at the creation of new products, 
services, processes and businesses to improve and 
sustain a company’s competitive position and financial 
performance. 
Many authors subscribe to the view that firm-
level entrepreneurial orientation serves as an indicator 
of the CE capability.  Firm-level entrepreneurial 
orientation is reflected by three dimensions:  
innovativeness, pro-activeness and risk-taking (Miller 
& Friesen, 1983; Covin & Slevin, 1991; Zahra, 1991; 
Knight, 1997).  However some authors, such as 
Lumpkin and Dess (1996) argue that five dimensions, 
not three should be used to measure entrepreneurial 
orientation, namely autonomy, competitive 
aggressiveness, pro-activeness, innovativeness and 
risk-taking.  In contrast with their views, this paper 
argues that autonomy is an internal organizational 
driver of CE, which influences the organizational 
climate for CE.  Furthermore, competitive 
aggressiveness forms part of the pro-activeness 
dimension and does not represent a separate dimension.  
Other researchers also support this view (Morris, Allen, 
Schindehutte and Avilla, 2006; Kreiser et al., 2002). 
The traditional school of thought view these three 
dimensions as contributing equally and in the same 
direction to entrepreneurial orientation (Miller & 
Friesen, 1983; Zahra, 1991; Barringer & Bluedorn, 
1999), while the other school of thought led by Kreiser 
et al. (2002) and supported by Lumpkin and Dess 
(1996) argue that the three dimensions vary 
independently of one another.  For the purposes of this 
paper, the authors subscribe to the views of Kreiser et 
al. (2002) in this regard.  Each of these dimensions will 
be analysed in more detail. 
The international CE literature acknowledge that 
innovativeness, risk-taking and pro-activeness, as 
dimensions of the CE capability are influenced by the 
organizational climate within an enterprise (Ahmed, 
1998; Morris & Kuratko, 2002; Hornsby, Kuratko & 
Zahra, 2002; Ngo & Lau, 2004; Martins & Terblanche, 
2003). 
 
3. Organizational factors influencing the 
environment for corporate 
Entrepreneurship 
 
Hornsby et al. (2002) built on the work of other authors 
and identified a set of organizational factors that are 
important facilitators of CE activities. These factors are 
strategic leadership and support for CE, empowered, 
autonomous employees, the use of appropriate rewards 
for CE, the availability of resources, especially time, 
and a supportive organizational structure.  Based on 
extensive research in the field, Hornsby et al. (2002) 
developed and refined the Corporate Entrepreneurship 
Assessment Instrument (CEAI) to measure the five 
internal drivers of CE in enterprises. 
 
3.1 Strategic leadership and 
entrepreneurial strategy 
 
The first factor as a facilitator for CE activities is 
strategic leadership. Ireland and Hitt (1999:42) defines 
strategic leadership as “a person’s ability to anticipate, 
envision, maintain flexibility, think strategically, and 
work with others to initiate changes that will create a 
viable future for the organization.” The same authors 
elaborate on describing this viable future of the 
organization as one of creating value, and where the 
resources are configured that capabilities can be 
leveraged in ways to create competitive advantages 
(Hitt & Ireland, 2002). Other authors describe strategic 
leadership as the ability to create fit and alignment in 
all business levels (Beer, Voelpel, Leibold & Tekie, 
2005), to establish the basic vision of the organization 
(Hough, Thompson, Strickland, Gamble, 2008), to 
appropriately balance the induced and autonomous 
processes with matching cycles of strategic dynamics 
(Burgelman & Grove, 2007), managing resources and 
that these managerial activities are a vital part of what 
is often a demanding work load for executives (Kotter, 
1982). The link between strategic leadership and 
innovation (Elenkov  & Wright, 2005),  leadership and 
strategic management (Westley &  Mint berg, 1989), 
strategic leadership and super-growth companies 
(Tonge, Larsen & Ito, 1998) is well known.  
New research confirms the linkages between 
strategy and leadership (Montgomery, 2008), 
leadership, strategy and competition (Porter, 2008), 
strategy and performance, (Kaplan & Norton, 2008) 
and leadership, ownership and value orientation 
(Kanter, 2008).  These strategy experts agree that 
(strategic) leadership is the driver to add value to the 
firm and to ensure that companies’ use their 
capabilities to differentiate themselves from their 
competitors.  
A current study by Serfontein (2010) study 
confirmed the relationship between strategic leadership 
and operational excellence in business organisations 
in South Africa as the correlation analysis showed 
strong positive relationships between strategic 
leadership and cost management as well as strategic 
leadership and integration. This study also confirms the 
strong effect of the three constructs of strategic 
leadership (action, coherence and discipline) on 
strategy orientation and its dimensions. The data from 
the study shows a strong positive relationship between 
action and the execution of strategy (r = 0.71; p = 
0.0000). The Spearman correlation coefficient also 
indicates the same relationship (ρ = 0.64; p = 0.00). 
The correlation analysis and scatter-plot shown in 
Figure 1 are indicative of a strong, positive relationship 
between action and execution of strategy as the data 
points illustrated the cluster in close proximity to the 
trend line. 
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Figure 1. A scatter-plot representing the nature and strength of the relationship between action and execution of 
strategy 
Source: Serfontein (2010: 188) 
 
The above discussion provides a solid base for 
“strategic leadership” and its various attributes to 
support viable and sustainable innovation, competitive 
advantages and capabilities for the firm. It captures the 
encouragement and willingness of managers to 
facilitate CE activities within an enterprise (Hornsby et 
al., 1993; Goosen, 2002).  These types of support 
should encourage employees to solve problems in 
innovative ways, seek opportunities in a pro-active 
manner and embark on moderately risky projects; 
therefore the following hypothesis is postulated: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Strategic leadership and support for CE 
is positively related to innovativeness, pro-activeness 
and risk-taking, thus to firm-level entrepreneurial 
orientation. 
 
3.2 Empowered, autonomous employees 
 
The second organizational factor facilitating CE 
activities is the degree to which employees are 
empowered and function autonomously in their jobs.  
This factor refers to the discretion and extent that 
employees are empowered to make decisions about 
performing their own work in the way they believe is 
most effective.  In entrepreneurial work environments 
employees are allowed to make decisions about their 
work processes and are seldom criticised for making 
mistakes when innovating (Hornsby et al., 2002).  This 
tolerance of failure should facilitate innovative, pro-
active and risk-taking behaviours in employees, 
therefore the following hypothesis is postulated: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Autonomy and empowerment of 
employees is positively related to innovativeness, pro-
activeness and risk-taking, thus to firm-level 
entrepreneurial orientation. 
 
3.3 Rewards for corporate 
entrepreneurship 
 
A third organizational factor encouraging 
entrepreneurial behaviour is the appropriate use of 
rewards for CE.  Rewards and reinforcement develop 
the motivation of individuals to engage in innovative, 
proactive and moderate risk-taking behaviour (Kanter, 
1989; Fry; 1987; Goosen, 2002).  Theorists, therefore, 
stress that an effective reward system that spurs 
entrepreneurial activity must consider goals, feedback, 
emphasis on individual responsibility, and 
performance-based incentives. The use of appropriate 
rewards can also enhance managers' willingness to 
assume the risks associated with entrepreneurial 
activity. Innovative organizations are characterised by 
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providing rewards based on performance, offering 
challenges, increasing responsibilities, and promoting 
the ideas of innovative people throughout the 
organization (Kuratko & Hodgetts, 2004). Therefore, it 
is expected that: 
 
Hypothesis 3:  Rewards for CE is positively related to 
innovativeness, pro-activeness and risk-taking, thus to 
firm-level entrepreneurial orientation. 
 
3.4 Time and resource availability 
 
The fourth organizational factor supporting the CE 
capability is the availability of resources, which seems 
best to be portrayed by time availability.  To consider 
acting in entrepreneurial ways, employees need to 
perceive resources as accessible for CE activities 
(Pinchot, 1985; Covin & Slevin, 1991; Kreiser et al., 
2002).  For new and innovative ideas to thrive, 
individuals should have time to incubate their ideas.  
Organizations should be reasonable in assigning the 
workload of their employees and allow employees to 
work with others on long-term problem solving. In 
entrepreneurial work environments, employees are 
allowed to conduct creative, entrepreneurial 
experiments in a limited portion of their work time 
(Von Hippel, 1977; Kanter, 1989; Morris, 1998).  
Thus, the following hypothesis can be postulated with 
regard to time and resource availability: 
 
Hypothesis 4:  Time availability is positively related to 
innovativeness and pro-activeness. 
 
3.5 Supportive organizational structure 
and organizational boundaries 
 
The final organizational factor facilitating CE is the 
existence of a supportive organizational structure and 
boundaries (Morris, 1998; Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). A 
supportive organizational structure provides the 
administrative mechanism by which ideas are 
evaluated, chosen, and implemented (Goosen, 2002).  
However, a bureaucratic organizational structure leads 
to perceived boundaries, preventing people from 
noticing problems outside their own jobs.  People 
should be encouraged to look at the organization from 
a holistic perspective.  Organizations should avoid 
having standard operating procedures for all major 
parts of jobs and should reduce dependence on narrow 
job descriptions and rigid performance standards 
(Kuratko, Montagno & Hornsby, 1990; Hornsby et al., 
2002).  Thus, the following hypothesis can be 
postulated: 
 
Hypothesis 5:  Supportive organizational structures and 
boundaries are positively related to innovativeness and 
pro-activeness. 
 
To summarise, the key factors of a supportive 
organizational climate facilitating CE should be 
characterised by strategic leadership and support for 
CE, rewards for CE, empowered employees who enjoy 
intrapreneurial freedom and autonomy, resource and 
time availability for CE and a supportive organizational 
structure and limited boundaries between departments. 
 
4. Research design 
 
The sample of firms that participated in the study 
included 315 companies, operating in South Africa. 
The following criteria was employed to select the 
sample (1) awareness of innovation practices and 
processes, by participating in the annual SA e-business 
survey, conducted by Trialogue (Hartley & 
Worthington-Smith, 2004); (2) active in e-business, 
since technological changes over the last five years 
have forced many enterprises to overcome 
technological challenges in innovative manners 
(Hartley & Worthington-Smith, 2004); and (3) 
accessibility to firms, since few comprehensive 
updated databases exist in South Africa.  The two main 
groups in the sampling frame were companies listed on 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) and 
companies operating in the information and 
communication technology industry (ICT). JSE 
companies were identified by using the register of all 
listed JSE operating companies at the end of 2004.  
ICT companies were identified, using the database 
obtained from IT Web in February 2005 (IT Web, 
2005).  The initial sample consisted of 715 companies.  
The key respondent (informant) targeted in JSE 
companies was the Information Technology (IT) 
manager or the Chief Information Officer (CIO), while 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or Sales Manager 
was the key respondent in ICT companies.  
Data was collected by a cross-sectional telephone 
survey between August to October 2005.  The 
administration of the telephone surveys was preceded 
by a pilot study, involving interviews with middle and 
senior level managers of 41 companies in Gauteng, 
South Africa.  The purpose of the pilot study was to 
assess the face validity and reliability of the 
measurement instrument.  Based on the results of the 
pilot study the questionnaire was refined. 
 
5. Data analysis and hypotheses test 
results 
 
Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients were 
used in the initial descriptive analysis. Structural 
equation modelling were used to assess the hypotheses. 
The correlation matrix shown in Table I indicate 
statistically significant correlations for the CE 
dimensions and three of the five organizational factors, 
which facilitate CE activities. 
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Table I. Correlation matrix for the variables assessed 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.  Innovativeness                
2. Risk-taking 0.34              
3.  Pro-activeness 0.42** 0.42**            
4.  Entrepreneurial orientation 0.77** 0.77** 0.77**          
5.  Strategic leadership and 
support for CE  
0.29** 0.29** 0.31** 0.38**        
6.  Autonomy 0.18** 0.29** 0.14** 0.27** 0.55**      
7.  Rewards for CE 0.30** 0.18** 0.13* 0.27** 0.53** 0.44**    
8.  Time availability 0.07 0.04 -0.01 0.05 0.26** 0.26** 0.20**  
9.  Organizational structure 0.04 -0.02 0.03† 0.02 -
0.21** 
-
0.24** 
-
0.31** 
-
0.14* 
n = 315  
†p<.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01 
 
Based on the CE literature, it was decided to construct 
a simple structural equation model of the influence of 
the organizational climate factors on the 
entrepreneurial orientation of firms.  It was decided to 
modify the theoretical model, by omitting the 
measures, which did not contribute significantly to a 
construct, for example time availability and 
organizational structure. The subsequent Structural 
Equation Model (SEM) generated is shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. A representation of the modified Structural Equation Model for the internal organizational factors and firm-
level entrepreneurial orientation 
 
Figure 2 shows that strategic leadership (SL) and 
support for CE , autonomy (Au) and rewards for 
CE (R) contribute significantly to assess the 
organizational climate factors, since the paths from 
these variables exceed the 0.70 threshold (Hair, 
Black, Babin, Anderson & Tatham, 2006).  
Entrepreneurial orientation  is measured by 
innovativeness (I), pro-activeness (P), and risk-
taking (RT), which paths also exceed the 0.70 
threshold recommended by Hair et al., (2006:747).  
The organizational climate factor construct has a 
significant influence (0.45) on the CE capability. 
This finding suggests that that the entrepreneurial 
orientation is a construct that could be managed 
and improved by focusing on the organizational 
climate factors of strategic leadership and 
management support for CE, rewards for CE and 
allowing employees to function autonomously. 
For the firms in the sample, there is a positive 
relationship between strategic leadership and 
support for CE and the three dimensions of the CE 
capability:  innovativeness, risk-taking and pro-
activeness.  There is also a positive relationship 
between strategic leadership and support for CE 
and the entrepreneurial orientation of an enterprise.  
Regarding hypothesis two, a positive 
relationship exists between the autonomy of 
employees and risk-taking (p <0.01), however no 
relationship was found between autonomy and 
innovativeness or pro-activeness.  The structural 
equation modeling supports the assertion that 
empowered, autonomous employees facilitates the 
CE capability. 
Concerning hypothesis three a positive 
relationship exists between rewards for CE and 
innovativeness (p<0.001), however no relationship 
was found between rewards for CE and pro-
activeness or risk-taking.  The structural equation 
modeling supports the assertion that rewards for 
CE facilitates the CE capability. Hypothesis four, 
which postulated a positive relationship between 
time availability and innovativeness and pro-
activeness, was not supported. Hypothesis five, 
which postulated a positive relationship between 
loose organizational boundaries and innovativeness 
and pro-activeness, was also not supported. 
Entrepreneurial 
orientation 
Organizational 
climate factors 
SL I 
P 
RT 
Au 
R 
0.45 
1.13 
0.86 
1.83 
0.98 
0.77 
1.05 
0.68 
1.00 
1.07 
1.70 
1.26 
2.02 
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6. Conclusion 
 
The results of this study suggest that the 
dimensions of firm-level entrepreneurial orientation 
are most strongly influenced by strategic leadership 
and support for CE, autonomy of employees and 
rewards for CE, thus creating a supportive 
organizational structure. Autonomy of employees 
showed the strongest relationship with risk-taking, 
while rewards for CE encourage innovativeness. 
On the basis of the SEM, the organizational 
climate factors strategic leadership, rewards and 
autonomy are significant and enable managers to 
focus on building a supportive organizational 
climate for CE inside their organizations. Thus, the 
most crucial organizational factor which facilitates 
CE is strategic leadership and top management 
support for CE. 
 
References 
 
1. Ahmed, P.K.  (1998). Culture and climate for 
innovation.  European Journal of Innovation 
Management, 1(1):30-43. 
2. Altman, J., & Zacharakis, A.L., (2003).  An 
integrated model for corporate venturing, Journal of 
Private Equity, 6(4):68-76. 
3. Barringer, B.R. & Bluedorn, A.C.  (1999). The 
relationship between corporate entrepreneurship 
and strategic management.  Strategic Management 
Journal, 20:421-444. 
4. Beer, M, Voelpel, S.C, Leibold, M & Tekie, M,B. 
(2005). Strategic Management as Organizational 
Learning: Developing Fit and Alignment through a 
Disciplined Process Long Range 
Planning, 38(5):445-465 
5. Bennis, W. (1997). Organizing genius: The secrets 
of creative collaboration. Reading, MA: Addison 
Wesley.  
6. Bouchard, V.  (2001).  Exploring Corporate 
Entrepreneurship:  A Corporate Strategy 
Perspective.  Paper read at European 
Entrepreneurial Learning Conference.  December 
2001:  Lyon. 
7. Burgelman, R.A, & Grove, A.S. (2007). Let chaos 
reign, then rein in chaos - repeatedly: managing 
strategic dynamics for corporate longevity. Strategic 
Management Journal, 28(10):965-980 
8. Covin, J.G. & Slevin, D.P.  (1989).  Strategic 
management of small firms in hostile and benign 
environments.  Strategic Management Journal, 
10:75-87. 
9. Covin, J.G. & Slevin, D.P.  (1991). A conceptual 
model of entrepreneurship as firm behaviour.  
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 16(1):7-25. 
10. Dess, G.G., Lumpkin, T.T. & McGee J.E. (1999).  
Linking CE to strategy, structure, and process:  
suggested research directions.  Entrepreneurship 
Theory & Practice, 99:85-102. 
11. Drucker, P.F. (2002) (reprint).  Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship.  Oxford:  Butterworth-
Heineman. 
12. Elenkov, D.S., Judge, W. & Wright, P.  (2005). 
Strategic Leadership and Executive Innovation 
Influence:  an international multi-cluster 
comparative study.  Strategic Management Journal, 
26:665-682. 
13. Fahden, A.  1998.  Bridging the Innovation Gap.  
Innovative Leader 7(9).  Available from: 
<http://www.winstonbrill.com/bril001/html/article_
index> [Accessed 25 November 2010]. 
14. Fry; A.  1987. The Post-it-note: an entrepreneurial 
success. SAM Advanced Management Journal. 
52:4-9. 
15. Garvin, David A., Levesque, Lynne C., 2006. 
Meeting the challenge of Corporate 
Entrepreneurship. Harvard Business Review, 84 
(10). 
16. Goffee, R., & Jones, G. (2000). Why should 
anyone be led by you? Harvard Business Review, 
78(5). 
17. Goosen, G.J.  2002.  Key factor intrapreneurship: 
The development of a systems model to facilitate 
the perpetuation of entrepreneurship in large South 
African organizations.  Unpublished Ph.D. thesis.  
University of Stellenbosch. 
18. Hair, J.F., Bush, R.P. & Ortinau, D.J.   2000.  
Marketing Research:  A practical approach for the 
new millennium.  Boston:  McGraw-Hill 
International. 
19. Hair, J.F., Black, W.C., Babin, B.J., Anderson, 
R.E. & Tatham, R.L.  2006.  Multivariate data 
analysis.  Sixth edition.  Prentice Hall:  Upper 
Saddle River, New Jersey. 
20. Hartley, P. & Worthington-Smith, R.  2004.  The e-
Business Handbook:  The 2004 review of 
innovation at work in South African business.  
Cape Town:  Trialogue. 
21. Hisrich, R.D, & Peters, M.P.  2002.  
Entrepreneurship.  5th edition.  New York:  
McGraw-Hill.  
22. Hitt, M.A, & Ireland, R.D. 2002 The essence of 
strategic leadership: Managing human and social 
capital.   Journal of Leadership & Organizational 
Studies, 9(1) 
23. Hof, R.D.  2004.  Now more than ever, innovation 
is the answer.  Business Week, 1 March:62-63. 
24. Hornsby, J.S. Kuratko, D.F. and Zahra, S.A.  2002.  
Middle managers’ perception of the internal 
environment for corporate entrepreneurship:  
assessing a measurement scale.  Journal of Business 
Venturing, 17:253-273. 
25. Hough, J. Thompson, AA, Strickland, AJ, & 
Gamble, JE. 2008. Crafting and Executing Strategy. 
South African Edition. Text, Readings and  Cases: 
McGraw-Hill: London 
26. Ireland, R. D., & Hitt, M. A. (1999). Achieving and 
maintaining strategic competitiveness in the 21st 
century: The role of strategic leadership. Academy 
of Management Executive, 13(1), 4357. 
27. IT Web, 2005.  Virtual Press Offices.  Available 
from:   http://www.itweb.co.za/sections/default.asp  
28. Kaplan, R.S & Norton, D.P. 2008. Mastering the 
management system. Harvard Business Review, 
86(1):63-77 
29. Kanter, R.M.  1989.  When Giants learn to dance.  
Simon and Schuster, New York. 
30. Kanter, R.M.  2008. Transforming giants. Harvard 
Business Review, 86(1): 43-52 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 8, Issue 2, Winter 2011, Continued - 2 
 
 
258 
31. Knight, G.A.  1997.  Cross-cultural reliability and 
validity of a scale to measure firm entrepreneurial 
orientation.  Journal of Business Venturing, 
12(3):213-225. 
32. Kotter, J. (1982). The general managers. New 
York: Free Press. 
33. Kreiser, P. Marino, L. & Weaver, L.M.  2002.  
Assessing the relationship between entrepreneurial 
orientation, the external environment and firm 
performance.  Frontiers of Entrepreneurship 
Research: 
<http://www.babson;edu/entrep/fer/Babson2002/X
VII/XVII_S4/SVII_S4_nav.html>  
34. Kuratko, D.F. & Hodgetts, R.M.  2004.  
Entrepreneurship:  Theory, Process and Practice.  
Sixth edition.  USA:  Thompson South-Western. 
35. Kuratko, D.F. Montagno, R.V. & Hornsby, J.S.  
1990.  Developing an intrapreneurial assessment 
instrument for an effective corporate 
entrepreneurial environment.  Strategic 
Management Journal, 11:49-58.  
36. Lumpkin, G.T. & Dess, G.G.  1996.  Clarifying 
entrepreneurial orientation construct and linking it 
to performance.  Academy of Management 
Review, 21(1):135-172. 
37. Martins, E.C. & Terblanche, F.  2003.  Building 
organizational culture that stimulates creativity and 
innovation.  European Journal of Innovation 
Management, 6(1):64-74. 
38. Miller, D. & Friesen, P.  1983.  Strategic-making 
and environment:  The third link.  Strategic 
Management Journal, 4(3):221-235. 
39. Mokoena B.A., 1999.  The Environmental 
Determinants of Corporate Entrepreneurship.  
Unpublished MComm. Dissertation.  Rand 
Afrikaans University. 
40. Montgomery, C.A. 2008. Putting leadership back 
into strategy. Harvard Business Review, 86(1):54-
60. 
41. Morris, M.H.  1998.  Entrepreneurial Intensity:  
Sustainable Advantages for Individuals, 
Organizations and Societies.  Quorum Books:  
Westport. 
42. Morris, M.H., Allen, J., Schindehutte, M. & Avila, 
R.A.  2006.  Balanced Management Control 
Systems as a Mechanism for Achieving Corporate 
Entrepreneurship.’  Unpublished paper. 
43. Morris, M.H. & Kuratko, D.F.  2002.  Corporate 
Entrepreneurship.  Harcourt College Publishers:  
Orlando, Florida. 
44. Morris, M.H., Kuratko, D.F. & Covin, J.G.  2008.  
Corporate Entrepreneurship and Innovation.  
Mason, Ohio:  Thomson South-Western. 
45. Ngo, H-Y & Lau, C-M.  2004. The HR system, 
organizational culture and product innovation.  
International Business Review, 13(6):685-703. 
46. Pinchot III, G.  1985.  Intraprenering:  You don't 
have to leave the corporation to become an 
entrepreneur.  New York:  Harper & Row. 
47. Porter, M. 2008.The five competitive forces that 
shape strategy.  Harvard Business Review, 86(1): 
79-92.  
48. Planting, S.  2006.  Executives know that growth 
must come from innovation.  Innovations – 
Financial Mail, (1 September):3. 
49. Rigby, D.  2003.  Management Tools Survey 2003:  
Usage up as companies strive to make headway in 
tough times.  Strategy & Leadership, 31(5):4-11. 
50. Serfontein, J.J. 2010.  The impact of strategic 
leadership on the operational strategy and 
performance of business organisations in South 
Africa Unpublished Ph.D. thesis.  University of 
Stellenbosch. 
51. Tonge, R, Larsen, P.C, & Ito, M. 1998. Strategic 
leadership in super-growth companies—a re-
appraisal. Long Range Planning, 31 (6): 838-847  
52. Volberda, H.W., Baden-Fuller, C. & Van den 
Bosch, F.A.J.  2001.  Mastering Strategic Renewal:  
Mobilising Renewal Journeys in Multi-unit Firms.  
Long Range Planning, 34(2):159-178. 
53. Von Hippel, E.  1977.  Successful and failing 
internal corporate ventures:  An empirical analysis.  
Industrial Marketing Management, 6:163-174.  
54. Westley, F &  Mintzberg, H. 1989. Visionary 
leadership and strategic management. Strategic 
Management Journal, 10(1):17-32  
55. Zahra, S.A.  1991.  Predictors and financial 
outcomes of corporate entrepreneurship:  an 
exploratory study.  Journal of Business Venturing, 
6(4):259-285. 
56. Zahra, S.A.  1993. Environment, corporate 
entrepreneurship and financial performance:  A 
taxonomic approach.  Journal of Business 
Venturing, 8(4):319-340. 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 8, Issue 2, Winter 2011, Continued - 2 
 
 
259 
AN INVESTIGATION OF BOARD DIRECTORS’ ABSENCE AND 
ITS DETERMINANTS IN THE MALAYSIAN STOCK MARKET 
 
Mohammad Refakar*,  Ming-Ming Lai**  
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the relation between directors’ absence in board meetings as an indicator of 
directors’ busyness with possible determinants of director absence on the constituent companies of 
FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI index from 2005 to 2008. This study has found board size as the strongest 
determinant of directors’ absence. As the size grows, there is higher probability of directors to be 
absent from board meetings. This study found a board size of 9 and less as an optimum board size. We 
also found that the more independent directors on the board, the less absence they made. The results 
showed that the number of multiple directorships a director holds, number of annual meetings, age, 
and ethnicity of the director are not significant determinants.  
 
Keywords:  Director absence, board size, determinants, multiple directorships, annual meetings 
 
*Multimedia University and Université du Québec à Montréal 
 
** Corresponding Author, Faculty of Management, Multimedia University 
Jalan Multimedia, 63100 Cyberjaya 
Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia 
Tel: 603-83125747 
Fax: 603-83125590, 603-83125445 
mmlai@mmu.edu.my 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The issue of multiple directorships has recently 
received attention in the field of corporate 
governance. Holding outside directorships may or 
may not add value to the firm’s performance. Prior 
studies (Ferris et al., 2003; Perry and Peyer, 2005; 
Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) on the relation between 
directors’ busyness or multiple directorships with a 
firm’s performance showed mixed findings. Some 
studies show that multiple directorships allow 
directors to build a business network and to 
improve their experience; others find multiple 
directorships as a threat to the firm value and the 
ability of board of directors to monitor 
management performance. 
While some work of multiple directorships are 
available for developed markets, little research on 
director absence and multiple directorships have 
been done on emerging economy such as Malaysia. 
Thus, this study is motivated to investigate the 
relation between director’s absence in board 
meetings as an indicator of director’s busyness with 
possible determinants of director absence on the 
constituent companies of FTSE Bursa Malaysia 
KLCI index during the years 2005 to 2008. The 
possible determinants are number of outside 
directorships that the director holds, board size, 
number of annual meetings, percentage of 
independent directors on the board, directors’ race 
and age. The findings of the study fill the gap of 
existing corporate governance literature by 
providing in-depth insights into significant 
determinants of director absence. Interesting 
findings showed that board size and percentage of 
independent directors rather than multiple 
directorships indicated significant relation with the 
board director absence.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Numerous studies have been conducted on the 
issue of multiple directorships. However, the 
determinants of multiple directorships on firm 
value and its significant relation with firm value 
warrants further investigation. 
There are two opposing hypotheses on the 
issue of multiple directorships. The reputation 
hypothesis advocates that directors are desirous to 
accept new outside directorships because the 
number of directorships they hold could signify 
their expertise and provides networks of business 
contacts. On the contrary, busyness hypothesis 
argues that multiple directorships would make 
directors so busy that they are not able to 
effectively do their jobs as corporate monitors. 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 8, Issue 2, Winter 2011, Continued - 2 
 
 
260 
Their busyness may also have negative effects on 
their attendance to the board of director. The 
busyness hypothesis implies that the directors who 
hold too many board seats may be unable to attend 
the board meetings.  The busyness of directors 
would produce oversight management and 
eventually reduce the firm value.  
Prior studies (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 
1983, Perry and Preye, 2005; and Fich, 2005) 
indicated that multiple outside directorships reflect 
good reputations of directors as these directors 
might consider as monitoring specialists. Multiple 
outside directorships are good for a firm’s value.  
A number of studies produced empirical 
support for the reputation hypothesis argument.  
According to Fama and Jensen (1983), the 
responsibilities of board of directors are to endorse 
management decisions and to monitor management 
performance. Utilizing outside directors might 
reduce the probability of managerial collusion 
(Fama, 1980) and can help as another potential 
source of corporate monitoring.   
Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003) 
examined 3190 firms in the United States 
pertaining to the effect of the multiple directorships 
by using four measures. Upon testing the busyness 
hypothesis in a multivariate framework, the results 
showed that there was no evidence that multiple 
board appointments reduced a firm’s performance 
in which the market-to-book ratio was used. They 
found positive coefficient of market-to-book ratio 
with multiple directorships which was inconsistent 
with busyness hypothesis. “Busyness hypothesis of 
corporate directorships postulates that serving on 
multiple boards overcommits an individual. As a 
consequence, such individuals shirk their 
responsibilities as directors” (p.1088).  This would 
also imply that busyness hypothesis predicts that an 
individual holding more outside board seats will 
serve on fewer internal board committees. Overall, 
the appointment of a multiple director for the first 
time experience would produce positive returns to 
the firms. There was no evidence the directors who 
held multiple directorships and busy attended less 
board committee meetings as compared to other 
counterparts. The results failed to find negative 
relationship of multiple directorships with firm 
performance as predicated by busyness hypothesis. 
The results are consistent with Fama and Jensen 
(1983) of the reputational effect of directorships.  
Perry and Peyer (2005) examined 349 
announcements of new director appointments from 
1994 to 1996 when an executive of a firm was 
nominated for an outside directorship in public 
listed companies in United States. The results 
showed that firms with executives that accepted an 
outside directorship would find negative 
announcement returns only when the executive 
primary employer (sender firm) had greater agency 
problems.  However, when fewer agencies 
concerned existed, additional directorships would 
increase the value of the sender-firm. Sender-firm 
announcement returns were also higher when 
executives accepted an outside directorship in a 
financial, high-growth, or related-industry firm. 
Overall, the results indicated that outside 
directorships for executives can enhance firm value 
in which the value can be gained through learning 
or networking opportunities or through signaling of 
managerial quality. The finding is consistent with 
reputation hypothesis. 
Despite many supports for reputation 
hypothesis, some literature questioned the rationale 
of holding too many board seats in which too many 
directorships may decrease the effectiveness of 
outside directors as they were overcommitted and 
too busy. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) contended 
that Ferris et al. (2003) had several methodological 
flaws and questioned their results. It should be 
pointed out that the definition of busy boards used 
by Fich and Shivdasani (2006) was different from 
Ferris et al.’s (2003). In terms of outside 
directorship, Ferris et al. (2003) computed the 
average number of sample firm directorships held 
by the directors of a firm. Whereas, Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006) considered directors busy if they 
held directorships in three or more firms.  
Fich and Shivdasani (2006) examined 508 
industrial firms that were listed in the Forbes 
magazine from 1989 to 1995 in United States on 
busy directors and corporate governance value. 
They focused on the boards in which directors held 
on more than three external directorships. The 
market-to-book ratio was used as a measure of firm 
performance and considered the busyness of a 
director who sat in three or more boards. The 
results indicated that firms with busy board 
directors were linked with lower market-to-book 
ratios, weak corporate governance, and poor 
financial performance. In addition, departure of 
busy outside director would produce positive 
abnormal returns of 1.33% on average significantly 
at the announcement. 
Jiraporn, Singh, and Lee (2009) examined 
1500 firms from 1999 to 2003 about corporate 
governance and director ability. They obtained the 
data from Investor Responsibility Research Centre 
in Wharton Research Service Centre, United States. 
The results indicated U-shaped relation between 
number of board seats and directors’ ability. The 
results provided evidence to the busyness 
hypothesis in which at lower levels of multiple 
board seats, directors holding more multiple 
directorships tend to serve on fewer board 
committees. However, on the higher levels of 
multiple directorships, the results supported the 
reputation hypothesis in which busy directors 
served on a higher number of committees. The 
results also suggest that board size and board 
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composition materially impact board committee 
assignments. 
We then moved to the review of the possible 
associated determinants of board effectiveness. 
Yermack (1996) examined a sample of 452 large 
U.S. industrial corporations between 1984 and 
1991 by using Tobin’s Q on the board size and its 
board effectiveness. The results indicated negative 
association between board size and firm value. The 
result was robust to numerous controls such as 
company size, industry membership, inside stock 
ownership, growth opportunities, and alternative 
corporate governance structures. Companies with 
small board showed favorable financial ratios as 
well as good CEO performance. 
Studies have found that the frequency of 
board meetings was an important determinant of 
company performance and the board’s ability.  If 
the board meeting frequency was reduced, the 
directors would have less time to discuss about the 
company issues properly. They might only rubber-
stamp management decisions. Vafeas (1999) 
examined the board meeting frequency and firm 
value for 307 firms in Unite States over the 1990 
to1994 period. The results showed that the number 
of annual board meetings was negatively related to 
market value. Nonetheless, when prior poor 
performance of the firm was incorporated in the 
model, the operating performance of the firm 
improved in the following years of abnormal board 
meeting. These improvements were most apparent 
for firms performing poor before such years and 
firms not engaged in corporate control transactions. 
Overall, the results suggested that board meeting 
frequency was an important determinant of 
company performance and the board’s ability. 
Mak and Kusnadi (2005) examined a sample 
of the 230 firms listed on the Singapore Exchange 
and Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. Each financial 
data, board composition, ownership structure, and 
other relevant data were collected for each firm for 
the 1999 or 2000 financial years.  They examined 
whether board size mattered with firm value by 
using Tobin’s Q. The results showed that the board 
size effect in which firm value was highest when 
board size was 5. Larger board seemed less 
effective as compared to smaller board. It should be 
pointed out that the board size of 5 was relatively 
small number in these two markets.  
Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) used about 
7,000 firms in United States from 1990 to 2004 to 
examine the corporate board structure, trends, and 
determinants. The results found that the board 
structure of firms was based on the costs and 
benefits of monitoring and advising. Strong 
relations between board structure and firm 
characteristics were shown. The board size was 
found to become smaller and more independent in 
the 1990s. Small firms indicated an apparent 
increase in board independence, whereas, large 
firms had more dramatic decrease in board size. 
Lwu Egwounwu (2010) reviewed existing 
literature on effectiveness of independent directors 
on the firm performance. Mixed evidence was 
found in which the effectiveness of independent 
directors was also influenced by organizational 
structural and culture factors.  Despite independent 
directors had improving corporate governance, it 
had not conclusively indicated better firm 
performance.  The studies in the west such as 
United States either showed no consistent 
relationship or no relationship at all between 
independent directors and firm performance.   On 
the other hand, studies done in the east, appeared to 
support the conventional wisdom that independent 
directors  produced positive firm performance. 
In Malaysia, the Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance (MCCG) was developed 
and approved by the high level Finance Committee 
on Corporate Governance (FCCG) in 2001. Ponnu 
(2008, p.218) indicated that “the Malaysian Code 
on Corporate Governance is the main cornerstone 
of the corporate governance reforms agenda in 
Malaysia. It provides guidelines on the principles 
and best practices in corporate governance and the 
direction for the implementation as well as charts 
the future prospects of corporate governance in 
Malaysia”.  Ponnu, (2008) further asserted that the 
companies which fully complied with MCCG 
showed better performance than the companies 
which had lower compliance. With respect to board 
independence, the results showed that increased of 
independent directors from below 33% to more 
than 33% indicated better firm performance than 
those companies whose proportion of independent 
director remained to less than 33%”. 
Despite the MCCG not being mandatory for 
the companies to comply, the listing requirements 
of Bursa Malaysia has incorporated parts of 
MCCG. For example, at least one third or two 
independent directors, whichever is higher, of the 
board should be independent directors for a public 
listed company that are listed in Bursa Malaysia. 
 
3. Data and Method 
 
This study concentrated on the board of directors of 
the constituents of the FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI 
for four years from year 2005 to 2008. FTSE Bursa 
Malaysia KLCI comprises the 30 largest companies 
in the Bursa Malaysia (Bursa Malaysia, 2010a).  
The Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance and KLSE listing requirements require 
the companies to reveal certain data in their annual 
reports. The sections of the annual reports which 
were relevant to this study were board of directors’ 
list, director’s profile, attendance of the directors 
and the statement on corporate governance. The 
data can be downloaded from Bursa Malaysia 
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website (Bursa Malaysia, 2010b). However, the 
annual reports of the companies which did not have 
sufficient information of the variables are excluded. 
Companies which had been listed or privatized 
after 2005 were excluded from this study. Also, the 
directors who were appointed in the middle of the 
financial year and were unable to attend at least 50 
percent of the board’s meetings were excluded 
from the analysis.  
This study used directors’ profile section of 
the annual reports to determine the number of 
directorships each director held as the KLSE listing 
requirements forced the companies to disclose the 
number of directorships each director served in 
public companies.  
 
3.1 The Dependant Variable: Directors’ 
Attendance 
 
The dependant variable of “directors’ attendance” 
is defined as the percentage of total board meetings 
in which a director was present.  
 
3.2 Multiple Directorships 
 
“Multiple directorships” is an independent variable 
and is defined as the number of outside 
directorships each director of each company held. 
 
3.3 Board Size 
 
Since the board size did not meet the normality 
assumption, for consistency and to reduce the 
distorting effects of outliers, as well as minimizing 
the problems that appeared when the normality 
assumption was violated, the variable “board size” 
was defined as the natural logarithm of the total 
number of the directors who sat in the board of 
directors meetings in each fiscal year, as stated in 
companies’ annual reports.  
 
3.4 Independent Directors 
 
The “independent directors” variable was 
determined as the percentage of the board of 
directors’ independent/outside directors in each 
fiscal year. Independent outside directors were 
described as directors who were not current or past 
employees of the firm, did not have significant 
business or family ties with management, nor had 
potential business links with the firm. 
 
3.5 Number of Annual Board Meetings 
 
Since the annual meeting variable was not normally 
distributed, to minimize the problems that came 
along the violation of normality assumption as well 
as consistency of the variables and to lessen the 
effects of outliers, the independent variable of 
“number of annual board meetings” was defined as 
the natural logarithm of the number of board 
meetings which had been held in a fiscal year, as 
stated in the companies’ annual report. 
 
3.6 Ethnicity of the Director 
 
Malaysia is a multiracial country and ethnicities 
play an important role in leading the firms. There is 
a recognizable capital segment division by ethnic 
lines in the Malaysian corporate environment. 
There are many ethnic groups in Malaysia; 
Bumiputra Malays, Chinese, Indians, Ibans, 
Kadazans, etc.; but from observing the public listed 
companies, their board memberships and share 
ownerships, there are two main ethnic groups who 
dominate much of the socio-economic activities 
and political policy making decisions: Bumiputra 
Malays and the Chinese. 
Chinese-controlled firms have contributed 
significantly to the economy of Malaysia. Listed 
private Chinese family-controlled companies are 
profit oriented and they use minimum costs of 
production to produce maximum output. Given this 
unique corporate environment of Malaysia and 
separation of bumiputra and non-bumiputra in it, 
this study measured the independent dummy 
variable of “race” and its potential relation to the 
absence of directors in the board meetings. The 
variable valued 0 if the director was non-bumiputra 
and 1 if the director was bumiputra. 
 
3.7 Age 
 
This research studied the association between the 
age of the director and its attendance in the board 
meetings by defining the independent variable of 
“age” which was defined as the natural logarithm 
of the age of the director who served in the board. 
Since age was seriously departing from normality, 
natural logarithm was used to minimize the 
problem. 
 
3.8 Regression Model 
 
This study used the percentage of directors’ 
attendance in the board meetings as the sole 
dependent variable, and number of multiple 
directorships, board size, and the percentage of 
independent directors, the number of annual 
meetings, age and race of the directors as the 
independent variables. The regression equation 
based on the dependent and independent variables 
is as follows: 
 
Director’s Attendance = a + b1 (Multiple 
Directorships) + b2 Ln (Board Size) + b3 
(Independent Directors) + b4 Ln (Annual Meetings) 
+ b5 Race + b6 Ln (Age) 
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The data of variables for year 2005 to 2008 
was collected on an individual basis and on the 
pooled basis. Descriptive statistics was employed.  
Besides, both cross-section and time-series 
analyses were used in order to capture the effect of 
control variables on directors’ attendance through a 
multiple regression methodology. The regression 
approach had been recommended in multiple 
directorships and used frequently in previous 
studies (Ferris et al., 2003; Fich and Shivdasani, 
2006).  
Assumptions of normality, linearity, 
homoscedasticity and multicollinearity were also 
tested before using the multivariate regression 
method to test the hypotheses. Multivariate 
regressions for each model were run for each year 
(2005-2008) as well as for the pooled data for all 
four years. No multicollinearity had been found 
between variables. 
 
4. Analyses and Discussions 
 
Descriptive statistics of the dependent and 
independent variables for the pooled sample, year 
2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 are shown in Table 1.  
The upward trend is consistent with the increase of 
the mean of the board size from 8.61 in 2005 to 
8.88 in 2008. The mean of the board size’s pooled 
sample for 2005-2008 is 8.74. 
On the other hand, the number of multiple 
directorships a director hold has experienced a 
decrease from 3.83 in year 2005 to 3.59 in year 
2006, 3.39 in year 2007 and 3.29 in year 2008. The 
mean of the number of multiple directorships for 
the pooled sample 2005-2008 is 3.52. Mean of the 
percentage of independent directors of the board 
for the pooled sample is 44.40%. While the mean 
for independent directors fluctuated throughout the 
sample period (2005 to 2008), generally it has risen 
from 44.5% in 2005 to 45.72% in 2008. 
The average number of annual meetings of the 
board grew from 8.27 in the year 2005 to 8.53 in 
year 2008 and the peak in year 2007 with 9.11 
annual meetings. The arithmetic average of the 
number of annual meetings of the pooled sample 
2005-2008 is 8.63. The mean age of the directors is 
also augmented by 2 years from 58.63 in year 2005 
to 60.11 in year 2008 with an upward trend. The 
mean age for the pooled sample is between 59 and 
60 years old. 
The percentage of Bumiputra directors of the 
participants of FTSE KLCI index has dropped from 
53.7% in 2005 to 49.8% in 2008 while it peaks in 
2006 with 54.5%. On the contrary, the percentage 
of non-Bumiputra directors has risen from 46.3% in 
2005 to 50.2% in 2008 with some fluctuations.  
Table 2 shows the distribution of the number 
of multiple directorships each director holds. The 
largest frequency, 17.36%, is for directors that hold 
no other directorships. This could be due to the fact 
that directorships in private and subsidiary 
corporations are not disclosed in the annual reports. 
About 88.62% of the directors hold six and less 
outside board seat. This shows the popularity of 
multiple directorships among Malaysian directors. 
The percentage of directors who hold zero 
directorships to six outside directorships remain 
more than 10% (17.36%, 10.80%, 11.03%, 13.10%, 
13.10%, 10.80%, 12.41% respectively), while it 
drops dramatically to 4.48% for directors who hold 
seven outside directorships. These frequencies 
show that the optimum amount of outside 
directorships among Malaysian directors is six. 
Approximately 4% of directors hold more than ten 
outside directorships. The highest number of 
outside directorships in the sample is 13 with a 
percentage of 0.23%. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
  All 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
N=870* 
2005 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
N=218* 
2006 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
N=213* 
2007 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
N=218* 
2008 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
N=221* 
Dependent variable1      
Directors’ Attendance  44.44% 
100% 
92.87% 
0.1115 
50.00% 
100% 
92.21% 
0.1195 
50.00% 
100% 
92.22% 
0.1166 
50.00% 
100% 
93.36% 
0.1051 
44.44% 
100% 
93.65% 
0.1042 
Independent variables1 
     
Multiple Directorships 0.00 
13.00 
3.52 
2.76 
0.00 
13.00 
3.83 
2.90 
0.00 
13.00 
3.59 
2.82 
0.00 
12.00 
3.39 
2.66 
0.00 
12.00 
3.29 
2.64 
 
Board Size 
 
5.00 
13.00 
8.74 
2.19 
 
6.00 
13.00 
8.61 
2.12 
 
5.00 
13.00 
8.61 
2.19 
 
5.00 
13.00 
8.85 
2.13 
 
5.00 
13.00 
8.88 
2.42 
 
Independent directors  
 
25% 
77.78% 
44.40% 
0.1033 
 
28.57% 
77.78% 
44.50% 
0.1238 
 
30.77% 
66.67% 
44.44% 
0.0934 
 
25% 
62.5% 
42.94% 
0.0966 
 
30.77% 
66.67% 
45.72% 
0.1010 
 
No. Annual meetings 
 
4.00 
23.00 
8.63 
4.52 
 
4.00 
17.00 
8.27 
4.40 
 
4.00 
18.00 
8.61 
4.59 
 
4.00 
23.00 
9.11 
5.15 
 
4.00 
16.00 
8.53 
4.10 
 
Age of  the director 
 
27.00 
87.00 
59.54 
10.32 
 
31.00 
84.00 
58.63 
10.24 
 
32.00 
85.00 
59.51 
10.30 
 
27.00 
86.00 
59.90 
10.52 
 
28.00 
87.00 
60.11 
10.21 
Race of the Director 
    Bumiputras (%) 
    Non-Bumiputras (%)     
 
52.3% 
47.7% 
 
53.7% 
46.3% 
 
54.5% 
45.5% 
 
51.4% 
48.6% 
 
49.8% 
50.2% 
* The number of board size samples, independent directors samples, annual meeting samples are 104 for the pooled samples 
and 26 for each year. 
** All the data extracted from annual reports of the companies in FTSE BMKLCI from year 2005 to 2008. 
Sources: 
1- Bursa Malaysia,  (2010b),  Annual Reports [Online], Retrieved from 
http://www.bursamalaysia.com/website/bm/listed_companies/company_announcements/annual_reports/index.jsp [2010, 
February 1-20]  
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Table 2. Distribution of Multiple Directorships 
 
Total sample (2005-2008)  
Number of 
multiple 
directorships* 
Frequency Percent (%) Cumulative  
Percent (%) 
0 151 17.36 17.36 
1 94 10.80 28.16 
2 96 11.03 39.20 
3 114 13.10 52.30 
4 114 13.10 65.40 
5 94 10.80 76.21 
6 108 12.41 88.62 
7 39 4.48 93.10 
8 18 2.07 95.17 
9 9 1.03 96.21 
10 8 0.92 97.13 
11 17 1.95 99.08 
12 6 0.69 99.77 
13 2 0.23 100 
Total 870 100 - 
* All the data extracted from annual reports of the participant companies. 
Sources: 
1- Bursa Malaysia, (2010b), Annual Reports [Online], Retrieved from http://www.bursamalaysia.com/website/bm/ 
listed_companies/ company_announcements/annual_reports/index.jsp [2010, February 1-20]  
 
The Pearson correlations are presented in Table 3 for the pooled samples 2005-2008. Table 4 shows Pearson correlations for 
2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008. As it is reflected in the tables, all the pair-wise correlations for all years are less than 0.80 and 
no multicollinearity between the variables detected4. Table 5 which is the collinearity statistics, shows the tolerances for all 
the independent variables which are greater than 0.1 and Variation Inflation Factors (VIFs) which are all lesser than 10. This 
confirms that there is no multicollinearity problem5. 
 
Table 3. Pearson Correlation Matrix for Independent and Dependent Variables for Pooled Samples (2005-2008) 
 
   
Attendan
ce 
Multiple 
Directorship
s 
Board 
Size 
Independent 
Directors 
Annual 
Meetings Race Age 
Attendance 1.000 0.028** -0.204** 0.182 0.019 0.042 0.076* 
Multiple 
Directorships 0.028 1.000 0.170** -0.008 0.103** 0.043 0.102** 
Board Size -0.204** 0.170** 1.000 -0.210** 0.214** 0.060 0.007 
Independent 
Directors 0.182** -0.008 -0.210** 1.000** 0.428** 0.092** 0.136** 
Annual 
Meetings 0.019 0.103** 0.214** 0.428** 1.000 0.207** -0.006 
Race 0.042 0.043 0.060 0.092** 0.207** 1.000 0.139** 
Age 0.076* 0.102** 0.007 0.136** -0.006 0.139** 1.000 
 
Notes: 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
                                                           
4
 When the Pearson correlation is more than 0.8, the multicollinearity problem may exists (Gujarati,2009). 
5
 According to Hair et. al., (1998), there would be no multicollinearity problem if tolerance for independent variables are greater than 0.1 
and VIFs are all smaller than 10. 
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Table 4. Pearson Correlation Matrix Independent and Dependant Variables for Years 2005 to 2008 
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2005 1.000       
2006 1.000       
2007 1.000       
Attendance 
2008 1.000       
        
2005 -0.054 1.000      
2006 0.030 1.000      
2007 0.112 1.000      
 
Multiple Directorships 
2008 0.061 1.000      
        
2005 -0.339 0.166 1.000     
2006 -0.161 0.171 1.000     
2007 -0.135 0.232 1.000     
 
Board Size 
2008 -0.189 0.137 1.000     
        
2005 0.227 0.065 -0.245 1.000    
2006 0.270 0.009 -0.121 1.000    
2007 0.139 -0.009 -0.173 1.000    
 
Independent Directors 
2008 0.069 -0.120 -0.295 1.000    
        
2005 -0.016 0.123 0.180 0.310 1.000   
2006 0.069 0.084 0.080 0.527 1.000   
2007 0.020 0.126 0.185 0.607 1.000   
 
Annual meetings 
2008 -0.011 0.099 0.398 0.306 1.000   
        
2005 0.055 0.058 -0.004 0.082 0.175 1.000  
2006 0.027 0.045 -0.004 0.117 0.225 1.000  
2007 0.010 0.027 0.100 0.107 0.194 1.000  
 
 
Race 
2008 0.086 0.030 0.147 0.074 0.247 1.000  
        
2005 0.059 0.192 0.021 0.205 -0.022 0.115 1.000 
2006 0.198 0.116 0.001 0.124 -0.021 0.142 1.000 
2007 -0.071 0.037 -0.006 0.058 -0.044 0.133 1.000 
 
 
Age 
2008 0.106 0.073 0.003 0.142 0.056 0.173 1.000 
 
Table 5. Collinearity Statistics 
  All 
Tolerance 
VIF 
2005 
Tolerance 
VIF 
2006 
Tolerance 
VIF 
2007 
Tolerance 
VIF 
2008 
Tolerance 
VIF 
Multiple Directorships 0.955 0.925 0.951 0.936 0.956 
 1.047 1.081 1.051 1.069 1.046 
Board Size 0.824 0.838 0.931 0.803 0.646 
 1.214 1.194 1.074 1.246 1.549 
Independent directors  0.701 0.761 0.676 0.539 0.674 
 1.426 1.313 1.480 1.856 1.484 
No. Annual meetings 0.687 0.794 0.659 0.522 0.618 
 1.455 1.260 1.518 1.914 1.617 
Race of  the director 0.937 0.953 0.927 0.938 0.910 
 1.067 1.049 1.079 1.066 1.099 
Age of the Director 0.942 0.897 0.936 0.962 0.943 
 1.062 1.115 1.068 1.040 1.060 
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Table 6 presents the results of regression analysis 
for the pooled samples (2005-2008), years 2005, 
2006, 2007 and 2008. The overall regression results 
seem to be significant. The F-values are in the 
range of 5.729 in 2005 to 10.784 for pooled data. 
All five models are significant for the pooled 
samples, as well as individual year of 2005 to 2008. 
The regression equation for the pooled samples 
(2005-2008) as shown in Table 6 is as follows: 
 
Directors’ Attendance = 0.920 + 0.002 (Multiple 
Directorships) - 0.083 Ln (Board Size) + 0.149 
(Independent Directors) - 0.003 Ln (Annual 
meetings) + 0.008 (Race) + 0.029 Ln (Age) 
 
The equation indicates that for every unit increase 
in the number of multiple directorships of a 
director, his presence in the board will increase by 
0.2% provided that other variables, board size, 
percentage of independent directors, number of 
annual meetings and age, remain constant. The 
same applies to independent directors, race and age 
which will increase the directors’ presence while 
other independent variables remain unchanged. 
However, an increase in the board size and the 
number of annual meetings reduces the percentage 
of attendance in the board. 
In the pooled samples, the p-value for board 
size and independent directors are less than 0.05 
(both are 0.00). This shows that board size and 
independent directors are the strong determinants 
of directors’ attendance. The R-square values 
reported in Table 6 are between 6.5 to 14 percent. 
This means approximately 6.5 to 14 percent of 
variation in directors’ attendance can be explained 
by all independent variables.  Schroeder, Sjoquist, 
and Stephan (1986) remarked “it is quite possible 
for all regression coefficients to be significantly 
different from zero, and yet the coefficient of 
determination may be very small.  If testing 
hypotheses about the regression coefficients is the 
aim of the study, the coefficient of determination 
should be considered only as additional 
information, not as the summary indicator of the 
quality of results” (p.56). Nau (2005) contended 
that an R-square of 10% or even as low as 5% may 
be considered as statistically significant in some 
applications e.g. predicting stock returns. 
Moreover, several previous empirical studies 
measuring the effects of multiple directorships have 
also reported that R-square values of lower than 
10% (Ahn, Jiraporn & Kim, 2010; Perry & Peyer, 
2005) and yet produced convincing results.  
Due to the strong significance of board size in 
determining the percentage of directors’ 
attendance, Table 7 presents the descriptive 
statistics of directors’ attendance in relation to the 
board size for the pooled sample. Panel A of Table 
7 indicates that the percentage of directors’ 
attendance reduces gradually when the board has 9 
members and above. The board size of 13 has the 
minimum attendance at 84.62% as the board size of 
7 corresponds to the maximum attendance at 96.36. 
To gauge a better understanding on the effect of the 
board size on directors’ attendance, we further 
divide the board size in two different groups: board 
size of 5 to 9, and board size of 10 to 13. It is clear 
from the Table that the board size of 5 to 9 has the 
higher attendance (94.47%) than another group 
(board size of 10 to 13) with 90.32%, respectively 
(see Panel B of Table 7).  The results show that 
board size of 5 to 9 appear to have higher board 
members’ attendance than a board size of 10 to 13. 
Given these results, the study would suggest the 
optimum board size of 9 or less.  
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Table 6. Regression of Directors’ Attendance and Independent Variables 
 
 All    2005    
R2 (%) 6.9    14    
F-value 10.687    5.729    
P-value 0.000    0.000    
         
 B 
Standard 
Error t sig B 
Standard 
Error t sig 
Constant 0.920 0.090 10.194 0.000 1.100 0.188 5.839 0.000 
Multiple directorships 0.002 0.001 1.638 0.102 -0.001 0.003 -0.330 0.742 
Board Size -0.083 0.016 -5.062 0.000 -0.150 0.035 -4.258 0.000 
Independent Directors 0.149 0.042 3.577 0.000 0.146 0.072 2.038 0.043 
Annual Meetings -0.003 0.009 -0.360 0.719 -0.003 0.017 -0.172 0.864 
Race 0.008 0.008 1.012 0.312 0.010 0.016 0.626 0.532 
Age 0.029 0.021 1.412 0.158 0.022 0.044 0.499 0.618 
         
 2006    2007    
R2 (%) 12.2    6.5    
F-value 4.753    2.449    
P-value 0.000    0.026    
         
 B 
Standard 
Error t sig B 
Standard 
Error t sig 
Constant 0.517 0.191 2.710 0.007 1.213 0.174 6.973 0.000 
Multiple directorships 0.002 0.003 0.541 0.589 0.006 0.003 2.297 0.023 
Board Size -0.062 0.032 -1.937 0.054 -0.056 0.033 -1.701 0.090 
Independent Directors 0.315 0.094 3.344 0.001 0.196 0.099 1.979 0.049 
Annual Meetings -0.013 0.019 -0.707 0.480 -0.019 0.018 -1.042 0.298 
Race -0.004 0.016 -0.239 0.811 0.006 0.014 0.445 0.657 
Age 0.105 0.044 2.396 0.017 -0.055 0.039 -1.421 0.157 
         
 2008        
R2 (%) 6.6    
F-
value 2.500     
   
P-
value 0.023     
         
         
 B 
Standard 
Error T sig     
Constant 0.915 0.172 5.321 0.000     
Multiple directorships 0.003 0.003 1.123 0.263     
Board Size -0.097 0.032 -3.013 0.003     
Independent Directors -0.035 0.085 -0.413 0.680     
Annual Meetings 0.014 0.019 0.741 0.459     
Race 0.019 0.014 1.332 0.184     
Age 0.050 0.039 1.269 0.206     
         
 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 8, Issue 2, Winter 2011, Continued - 2 
 
 
269 
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics of Directors’ Attendance in Relation to Board Size 
 
 
Panel A: Board Size 
 
Attendance 
 5 Mean 93.48% 
  Standard Deviation 0.1001 
 6 Mean 95.82% 
  Standard Deviation 0.0810 
 7 Mean 96.36% 
  Standard Deviation 0.0662 
 8 Mean 92.38% 
  Standard Deviation 0.1353 
 9 Mean 94.50% 
  Standard Deviation 0.0996 
 10 Mean 93.27% 
  Standard Deviation 0.0892 
 11 Mean 93.13% 
  Standard Deviation 0.0886 
 12 Mean 91.99% 
  Standard Deviation 0.1217 
 13 Mean 84.62% 
  Standard Deviation 0.1434 
Panel B: Board Size 
 
Attendance 
  (5 to 9) Mean 94.47% 
  Standard Deviation 0.1024 
 (10 to 13) Mean 90.32% 
 Standard Deviation 0.1204 
 
 
The reputation hypothesis posits that directors are 
inclined to have more outside directorships because it 
improves their experiences, helps them to build 
business networks and enhances their status. This 
study shows that about 60% of the directors have 
three or more outside directorships and about 88% of 
them have six outside directorships and lesser. This 
reflects the popularity of multiple directorships 
among Malaysian directors. These findings are 
consistent with the results of several studies (Fama, 
1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Ferris et al., 2003).  
The percentage of independent directors in a 
board also shows a relation with directors’ attendance 
in the meetings. As the percentage increases, the 
likelihood of the director’s absence in the board 
decreases. This is consistent with the some studies 
which advocate that the larger the percentage of 
independent directors in a board, the better the firm’s 
performance (Iwu-Egwuonwu, 2010).  
Although the common belief is when the 
number of annual meetings of a board increases, the 
directors tend to miss the meetings. However, this 
study finds no significant relation between the 
number of annual meetings and the percentage of 
director’s attendance in board meetings. At the same 
time, age and ethnicity of the director are also not the 
significant determinants of directors’ attendance in 
board meetings.  
 
4.1 Implications of the Study 
 
The results of regression analysis show that 
board size is the strongest determinant of directors’ 
attendance in the board with negative and high 
significant coefficients. The finding implies that in 
larger boards, directors tend to attend fewer meetings. 
Relatively larger boards affect inversely on directors’ 
concern on company issues and make it easy for 
directors to be absent from board meeting. Their 
absence is less noticeable and fewer responsibilities 
are entrusted to them. 
This study also finds the negative relation 
between percentage of independent directors in the 
board and directors’ attendance. As the percentage of 
independent directors in a board increases, the 
probability of directors’ absence falls. Boards with 
more independent directors are more efficient and 
produce better performance. The increase of 
independent directors in the boards not only improves 
the overall performance of the firms but also 
enhances the monitoring role of the directors. 
Despite the general belief that directors tend to 
be absent in boards which have large number of 
annual meetings, this study fails to provide evidence 
on the relation of number of annual meetings and 
directors’ absence. In addition, the number of 
multiple directorships of a director is also found to be 
unrelated to his or her absence in board meetings. 
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This study finds no evidence to support the busyness 
hypothesis.  
As the board size is the strong determinant of 
directors’ absence in board meetings, this study 
recommends companies to scrutinize and investigate 
the optimal board size to maximize the efficiency and 
the board’s productivity. As the optimal level for a 
board size differs from one company to another, this 
study recommends the companies to have boards 
with 9 or less members. This range is found to be the 
optimum board size with the least director’s absence. 
This result is quite consistent with recommendation 
of Jensen (1993) for board size of no more than 8 in 
United States. Generally, board of director, like any 
decision making board, the larger the board size, the 
greater the difficulties in decision making as well as 
coordination.  
Since the percentage of the independent 
directors have a positive effect on directors’ 
attendance in board meetings, this study recommends 
the companies to have more independent directors on 
their board to improve board effectiveness and firm 
performance. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This study finds the board size and the percentage of 
independent directors in the board as significant 
determinants for director absence. No significant 
relation between multiple directorships and directors’ 
attendance is found. This study also suggests for 
firms to have a board size with 9 or less to be more 
effective in supervision and monitoring. Future 
researchers may investigate not only the quantitative 
variables, but also the possible relation of qualitative 
variables (i.e. personal relationships, political 
network etc.) and directors’ absence. 
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SHARE TYPES AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT: EVIDENCE 
FROM CHINESE LISTED COMPANIES 
 
Yongqing Li, Jinghui Liu*, Ian Eddie** 
 
Abstract 
 
This study contributes to the literature on the ownership structure by investigating the effect of special 
share types on the practice of earnings management in China. Equity ownership in listed Chinese 
companies have five different types: state-owned shares, legal person shares, employee shares, A-shares, 
and B- & H-shares, which is a phenomenon unique to the Chinese equity market. Empirical analysis 
shows that different share types and mixed ownership structure significantly affects the company’s 
earnings management. Using a sample of 544 listed Chinese company-years, this study finds that the 
state-owned shares and legal person shares are positively associated with earnings management. 
However, the proportion of B- & H-shares is not related to earnings management. In addition, empirical 
results also show evidence in support of a positive relationship between the proportion of A-shares and 
earnings management. These findings indicate that transferral of more state-owned shares and legal 
person shares to the public can mitigate earnings management. However, because currently in China 
shares are still largely owned by the state or legal persons, the magnitude of earnings management may be 
maintained at a high level. In addition, due to tradable A-shares has a positive relation with earnings 
management, holding a large proportion of A-shares still cannot effectively constrain earnings 
manipulation, which suggests that China’s ownership structure reform may not be highly successful as 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) expected. In achieving a better corporate governance 
practice, further structure reform is essential. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A unique feature of ownership structure in Chinese 
listed companies is that many of them have five 
different types of equity shares: state-owned shares, 
legal person shares, employee shares, A-shares, and 
shares available to foreign investors. Based on the 
separation of ownership from control literature (Blair 
1995), Chinese different share types are expected to 
associate with earnings management. Although the 
literature on the relationship between Chinese special 
share types and management incentives is relatively 
unexplored, evidence suggests that there are some 
indirectly linkages between ownership structure and 
managerial incentives. Ding et al. (2007) using 
Chinese data find that ownership structure has a non-
linear impact on reducing earnings management. 
Firth et al. (2007) show that concentrated ownership 
structure has implications for the level of information 
asymmetry between managers and investors which 
influences the quality of earnings and managers’ 
accounting choices. Considering the mixed 
ownership structure is a unique phenomenon of 
Chinese listed companies, this study intends to 
examine whether various classes of shares have an 
association with earnings management and in what 
manner they are related to earnings management. 
The motivation of this study is drawn by the 
implicit assertion of the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) that earnings management can 
be mitigated through the ownership structure reform 
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). From the 
beginning of 1980s, China started the economic 
reform by privatisation of SOEs’ ownership and 
transferral of its economy from planned economy to 
market economy. According to the plan, small and 
medium size SOEs are gradually merged or 
privatized, while large SOEs are restructured to 
incorporated companies, and among these large 
SOEs, some are selected to be listed on Chinese stock 
exchanges. CSRC believes that these strategic 
arrangements can assist the restructured SOEs to 
separate their management from state ownership 
control and to further improve corporate governance 
mechanisms. However, this unique reformational 
approach has been admitted to benefit the setting up 
of modern enterprise system, whereas its 
effectiveness on improving the capability of 
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monitoring the quality of reported earnings is in 
doubt and need to be further investigated. 
Different share classes have the same claim and 
voting power, while their holders differ in terms of 
motivation, expertise and ability in monitoring 
companies’ management. The state, as the 
shareholder, can have conflict interests with their 
agents. For example, in order to meet requirements of 
the state, state representatives may collude with 
companies’ managers by misstatement of reported 
earnings. Legal persons, on the other side, have 
stronger incentives to maximise returns. However, 
they are partly controlled by the Chinese government 
and thereby may not be able to monitor the 
management independently as Western countries. 
Domestic A-shares holders usually are considered in 
a negative position in involving the governance 
process. Compared with other shareholders, each A-
share holder averagely holds a small proportion (less 
than 0.5%) of total shares outstanding. Therefore, it is 
difficult for these dispersive minority stockholders to 
perceive and constrain earnings management 
activities. B- & H-shares holders are considered to be 
the most intolerance shareholders in misstatement of 
reported earnings. They are not only well equipped 
by investment knowledge but also highly cautious in 
making their investment decisions. Accordingly, they 
may play a monitoring role on mitigating earnings 
manipulation. In general, various Chinese 
shareholders might not have the same response to 
manager’s opportunistic behaviour. As a result, this 
study argues that shareholders’ reaction on such 
behaviour should be reflected through their 
shareholding type and proportion of shares they hold. 
The relationship between different share types and 
earnings management is therefore investigated. 
This study selects sample companies that were 
transformed from SOEs and listed on Shanghai Stock 
Exchange from 2004 to 2007. Using a 544 company-
year sample, this study investigates whether different 
types of shares, in particular state-owned shares, legal 
person shares, A-shares, and B- & H-shares, have an 
association with discretionary accruals (proxy of 
earnings management). This study finds that the 
proportion of state-owned shares and legal person 
shares has a positive relation with discretionary 
accruals. However, this study obtains little evidence 
to support that B- & H-shares have a significant 
association with discretionary accruals. In addition, 
empirical results show evidence in support of a 
positive relation between the fraction of A-shares and 
discretionary accruals. These findings indicate that 
after the SOEs’ reform and listing on the stock 
market, earnings management activates can be 
mitigated by exhibiting different classes of shares in 
general. Nonetheless, in China, because shares are 
still largely owned by the state or legal persons, 
where these shares are not transferred to the public, 
the magnitude of earnings managements may be 
maintained at a high level. Moreover, as tradable A-
shares are positively associated with earnings 
management, higher proportion of A-shares indicates 
a higher level of earnings management, which 
implies that privatisation and institutional reform of 
SOEs might not be highly effective as CSRC 
expected. In order to improve corporate governance 
practices and the quality of earnings reported by the 
Chinese listed companies, further ownership structure 
reform is substantial. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
illustrates the Chinese institutional background. 
Section 3 reviews the existing literature and develops 
research hypotheses. Section 4 describes the method 
applied to measure earnings management and designs 
the research model. Section 5 shows the sample and 
data. Section 6 outlines empirical results. Section 7 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Institutional Background 
2.1 China’s capital market and SOEs 
reform 
 
The first Chinese stock company appeared in 1984 
(Ellman, 1988), but formal trading of shares did not 
start until early 1990s. After the establishment of 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) in December 1990 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in April 1991, 
the equity and shareholding system became a 
significant vehicle for ownership structure reform of 
SOEs (Xu & Wang, 1999). The CSRC was 
established in 1992 as the Chinese equivalent of the 
U.S. Securities and Exchanges Commission (SEC) to 
monitor and regulate the capital market. Since then, 
the Chinese securities market developed rapidly with 
the total number of listed companies increased from 
183 in 1993 to nearly 1600 in 2007. Table 1 shows 
the market capitalization and the number of 
companies listed on SHSE and SZSE over the period 
2004 to 2007. Market capitalization was about 
3,675,529 million Yuan in 2004 and reached 
62,714,088 million Yuan in 2007, an increase of 
almost 17 times within four years. In the same period, 
the number of listed companies has increased from 
1373 to 1530. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
SOEs were previously owned by the state and 
managed by various industrial departments of the 
central government or local governments. Before the 
enterprise reform in 1984, as all production and 
management decisions were made by governments, 
SOEs were operated as cost centres only (Gao, 1996). 
In the absence of market competition, the operation 
of most SOEs maintained at high costs and low 
productivity (Sun & Tong, 2003). The overall 
performance of SOEs had dropped significantly since 
the national economy was unified in 1960s. Chinese 
government has identified the problem and realised 
that such poor performance might attribute to the 
ownership structure, which gives rise to severe 
agency problems. On the one hand, managers were 
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nominated and controlled by the state and only 
compensated by the government’s salaries. Their 
personal interests were tied loosely to the company’s 
performance. As the reward scheme was rarely taken 
place, it is unlikely that managers had enough 
incentives to act their best interests on behalf of 
SOEs. On the other hand, the government was not 
able to establish effective monitoring system and 
incentive mechanism to encourage their managers to 
act on the government’s interests. Consequently, the 
government had ‘lost’ the essential control of their 
managers. Due to these twofold agency problems, 
Chinese government gradually restructured SOEs’ 
ownership formation, which included going public, in 
order to strengthen the ability of monitoring 
managers’ behaviour and more importantly to 
improve SOEs’ performance. 
 
2.2 Share types in China 
 
According to China Company Law (2005) 6  the 
shares of Chinese listed companies can be classified 
as non-tradable and tradable shares. Non-tradable 
shares cannot be traded on the security markets, 
which include state-owned shares, legal person 
shares, and employee shares. While tradable shares, 
including A-shares, B-shares, and H-shares, can be 
traded on the securities market. 
State-owned shares are solely held by the 
central government, local governments or another 
SOE. At the end of 1990s the central government 
declared that the ultimate owner of state-owned 
shares is the State Council. State-owned shares 
cannot be traded but are transferrable upon CSRC’s 
approval. Legal person shares are owned by domestic 
institutions, including shareholding companies, non-
bank financial institutions and SOEs that have at least 
one non-state owner. Like state-owned shares, legal 
person shares cannot be traded and are transferable 
only upon CSRC’s approval. Employee shares, a 
unique feature of the Chinese shareholding system, 
differ from an employee share plan in Australia. They 
are collectively owned by employees of a company 
including workers and managers, usually purchased 
at a substantial discount (Xu & Wang, 1999) and 
represented accumulated profits retained by these 
workers and managers under the Contract 
Responsibility System (Qi et al., 2000). Employee 
shares are not tradable at the time of listing and are 
managed by either an investment management 
committee or a labour union (Xu & Wang, 1999). 
Because most listed companies do not have employee 
shares and they typically account for a small fraction 
of total shares outstanding, this study excludes 
employee shares from the investigation. 
                                                           
6
 The Company Law of the People’s Republic of China, 
Zhong hua ren min gong he guo gong si fa, adopted by the 
Eighteenth Session of the Standing Committee of the Tenth 
National People’s Congress, 27 October 2005, effective 1 
January 2006. 
A-shares are held and traded most by 
individuals, although some are now being held by 
institutional investors (e.g. insurance companies and 
investment funds). There is no restriction on the 
number of shares traded and the minimum holding 
period. The Company Law (2005), however, requires 
that total A-shares of a company account for no less 
than 25% of total outstanding shares when a company 
makes its initial public offering (IPO). A-shares are 
the only type of shares can be traded by domestic 
investors at the two stock exchanges. B-shares are 
available to foreign investors and some authorized 
domestic securities companies. Recently, individuals 
in China have been allowed to trade B-shares if they 
can access to foreign currencies. The market for B-
shares is separated from the A-shares market. They 
are denominated in U.S. dollars on the SHSE and in 
Hong Kong dollars on the SZSE. Only about one-
eighth of the listed companies which can meet the 
more stringent requirements have issued B-shares. H-
shares are similar to B-shares in nature except that 
they are listed and traded on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange (HKSE). The issuing of H-shares has 
increased in recent years because the Chinese 
government encourages transformed SOEs to list on 
developed stock markets (Xu & Wang, 1999). 
Table 2 represents the ownership structure of 
the sampling Chinese companies in SHSE from 2004 
to 2007. It can be found that typical Chinese listed 
companies have a mixed ownership structure. The 
state, legal persons and domestic individual investors 
are the dominant groups of shareholders which hold 
83.93% of total shares outstanding on average. As 
shown in the table 2, most of listed companies do not 
have employee shares, and even if they do, those 
shares on average account for less than 0.1% of total 
shares outstanding. B- & H-shares represent 15.88% 
of total shares on average which indicates that foreign 
investors are the minority group in Chinese listed 
companies. The proportion of total non-tradable 
shares decreased from 65.8% in 2004 to 54.66% in 
2007 as CSRC intends to transfer more state-owned 
shares to the public. Although domestic listing of A- 
and B-shares is slightly decreased, the total number 
of tradable shares is increased from 34.2% to 
37.49%. This implies that the overseas listing is 
growing rapidly. As shown in table 2, the proportion 
of H-shares has almost tripled within only 4 years 
which increased from 7.22% to 26.89%. The overall 
changes of the sampling shareholding structure 
indicate the fact that although the proportion of 
tradable shares has increased, about two thirds of 
shares are still largely controlled by the state or 
Chinese legal persons. Listed companies in China 
still exhibit a concentrated shareholding structure. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
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3. Earnings Management Literature and 
Hypotheses Development  
 
There exists a substantial literature on whether and 
how ownership structure affects earnings or earnings 
management where most of them are limited to 
studies based on developed economies. Early study 
by Grossman and Hart (1980) have investigated that 
if a company’s ownership is widely dispersed, no 
shareholder has adequate incentives to monitor the 
management closely because the existing benefit is 
too small to cover the monitoring costs. However, 
Shleifer & Vishny (1986, 1997) find that if the 
ownership is concentrated, it may enhance corporate 
earnings performance because controlling 
shareholders, in a position to harvest a substantial 
portion of the gains from an improvement in the 
firm’s performance or a takeover, have an incentive 
to monitor the manager’s behaviour. Nevertheless, 
they also report that when controlling shareholders 
hold a large portion of shares (e.g. 95% of total 
outstanding shares) and can effectively control the 
company, they might collude with managers to 
manage earnings at the expense of minority 
shareholders. 
Following Shleifer and Vishny’s study, Fan and 
Wong (2002) further confirms that the degree of 
ownership concentration can affect the nature of 
contracts and create different agency problems 
between managers and various groups of 
shareholders. They suggest that the major agency 
problem may shift away from manager-shareholder 
conflicts to conflicts between the controlling owner 
and minority shareholders. Because the shareholding 
structure of Chinese listed companies is also 
concentrated, Ding et al. (2007) argue that the 
relationship between Chinese shareholding 
concentration and earnings management exhibits a 
non-linear, inverted U-shape pattern. They also 
suggest that privately-owned companies tend to 
maximise accounting earnings more than state-owned 
companies. In brief, these previous studies have 
shown some evidence that earnings management is 
associated with various groups of shareholders 
especially in the circumstance that companies’ 
ownership structure is highly concentrated. 
Considering that the state, legal persons and domestic 
individual investors are the China’s dominant groups 
of shareholders, this study expects that these groups 
of shareholders might influence earnings 
management activities in Chinese context. 
Many Chinese listed companies are transformed 
from SOEs which were previously owned by the 
state. After the IPO of SOEs, shareholder’s rights of 
the state are managed by either local offices of the 
Bureau of State Assets Management (BSAM) of the 
central government or the finance bureaus of local 
governments (Qi et al., 2000). This transformation 
does not change the status that the state as the owner 
dominates the listed SOEs. Generally, the state relies 
on control over the board to influence managers’ 
decisions and to protect its own interests (Gao, 1996). 
However, this institutional setting creates some 
agency problems which may not improve the 
effectiveness of monitoring role by the state as a 
shareholder.  
Local BSAM and finance bureau officials who 
are appointed to hold the state-owned shares do not 
have sufficient incentives and skills to monitor 
management behaviour. On the one hand, although 
they represent the right of the substantial stockholder 
of a listed company, these Chinese officials are 
reluctant to involve in the supervision process 
without any benefit, because their compensation is 
paid by government which is not linked to the 
performance of the listed companies. On the other 
hand, most of local BSAM and finance bureau 
officials have a very limited knowledge of financial 
techniques and investment practices but these are 
fundamental to oversee the management especially in 
the circumstance that the public officials stand for the 
block holders. Chinese managers, therefore, may 
utilize their professional knowledge to adjust the 
reported earnings without any perceiving. 
Consequently, it is difficult for these government 
officials to detect if managers manipulate the 
earnings. In addition, as the de facto controller, these 
representatives may have conflict interests with the 
state that they represent, which give rise to certain 
agency problems. State representatives are more 
likely to collude with companies’ managers to 
manipulate the reported earnings in order to meet the 
state requirements. In that way, both of them can not 
only enjoy the benefit of a large stream of cheap 
direct state investments but also avoid the 
investigation conducted by the state. Ding et al. 
(2007) has found that the opportunistic earnings 
management activities are more serious in state-
controlled listed companies than in private-controlled 
listed companies. One reason they argued is that 
Chinese managers, with the helping hand of the 
government officials are largely insulated against 
pressure from the true owners. Because transforming 
from SOEs to public companies may give rise to 
agency problems and cannot effectively constrain the 
earnings management, this study expects that 
earnings management is positively affected by the 
level of state ownership. The first hypothesis is then 
developed: 
 
H1: The proportion of shares held by the state (state-
owned shares) is positively associated with earnings 
management. 
 
Legal persons are commercial entities who usually 
have independent accounting systems and are 
separated from the government departments. In 
general, legal persons have been considered to have a 
stronger motivation to maximise profit. Qi et al. 
(2000) find that legal person shareholders in China 
can help improve the company performance, 
especially when they are dominant stockholders. 
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However, no other than that legal persons are charged 
with making profits, some of them may have 
incentives to assist managers to overstate the reported 
earnings. Chen et al. (2006) has argued that legal 
person shareholders may collude with managers to 
engage in unlawful practices in order to maximise 
profit, whereas their motivation in monitoring 
managers is relatively weak. Firth et al. (2007) also 
show that legal persons as the dominant shareholders 
are related to a lower quality of reported earnings. In 
addition, the institutional settings of Chinese legal 
persons also trigger the difficulty of governing 
earnings management. Legal person shareholders are 
a heterogeneous group of investors comprising 
mainly corporatized SOEs, partially privatized 
shareholding companies, and state-owned non-bank 
financial institutions. It is the fact that many Chinese 
legal persons are partially owned by the state and are 
often considered as business agencies or enterprises 
of the state that help starting up the public companies 
either by giving permission to operate or by 
providing public resources (Tenev & Zhang, 2002; 
Tian, 2000). Thus, in China, a unique phenomenon is 
that legal persons are largely controlled by the state. 
As the agencies of the state, as well as the 
shareholders of the listed companies, Chinese legal 
persons are lack of independence in monitoring 
companies’ managers and their interests would not 
inconsistent with the state. Thus, this study 
formulates the following second hypothesis: 
 
H2: The proportion of shares held by the legal person 
(legal person shares) is positively associated with 
earnings management. 
 
The majority of A-shares holders are Chinese 
individuals. They have been considered in a 
disadvantageous position in the business operation 
and decision making, especially in participating in the 
governance process. Xu and Wang (1999) have 
reported that almost no individual investors can be a 
member on the board of directors or on the 
supervisory board in Chinese listed companies. They 
also find that A-shares shareholders’ participation in 
the shareholder annual conference is low. Therefore, 
Chinese A-shares holders have little abilities to 
oversee the operations of Chinese listed companies. 
In addition, most individual investors hold A-shares 
only for short-term speculative gains instead of long-
term investment intentions. This unique phenomenon 
has been verified by the extremely high turnover 
rates. In 2004, the turnover rate for A-share market is 
308%, while it is almost 1000% in 2007 (The Fact 
Book of Shanghai Stock Exchange 2005, 2008). Xu 
and Wang (1999) also show that the average A- 
shares holding period in China is only one or two 
months, whereas it is eighteen months in the U.S. 
Such a short investment time horizon makes 
individual investors lack of intentions to monitor the 
management closely and gives rise to the classic free-
rider problem (Xu & Wang 1999; Qi et al., 2000). 
Thus, A-shares holders are considered to have little 
incentives to monitor earnings quality. Since the A-
share holders have limited capability and incentives 
to oversee the management, this study assumes that 
they should positively affect earnings management 
activities. Accordingly, the following third 
hypothesis is developed: 
 
H3: The proportion of shares held by the individual 
investor (A-shares) is positively associated with 
earnings management. 
 
B- & H-shares investors are predominantly foreign 
individual and institutional investors who have 
stronger incentives to boost returns of their 
investments. However, foreign shareholders are 
facing various risks to invest in Chinese listed 
companies such as lack of participation in corporate 
governance, regulation differences and culture 
diversities. Therefore, they are more prudential and 
alert in investment decisions compared to domestic 
investors. Unlike domestic individual investors 
whose investment opportunities are restricted by 
domestic stock market, foreign investors can also 
choose their stock portfolio on the international 
developed stock market. Foreign investors’ demand 
is more elastic than that of domestic investors 
(Gordon & Li, 2003). Therefore, they are less tolerant 
with earnings manipulation and willing to invest in 
the companies with high quality of earnings. In 
addition, the cost of manipulating earnings is 
potential high for companies issuing B- & H- shares. 
Chinese listed companies which issue B- or H-shares 
are regulated not only by Chinese mainland 
accounting rules but also by Hong Kong accounting 
standards or other overseas accounting regulations.7 
These companies must report earnings according to 
more rigid accounting standards (e.g. International 
Financial Reporting Standards) than Chinese 
domestic rules. Their financial statements are 
required to be audited by internationally recognized 
accounting firms (e.g. Big 4). For avoiding the 
punishment by overseas regulators and maintaining 
higher investment credibility, those companies are 
less likely to conduct opportunistic accounting 
practices and usually adopt more conservative 
accounting policies when preparing their financial 
statements. Because B- & H-shares holders are 
intolerant with opportunistic earnings practices and 
companies issuing B- & H-shares are fear of 
punishment by overseas regulations, this study 
accordingly develops the following fourth 
hypothesis: 
 
H4: The proportion of shares held by the foreign 
investor (B- & H-shares) is negatively associated 
with earnings management. 
 
                                                           
7
 Hong Kong adopts International Financial Reporting 
Standards since 2005. 
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4. Measurement of discretionary accruals 
and the Model 
4.1 Measurement of discretionary 
accruals 
 
The proxy for earnings management in this study is 
discretionary accruals. Manipulation of accruals is a 
popular instrument for opportunistic earnings 
management because it generally has no direct cash 
flow consequences and is difficult to detect (Peasnell 
et al., 2005). There is a large body of literature using 
accruals to measure earning management (e.g. Firth 
et al., 2007; Klein, 2002; Kothari et al., 2001; Park & 
Shin, 2004; Xie et al., 2003). Companies may have 
some other ways to manipulate earnings, such as 
cutting back on staff training, reducing expenses on 
advertising or selling idle equipment whereas these 
alternative approaches are costly and have negative 
effects on companies’ future cash flows (Peasnell et 
al., 2005). According to previous studies, this study 
assumes that in Chinese context, manipulation of 
accounting accruals is likely to be the first choice for 
opportunistic earnings management, prior to 
managers looking at more costly approaches. 
This study estimates discretionary accruals using 
the modified-Jones model. Several models have been 
proposed in the literature for calculating the 
discretionary accruals. The most frequently used 
models are the Jones (1991) model and the modified-
Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995). Dechow et al. 
(1995) present evidence that the modified-Jones 
model is more powerful at detecting sales-based 
earnings management than the Jones model. Because 
the total accounting accruals are assumed to be the 
sum of both non-discretionary and discretionary 
components, in order to get the discretionary 
accruals, this study firstly follows the modified-Jones 
model  to estimate the non-discretionary component 
(equation (1) and (2)). Specifically, the modified-
Jones model coefficients are estimated using the 
following OLS regression: 
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where tikTA ,  is total accruals for company i in industry k in the year t, 1, −tikA  is total assets in the year t-1, 
tikREV ,∆
 is the change in revenue, tikPPE ,  is the gross value of property, plant and equipment. tk ,0β , tk ,1β , and 
tk ,2β
 are regression coefficients, and tike ,  (assumed i.i.d.) is the regression residual.8 
Then non-discretionary accruals (NDA) can be calculated as follows: 
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where tk ,0
∧β
, 
tk ,1
∧β
, and tk ,2
∧β
 are OLS regression estimates of tk ,0β , tk ,1β , and tk ,2β  respectively, obtained from 
equation (1), and tikREC ,∆  is the change in receivables. Adjusting tikREC ,∆  by tikREV ,∆  is designed to 
eliminate the conjecture tendency of the Jones Model to measure discretionary accruals with error when managers 
exercise discretion in manipulating earnings through revenue recognition (Dechow et al., 1995). 
  Finally, the remaining portion of the total accruals can be obtained as the discretionary accruals (DA): 
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8
 Industries are classified according to the ANZSIC codes (Australia codification roughly similar to the U.S. SIC one). 
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Since the analysis does not depend on the direction of 
the accruals but on the magnitude of the accruals, this 
study therefore uses absolute value of discretionary 
accruals as the proxy for the combined effect of 
income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings 
management. Other studies using this measure are 
Bartov et al. (2000), Becker et al. (1998), Firth et al. 
(2007), Klein (2002), and Warfield et al. (1995). 
 
4.2 The model 
 
The cross-sectional pooled regression method is 
employed to test the associations between different 
share types and earnings management. The dependent 
variable is the discretionary accruals which have been 
calculated by equation (3). The model which is 
adopted to test the hypotheses H1 to H4 is as follows: 
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where STATE represents the proportion of shares 
held by the state. Holding other explainable variable 
effects constant, this study predicts that 1δ  will be 
positive due to inefficiency of the state as an owner in 
monitoring the earnings management. LP denotes the 
proportion of shares held by Chinese legal persons. 
Because shares held by legal persons might not 
difference compared with that they are held by state, 
this study predicts that 2δ  will be positive. 
ASHARE stands for the proportion of A-shares 
which are held by domestic individual investors. As 
individual investors who hold a small proportion of 
total shares have either less capability or little 
incentive to monitor management behaviour, this 
study therefore predicts that 3δ  will be positive. 
BSHARE is the proportion of B-shares and HSHARE 
is the proportion of H-shares. Note that companies 
issuing B- and/or H-shares are more conservative and 
fear of punishment by overseas regulators, they 
possibly maintain lower level of earnings 
management. Therefore, 4δ  and 5δ  should be 
negatively correlated with discretionary accruals. 
As examining the association between share types 
and earnings management, it is necessary to allow for 
other factors that may also influence earnings 
management. Consistent with previous literature (e.g. 
Firth et al, 2007; Klein, 2002; Park & Shin 2004), 
this study uses the leverage ratio (LEVERAGE) and 
the natural logarithm of the net sales (LSIZE) to 
control for the influence of capital structure and 
company size respectively. The intensity of 
conflicted interests between debtors and shareholders 
increases when financial leverage rises. Generally, 
the higher the leverage ratio, the greater the risk that 
some of debt covenants might be breached and the 
higher cost of debt financing. Similarly, in China, as 
debt increases, listed companies may tend to adjust 
earnings upwards in order to avoid debt-covenant 
violation and an increase in financing cost. This study 
then expects that a positive relation should be 
observed between discretionary accruals and 
leverage ratio. China’s larger companies are usually 
followed actively by the external capital markets. 
Therefore, larger listed Chinese companies are less 
likely to be able to hide discretionary accruals than 
smaller companies. Accordingly, this study expects 
that the company size has a negative association with 
discretionary accruals. 
 
5. Sample and Data 
 
The sample period covers from 1 January, 2004 to 1 
January, 2008. Share types information, ownership 
data and other financial data are collected from 
annual reports issued by Chinese listed companies. 
The primary sample used in this study consists of 160 
Chinese companies listed on the SHSE. The 
minimum number of observations for any given 
industry-year combination is 8. There are total 120 
Chinese domestic companies listing on HKSE, 52 of 
them also simultaneously issue A-shares on the 
SHSE. In order to maximise sample size, this study 
includes all of the 52 listed companies as the sample. 
Similarly, in the SHSE, only 54 companies have 
issued B-shares during the sample period and all of 
them are included in this study. Finally, the 
remaining 54 samples are random selected from 
companies listed on SHSE. After deleting companies 
whose accounting data is unavailable, and those who 
are operating in finance sectors, the actual sample 
used in the study is 136.9 Table 3 summarizes how 
the sample is constructed. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Table 4 presents the ownership structure of the 
sample companies at the end of 2007 by industries. 
The proportion of state ownership is highest in the 
mining industry (80.22%) and lowest in the 
communication services industry (1.54%), while the 
proportion of legal person shares is the opposite. This 
has shown that most resources companies are directly 
controlled by Chinese government even they are 
listed on the stock market. Chinese legal persons 
dominate communication services. However, because 
                                                           
9
 In line with other literature (e.g. Firth et al., 2007; Klein, 
2002; Park & Shin 2004; Peasnell et al., 2005) this study 
excludes companies in the finance sector because they have 
fundamentally different accruals processes that are not 
captured by the modified-Jones model. 
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legal persons are themselves partially owned by the 
state, the telecommunication companies are still 
indirectly controlled by the state. Companies in the 
wholesale and retail trade industry issued the most 
shares to domestic individual investors (43.52%); 
those in the mining industry issued the least (2.3%). 
This implies that in China, listed retail companies 
have the most dispersed ownership structure. They 
usually are financed from domestic individual 
investors rather than the state, legal persons, or 
foreign investors. The social work industry (16.5%) 
and transport and storage industry (24.67%) are 
found to be the two largest groups raising capital 
from foreign investors. This indicates that many 
listed companies in those two sectors are likely 
governed not only by domestic accounting rules but 
also by overseas regulations. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics of the sample 
companies. Of the 640 company-years initially 
targeted, this study obtains 544 usable observations. 
Panel A shows descriptive statistics of the dependent 
variable. Discretionary accruals range from -2.1912 
to 0.9505 with a median of 0.0062. The average 
discretionary accrual is 0.0057. Testing for whether 
the mean discretionary accrual is different from zero 
outputs a p-value of 0.3109 and a sign test yields 
54% of discretionary accruals are positive. This 
indicates that there is no evidence showing that 
earnings management activities have a systematically 
increasing or decreasing trend. This result reflects 
that the selected sample is a relatively random sample 
with respect to earnings management incentives. 
Because of this quality, using the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals as the proxy of earnings 
management is appropriate, which is also supported 
by other studies (e.g. Bartov et al., 2000; Becker et 
al., 1998; Firth et al., 2007). Panel B reports 
descriptive statistics of independent variables. It can 
be seen that state-owned shares, legal person shares, 
and A-shares are accounting for 21.79%, 30.1%, and 
29.01% respectively. It further verifies that the state, 
legal persons and individual investors are the 
dominant groups of shareholders in Chinese listed 
companies. B-shares and H-shares on average consist 
less than 10% of total shares outstanding. This 
indicates that overseas investors still share small 
proportion of Chinese stock market even though in 
the recent years many domestic companies have 
listed on HKSE. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
6. Empirical results 
6.1 Multivariate models 
 
A number of research hypotheses have been 
developed for testing the association between share 
types and earnings management. The testing results 
are reported in table 6 for non-tradable shares and 
table 7 for tradable shares. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Column (i) and (iii) of table 6 present the results for 
hypothesis H1. The estimated coefficients on STATE 
are positively related to the discretionary accruals at 
the 5% and 1% level, respectively. These findings are 
consistent with the hypothesis, which confirm that 
companies with more state-owned shares maintain a 
relatively high level of earnings management. It can 
be seen that even reforming the SOEs, agency 
problems might still exist between the state and their 
representatives and/ or between representatives and 
managers. As discussed above, due to these agency 
problems, manipulating earnings becomes a popular 
instrument by the management to make up their 
performance and meet shareholders’ requirements. 
To examine the association between the proportion of 
legal person shares and earnings management, this 
study also regresses two models and the empirical 
results are reported in column (ii) and (iii) of table 6. 
Consistent with hypothesis H2, the estimated 
coefficients on LP are statistically positive and 
significant at the 10% and 1% level. These empirical 
results indicate that in China the extent of earnings 
management is higher in a listed company with more 
legal person shares. These results also confirm that 
Chinese legal person shareholders are not very 
different from state shareholders. In certain extent, 
legal persons are indirectly owned and controlled by 
the state. Sun et al., (2002) in examining the effect of 
ownership structure on companies’ performance also 
argues that the state-owned shareholders and legal 
person shareholders essentially have the same 
tendency. It can be seen that no matter non-tradable 
shares are held by state or by legal persons, 
companies issuing more these types of shares have a 
higher possibility to maintain a higher level of 
earnings management and the quality of their 
reported earnings should be lower. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Hypothesis H3 states a positive association between 
the proportion of A-shares and earnings management. 
Column (i) and (iv) of table 7 reports the empirical 
results for this hypothesis. As predicted, the 
estimated coefficients on ASHARE are positively 
correlated to the discretionary accruals at the 10% 
and 5% level, respectively. These results confirm that 
Chinese listed companies issuing more shares to 
Chinese domestic individual investors would increase 
the possibility of manipulating reported earnings. It is 
possible, because Chinese domestic investors rarely 
involve in the corporate governance process, 
managers can utilize this limitation to 
opportunistically represent companies’ reported 
earnings. As in an inefficient governance system, it is 
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unlikely that these managers can be detected when 
they manipulate earnings. Therefore, managing 
earnings turn into a favourite method adopting by 
Chinese managers. This finding is consistent with 
several previous studies (e.g. Ding et al., 2007; Qi et 
al., 2000; Wong et al., 2004; Xu & Wang, 1999). 
The impact of other two types of tradable shares is 
described in hypothesis H4 which predicts that both 
of them are negatively associated with earnings 
management. Columns (ii), (iii) and (iv) of table 7 
show the results. The estimated coefficients on 
BSHARE and HSHARE are both negative but not 
statistically significant. These results have not 
completely support the hypothesis and indicate that 
foreign investors may not constrain companies to 
conduct opportunistic accounting practices. These 
findings further demonstrate that in China even 
foreign investors have the ability and intention to 
oversee the accounting information, due to the small 
proportion of shares they hold, they cannot 
effectively intervene in company’s reporting 
procedure. Furthermore, although Chinese listed 
companies issuing foreign shares are regulated by 
more rigid accounting standards, they are not 
substantially influenced by overseas listing status. 
Chinese domestic accounting standards and company 
laws still play the dominant role in regulating 
earnings reporting process. This is also consistent 
with Firth et al.’s (2007) findings which have argued 
that Chinese listed companies with B- or H-shares do 
not have impact on the quality of reported earnings. 
Both table 6 and table 7 has reported the results for 
control variables. The overall sign of control 
variables are consistent with the prediction. The 
coefficients on company size are negative and 
significant (p < 1%) in all the regressions, consistent 
with the notion that larger Chinese companies are 
more closely scrutinized than smaller companies. 
However, the coefficients on capital structures are 
significant in column (i) of table 6 (p < 10%) and 
column (ii), (iii) and (iv) of table 7 (p < 10%), 
indicating Chinese companies tend to increase their 
earnings when they face a high debt-to-equity ratio 
but due to the lenders’ monitoring, the intensity has 
been controlled. 
 
6.2 Additional tests 
 
To check the robustness of the results, this study 
conducts two sensitivity tests. In particular, this study 
uses NONTRADABLE and TRADABLE as the 
experimental variables to test the effect of non-
tradable shares (the state-owned shares and legal 
person shares) and tradable shares (A-, B- & H-
shares) on earnings management. This study argues 
that the state-owned shareholders and legal person 
shareholders would not be different in governing the 
earnings reporting process and therefore, their joint 
effects on earnings management should be consistent 
with the results shown in table 6. Similarly, for total 
tradable shares, due to A-shares are the dominant 
group their collective effects on earnings 
management should be positive and significant, too. 
Table 8 provides the estimated coefficients and p-
values for the additional tests. The empirical results 
with specification are almost identical to those 
reported in the table 6 and table 7. The proportion of 
total non-tradable shares are positively related to 
earnings management which confirms that 
maintaining a large proportion of non-tradable shares 
would lead to a high level of earnings management 
and transferring more shares to the share market is 
essential. However, total tradable shares are 
positively associated with earnings management. This 
empirical result implies that simplified transferring 
more shares to the A-share market cannot fully 
achieve the goal of effectively mitigating earnings 
manipulation, while transferring (or issuing) more 
shares to the B- & H-share market seems to be 
significant. Briefly, empirical results of additional 
test are robust and further confirm that in China more 
extensive ownership structure reform is fundamental. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 8 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
As Chinese listed companies have unique ownership 
structure, this study developed four hypotheses to 
analysis whether different classes of shares can affect 
earnings management. In particular, this paper 
examines whether the state-owned shares, legal 
person shares, A-shares, and B- & H-shares are 
related to earnings management. Empirical tests use 
data in the annual report of Chinese listed companies 
from 2004 to 2007. Discretionary accruals are 
considered in absolute value as the proxy for the 
magnitude of earnings management. This study finds 
that earnings management are positively associated 
with the proportion of the state-owned shares and 
legal person shares. In addition, the proportion of A-
shares is found to be associated with higher level of 
earnings management. Although the proportion of B- 
& H-shares has negative effect on earnings 
management, the influence is not significant. 
These findings make several contributions to the 
ownership structure reform in Chinese corporate 
governance system. Firstly, this study conducts 
analysis on a sample of large, publicly traded Chinese 
companies with unique ownership structure that is 
remarkable different with those of Western countries. 
Therefore, the empirical results can be used as 
evidence to provide suggestions to Chinese 
regulatory body on aspects of curing agency 
problems between shareholders and managers. 
Secondly, this paper contributes to the literature on 
discussions of the relationship between ownership 
structure and earnings management. With more state-
owned shares and legal person shares, companies are 
found to maintain a higher level of earnings 
management. Therefore, for mitigating earnings 
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manipulation, Chinese listed companies are suggested 
to transfer more shares to the stock market. 
Nevertheless, this study also finds that more A-shares 
can increase the level of earnings management. 
Accordingly, reforming corporate governance 
structure is becoming critical and complex. Only 
relaying on change of ownership structure is 
insufficient to achieve a great improvement in 
governance practice. Finally, these findings have 
several policy implications. CSRC can adopt more 
rigid accounting standards and governance 
mechanisms to oversee mangers’ opportunistic 
accounting practices. The government, on the other 
hand, can allow more foreign investors enter into 
Chinese stock market because those investors has 
been found that they are more experienced in 
monitoring and reporting process. 
  Caution is needed as interpreting the results. First, 
the Chinese context is perhaps unique, and this may 
have caused factors found to be significant in other 
settings to be insignificant in this test. This 
uniqueness implies that the findings may not apply to 
other countries, even for ones at similar stages of 
economic development. Second, it is suggested that 
there might be endogenuity of ownership in transition 
economies. That is institutional owners can buy 
shares in better performing companies and leave all 
poorly performing ones in the hands of the 
government. This study argues that this is not likely 
in China, because the government has the control 
over which company is to be listed and how many 
shares remain in the hands. In China, legal persons 
have less power to select companies than the 
government. Nonetheless, this issue must be tested in 
future studies. Third, this study chooses a clean and 
perhaps well-structured ownership group of 
companies as the sample. Thus sampling procedure 
suffers unavoidably sample selection bias. Therefore, 
the results might apply only to large and former state-
owned corporations. 
In order to improve the understanding of 
earnings management in Chinese listed companies, 
future researchers may expand this study to explore 
more theoretical aspects, as well as refining the 
existing research methodology from statistical 
perspectives. For example, this study excluded the 
financial sector from the analysis given that other 
studies have found that its earnings management 
differs substantially from other sectors. Hence, 
further studies could focus on the financial sector to 
examine who monitors earnings management and 
how well they do so. Additionally, further research 
could extend this study by examining the association 
between earnings management and Chinese 
managerial ownership. At present, managers in 
Chinese listed companies are allowed to receive 
shares or options as a form of compensation which is 
not permitted before. Thus, examining whether 
managerial ownership of Chinese listed companies 
can affect earnings management is a valuable 
research topic. 
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Appendices  
 
 
Table 1. Market capitalization and number of listed companies 
 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 
Panel A: Market capitalization (million Yuan) 
 3675529  3219021  8890946  62714088  
SHSE A-shares 2571407  2285607  7111795  56849727  
 B-shares 30 027 24 006 49 443 134160  
SZSE A-shares 1059527 895447 1699601 5609046 
 B-shares 44595 37967 79550 121155 
Panel B: Number of listed companies 
 1373 1377 1421 1530 
SHSE Companies with A-share 827 824 832 850 
 Companies with B-share 54 54 54 54 
SZSE Companies with A-share 522 531 566 657 
 Companies with B-share 56 55 55 55 
Note: Panel A shows the total market capitalization of A-shares and B-shares and Panel B presents the number of 
listed companies on the SHSE and SZSE. 
Source: Data in this table were obtained from the Fact Book of Shanghai Stock Exchange 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 
and the Fact Book of Shenzhen Stock Exchange 2007. 
 
Table 2. Ownership structure (percentage) in Shanghai Stock Exchange 
 
Share type 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average 
Total non-tradable 65.8 64.02 64.89 54.66 62.34 
State-owned shares 52.81 50.85 36.12 37.85 44.41 
Legal person shares 12.9 13.13 28.75 16.8 17.9 
Employee shares 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.04 
Total tradable 34.2 35.98 35.11 44.67 37.49 
A-shares 25 26.95 17.33 17.18 21.62 
B-shares 1.98 1.91 0.9 0.6 1.35 
H-shares 7.22 7.12 16.88 26.89 14.53 
Note: This table represents the average ownership for five different types of investors across 136 listed companies 
on the SHSE. 
 
Table 3. Sample used in analyses 
 Company Observations 
Initial sample for 2004-2007 160 640 
Insufficient industry-year sample (9) (36) 
Banking companies (8) (32) 
Insurance companies (3) (12) 
Missing financial reports (4) (16) 
Final sample 136 544 
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Table 4. Ownership structure of sample companies by industry 
 
 No. STATE LP ASHARE 
BSHAR
E HSHARE 
Communication services 8 1.54% 61.52% 36.69% 0.00% 0.00% 
Construction 12 43.26% 18.78% 18.50% 3.20% 12.17% 
Electricity, gas & water supply 9 35.12% 22.66% 18.21% 2.74% 16.38% 
Manufacturing 63 28.03% 24.66% 25.94% 6.15% 14.93% 
Mining 14 80.22% 1.45% 2.30% 0.07% 14.80% 
Transport and storage 13 35.45% 22.12% 15.29% 2.25% 24.67% 
Social work 9 15.23% 38.72% 29.55% 16.50% 0.00% 
Wholesale and retail trade 8 28.06% 19.26% 43.52% 7.53% 0.00% 
Notes: Industries are classified according to the ANZSIC codes; STATE is the proportion of state-owned shares; 
LP is the proportion of legal person shares; ASHARE is the proportion of A-shares; BSHARE is the proportion of 
B-shares; HSHARE is the proportion of H-shares. 
 
Table 5.  Descriptive statistics on the sample companies 
 
 Min Max Median Mean Std.dev. 
Panel A: Dependent variable 
Discretionary accruals (DA) -2.1912  0.9505  0.0062  0.0057  0.1402  
Abs (DA) 0.0001  2.1912  0.0389  0.0672  0.1223  
Panel B: Independent variables 
STATE 0 1 0.0384  0.2179  0.2586  
LP 0 0.8375  0.3181  0.3010  0.2543  
ASHARE 0 1 0.2967  0.2901  0.2030  
BSHARE 0 0.5434  0 0.0976  0.1667  
HSHARE 0 0.5007  0 0.0699  0.1317  
LSIZE 5.3350  8.9565  6.5808  6.6316  0.6192  
LEVERAGE 0.0337  6.7004  0.5183  0.5280  0.3245  
Notes: Abs is the absolute value; STATE is the proportion of state-owned shares; LP is the proportion of legal 
person shares; ASHARE is the proportion of A-shares; BSHARE is the proportion of B-shares; HSHARE is the 
proportion of H-shares. LSIZE is the natural logarithm of the net sales; LEVERAGE is the leverage ratio. 
 
Table 6. Pooled regression analysis of absolute values of discretionary accruals (DA) on non-tradable 
shares 
 
  (i) (ii) (iii) 
Variable Expected sign Coefficient (P-
value) 
Coefficient (P-
value) 
Coefficient (P-
value) 
STATE + 0.0159  (0.0364)**  
0.01248 
(0.00)*** 
LP +  0.0412 (0.065)* 
0.0136 
(0.00)*** 
LSIZE - 
-0.0137  (0.00)*** 
-0.0309 
(0.002)*** 
-0.0318 
(0.00)*** 
LEVERAGE + 0.0169 (0.0807)* 
0.0173 
(0.2493) 
0.0175 
(0.2493) 
INTERCEPT 0.2665  (0.00)*** 
0.2618 
(0.00)*** 
0.2622 
(0.00)*** 
Notes: The pooled sample provides 544 observations, representing 136 Chinese listed companies; The White 
Cross-section or Cross- section SUR (PCSE) method is used to correct cross section heteroskedasticity and 
correlated period effect; * Significant at a level of 10%; ** Significant at a level of 5%; *** Significant at a level 
of 1%. 
 
Table 7. Pooled regression analysis of absolute values of discretionary accruals (DA) on tradable 
shares 
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  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Variable Expected 
sign 
Coefficient                                 
(P-value) 
Coefficient
(P-value) 
Coefficient (P-
value) 
Coefficient 
(P-value) 
ASHARE + 0.0106 
 (0.073)*   
0.0649 
(0.0414)** 
BSHARE -  -0.0007   (0.9697)  
0.06243 
(0.5637) 
HSHARE -   -0.0213 (0.4208) 
-0.2498 
(0.2431) 
LSIZE - -0.0287 (0.00)*** 
-0.0312 
(0.00)*** 
-0.0332 
(0.00)*** 
-0.0327 
(0.00)*** 
LEVERAGE + 0.0186  (0.274) 
0.017 
(0.0903)* 
0.0176  
(0.10)* 
0.0174 
(0.098)* 
INTERCEPT 0.2447  (0.00)*** 
0.265  
(0.00)*** 
0.2769  
(0.00)*** 
0.27 
(0.00)*** 
Notes: The pooled sample provides 544 observations, representing 136 Chinese listed companies; The White 
Cross-section or Cross- section SUR (PCSE) method is used to correct cross section heteroskedasticity and 
correlated period effect; * Significant at a level of 10%; ** Significant at a level of 5%; *** Significant at a level 
of 1%. 
 
Table 8. Estimate coefficients and p-values for additional models 
  (i) (ii) 
Variable Expected sign Coefficient (P-value) Coefficient (P-value) 
NONTRADABLE + 0.0131 (0.0756)*  
TRADABLE +  0.0329 (0.085)* 
LSIZE - -0.0319 (0.00)*** -0.0283 (0.00)*** 
LEVERAGE + 0.0174 (0.2822) 0.0182(0.0743)* 
INTERCEPT  0.263(0.00)*** 0.2303(0.00)*** 
Notes: The pooled sample provides 544 observations, representing 136 Chinese listed companies; The White 
Cross-section or Cross- section SUR (PCSE) method is used to correct cross section heteroskedasticity and 
correlated period effect; * Significant at a level of 10%; ** Significant at a level of 5%; *** Significant at a level 
of 1%. NONTRDABLE is the proportion of state-owned shares and legal person shares; TRADABLE is the 
proportion of A-shares, B-shares and H-shares. 
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THE MANAGEMENT PROCESS OF PROJECT RISK IN 
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Abstract 
 
As enterprises need to remain financially viable and competitive in a business environment 
which changes continuously, projects are of prime importance to assist the transformation 
process. Executive managers should therefore play a proactive role by handling project risks 
during the project life cycle to ensure the successful completion of projects.  
The objective of this research embodies the improvement of financial decision-making 
concerning the management of project risk. To achieve this objective, attention is paid, 
amongst others, to the project life cycle, the importance, duration and re-evaluation of the 
phases of the management process of project risk, the techniques used to identify, as well as 
analyse project risks, and alternative response strategies used when handling project risk. The 
various aspects mentioned will be addressed by means of a literature study and an empirical 
survey.  
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1. Introduction and objective of 
the research  
 
Enterprises have to be continuously 
transformed in order to remain financially 
feasible and competitive in an ever-changing 
business environment. Projects are needed to 
assist in the transformation process to achieve 
the desired business objectives and a 
sustainable competitive advantage (Frame, 
2002:3).  
Projects, however, are subjected to risks, 
which are particular circumstances of which 
the probabilities of occurrence and the possible 
alternatives are known and can be usually be 
measured (Diacon & Carter, 1992:4). This 
highlights the proactive role which risk 
management should play in the management 
process of project risk by handling the risk 
(Munns & Bjeirmi, 1996:84; Olsson, 
2007:746). The lack of proper risk 
management may lead to project failure 
(Royer, 2000:6). According to Scharf 
(2009:53), a too small role allocated to risk 
management is often an important limitation in 
the management process of project risk.  
When a project is executed successfully, 
despite the risks, it should provide a unique set 
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of benefits to the enterprise, ranging from the 
development of the technical skills of the 
organisation to obtaining an attractive return 
on the capital employed (Kerzner, 2006:23). It 
is, however, important that the allocation of 
resources should be done in a proper and 
responsible manner to provide a satisfactory 
product or service at the end of the project life 
cycle (Turner, 2000:65).  
The objective of this research embodies 
the improvement of financial decision-making 
concerning the management process of project 
risk. In order to achieve this objective, this 
research focuses on the management process 
of project risk by highlighting, amongst others, 
the project life cycle, the importance, duration 
and re-evaluation of the phases of the 
management process of project risk, the 
techniques used to identify, as well as analyse, 
project risks and alternative response strategies 
used when handling project risk. The success 
of projects depends mainly on the manner in 
which project risks are managed. The various 
aspects of this topic will be addressed by 
means of the following literature study and 
empirical survey.  
 
2. The project life cycle  
 
As a project is a unique package of 
possibilities, it should have a sequence of 
activities and tasks to achieve specific 
objectives, deadlines and funding limits 
(Kerzner, 2006:2). In order to achieve its 
goals, a project has to go through the four 
stages, viz. (Chapman & Ward, 2003:17-24; 
Melton, 2007:7):  
• The conceptualisation stage entails the 
identification of the product or service which 
will eventually be provided, as well as the 
benefits anticipated from the product or 
service.  
• The planning stage embodies the design 
of the product or service, the planning of the 
execution of the project, together with the 
allocation of resources.  
• The execution stage focuses on the actual 
production of the product or the development 
of the service.  
• The termination stage has three goals in 
mind, namely the delivery of the product or 
service, the review of the process in order to 
avoid that the same mistakes are repeated 
when other projects are undertaken, as well as 
providing adequate support for the product or 
the service rendered.  
3. The management process of 
project risk  
 
Project risk management is a broad concept. 
Several processes have been developed to 
assist in the effective and systematic 
management of risks, with the intention of 
ultimately improving project performance. 
These processes include the PRAM (Project 
Risk Analysis and Management) process 
which was developed in the mid 1990s as a 
guide to risk management within projects 
(Chapman & Ward, 2003:65). Another guide 
for managing project risks appeared in 1998, 
namely the RAMP (Risk Analysis and 
Management of Projects) process, and in 2000 
the Project Management Institute introduced a 
substantial standard for managing project risks 
called the PMBOK (Project Management 
Body of Knowledge) guide (Chapman & 
Ward, 2003:65).  
To manage project risk through its life 
cycle, the management process primarily 
focuses on the following five consecutive 
managerial phases:  
 
(1) Risk identification represents the 
first managerial phase, involving the identify-
cation of risks to simplify decision-making 
(Edwards & Bowen, 2005:103). There are 
various techniques to assist in the 
identification of project risks. The HAZOP 
(Hazard and Operability studies) technique as 
well as the FMECA (Failure Mode and Effects 
Critically Analysis) technique both need the 
inputs of experts and are most effective in 
fairly simple flow processes that are of linear 
kind (Edwards & Bowen, 2005:105). The 
Delphi technique relies on the judgement and 
experience of experts and can be time 
consuming and expensive if the experts need 
to be compensated. (Kerzner, 2006:724). 
Brainstorming is a technique used in a group 
context to identify risks (Silvers, 2008:36). 
The group can consist of any number of 
participants and should preferably include the 
project team members, higher level of 
management and stakeholders. Although it is 
time consuming and requires firm leadership, 
brainstorming has the advantage of covering a 
wide variety of risks (Silvers, 2008:36). 
Documentation review involves re-examining 
documentation such as budgets, job 
descriptions, contracts, inspection reports, 
marketing plans, production schedules, 
emergency plans, insurance policies and 
personnel policies (Silvers, 2008:36). This 
technique should assist in exposing areas and 
activities of concern. The Work Breakdown 
Structure technique can be used in 
combination with the Gap analysis (Silvers, 
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2008:38). Gap analysis is an analytical tool 
used to identify inconsistencies or missing 
components in the plans of the project which 
could lead to a potential risk. The Work 
Breakdown Structure technique is a swift and 
cost-effective technique, but may limit the 
range of potential threats identified. SWOT 
analysis is also an analytical tool that 
distinguishes the strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats of the project 
(Silvers, 2008:37). Although the strengths and 
opportunities can lead to positive risks, more 
attention should be given to the risks that 
might occur due to the weaknesses and threats. 
The Fault Tree analysis examines the 
underlying effects of every occurrence by 
developing a fault tree of events (Edwards & 
Bowen, 2005:108). Fault Tree analysis applies 
the same principle as a family tree and traces 
each event to its origin. Event Tree analysis 
also creates a tree of events but are the 
opposite of fault tree analysis in the sense that 
inductive reasoning are used to examine the 
consequences of every event (Edwards & 
Bowen, 2005:108).  
The identification phase, however, does 
not only involve the search for sources of risk, 
but also includes the categorisation of those 
risks (Chapman & Ward, 2000:383). 
According to Kerzner (2006:725) the 
predictable external project risks can mainly 
emerge from economic risks (such as interest 
rate, inflation rate and foreign exchange rate 
risks), while the unpredictable external project 
risks usually surface from natural, political and 
competitive risks. Internal project risks may be 
technical of nature according to Kerzner, or 
may be financial or human resource risks.  
 
(2) Risk analysis occurs when the 
probability, impact and duration of the 
identified risks are determined (Edwards & 
Bowen, 2005:11). This can happen by means 
of quantitative models or can be based on 
human judgement (Frame, 2002:85). The 
methodologies used to analyse the components 
of risks include, amongst others, Risk Scales, 
Risk Mapping matrixes, the Delphi technique 
and Influence diagrams. It is of utmost 
importance to use well known and systematic 
methods to ensure accurate results (Kerzner, 
2006:721). An effective guide to articulate the 
probability of an event is by positioning the 
risk on a five point Likert interval scale using 
descriptions like rare, unlikely, possible, likely 
and almost certain (Edwards & Bowen, 
2005:117). The impact of an event may be 
described in terms of cost, although the loss 
may not necessarily be in monetary terms. 
Assessing the impact of a risk may be done by 
using a five point Likert scale with intervals 
like insignificant, minor, moderate, major and 
catastrophic (Edwards & Bowen, 2005:119). 
The third component of risk is the duration of 
exposure to the risk. The evaluation of the 
duration is once again done using a five point 
Likert interval scale. The period of exposure 
can be described as short term, medium-short 
term, medium term, medium-long term and 
long term (Edwards & Bowen, 2005:121). 
 
(3) Risk prioritisation involves the 
conversion of the risk analysis to a 
corresponding risk level (Kerzner, 2006:721). 
The prioritisation of a risk is therefore based 
on the probability, impact and duration of that 
risk, as described in the previous section. An 
illustration of the decision-making process is 
depicted as a cube where the horizontal side 
represents the probability of the risk (ranging 
from low to high probability), the vertical side 
represents the impact of the risk (ranging from 
small to large impact), and the depth of the 
cube representing the duration of the risk 
(ranging from short to long duration). Figure 1 
illustrates the decision-making process 
concerning the prioritisation of risks.  
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Figure 1. Decision-making process concerning the prioritisation of risks 
 (Source:  Adapted from Edwards & Bowen, 2005:114) 
 
 
The position of a particular risk within the 
cube will therefore indicate its risk level, for 
example a small impact, low probability, short 
duration risk may indicate a low risk level, 
compared to a large impact, high probability, 
long duration risk which may be assessed as a 
high level of risk. All the risks must thereafter 
be prioritised according to the acceptability of 
the various risk levels to a particular enterprise 
to ensure that the various risks are addressed in 
a suitable order according to the importance or 
degree of urgency (Silvers, 2008:38).  
 
(4) The response strategies to risks can 
entail a number of alternatives, for example 
risk avoidance, risk reduction, risk transfer or 
risk retention, to name only a few (Edwards & 
Bowen, 2005:129-130; Frame, 2002:77 & 87). 
Risk avoidance is the most severe response 
strategy by considering the possibility to 
abolish the project entirely to avoid the 
negative impact of risks. Only when the 
expected extent of the risks is of an extreme 
nature, will this response strategy be 
contemplated. Risk reduction represents an 
approach of balancing the extent of the risk 
with the expected benefits, by trying to 
mitigate the extent of the risk. Risk transfer 
implies that an enterprise may transfer the 
actual business activities or the detrimental 
financial impact of the risks to other 
enterprises, by paying the enterprises to bear 
the risk. By applying risk retention, an 
enterprise is merely accepting the possible 
negative impact of the risks. Planning the 
application of the responses to the various 
risks, may lead to the emergence of secondary 
sources of uncertainties, initiating the 
reiteration of the management process of 
project risk from the risk identification phase 
(Chapman & Ward, 2003:105). According to 
Lester (2007:71) it is advisable to keep a risk 
register where each risk, the applicable 
response strategy and the employee 
responsible for the execution thereof are 
recorded.  
 
(5) The monitor and control phase 
follows on the response strategies to ensure 
that effective risk handling actions are taken 
when necessary (Frame, 2002:87; Kerzner, 
2006:747). It is recommended that trigger 
points are established for every risk, where the 
activation of a trigger will initiate the 
predetermined response plan (Silvers, 
2008:32). Monitor and control are ongoing 
activities while a project is in progress.  
The five consecutive phases to manage 
project risk must be applied to the entire 
project life cycle. This will increase the ability 
of an enterprise to manage risks on all levels 
during the project life cycle (Edwards & 
Bowen, 2005:95). Furthermore, it will prevent 
that risks are overlooked in earlier stages of 
the life cycle of a project, which may have 
more fatal consequences when they emerge 
during later stages (Chapman & Ward, 
2003:20).  
 
4. Research methodology  
 
It was already stated that the objective of this 
research embodies the improvement of 
financial decision-making pertaining to the 
management process of project risk. It is 
therefore of prime importance to obtain the 
view of the market leaders in South Africa on 
the research topic, which provides the actual 
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frame of mind of the companies concerned. 
The empirical sample consisted of the top 20 
listed South African companies based on their 
annual turnover for 2008 (Financial Mail, 
2009). They are the market leaders of the 
South African business environment and are 
considered to set an example for the 
enterprises in South Africa. As South Africa is 
a developing country with an emerging market 
economy, the empirical results should also be 
valuable to enterprises in similar countries.  
The literature study was used to construct 
a questionnaire, which was sent with covering 
letters to the executive managers who are 
responsible for the management of project risk 
at the 20 companies. Five of them replied that 
they are not involved in projects at all, due to 
the fact that they only control financial 
investments and that the research topic 
therefore did not apply to them. The actual 
sample was thus decreased to 15 companies. 
After following up, 12 completed 
questionnaires were available. The response 
rate is consequently equal to 80%. The 
empirical results obtained are discussed in the 
next part of this paper.  
 
5. Empirical results  
 
The empirical results are presented in the 
following sections:  
 
5.1 The importance of the phases 
of the management process of 
project risk  
 
Table 1 contains the importance of the five 
phases of the management process of project 
risk according to the respondents.  
 
 
 
Table 1. The importance (in terms of the monetary amounts involved) of the phases of the management 
process of project risk, as perceived by the respondents 
 
The phases of the 
management process of 
project risk  
Extremely 
important 
Highly 
important 
Moderately 
important 
Little 
important 
Not 
important 
Risk identification  10 2    
Risk analysis  7 5    
Risk prioritisation  7 3  2  
Response strategies  8 3 1   
Monitor and control  7 5    
 
In order to obtain a clear depiction of how 
important the respondents perceive the five 
phases of the management process, different 
weights were assigned to the responses. The 
various phases were thereafter ranked in a 
declining order of importance. The application 
of weights was possible as it was explicitly 
stated on the questionnaire that the five point 
Likert interval scale used, forms a continuum 
whenever it was applied (Albright, Winston & 
Zappe, 2002:224-229 & 245).  
Where applicable in this research paper, 
the following weights were assigned to the 
responses received from the respondents:  
 
 Assigned a weight of 5 for: Extremely important / More than 9 days / Always  
 Assigned a weight of 4 for: Highly important / 7 to 9 days / Very 
often  
 Assigned a weight of 3 for: Moderately important / 4 to 6 days / Sometimes 
я 
 Assigned a weight of 2 for: Little important / 1 to 3 days / Seldom  
 Assigned a weight of 1 for: Not important / Less than 1 day / Never  
 
The weighted responses on the importance of 
the phases of the management process of 
project risk as perceived by the respondents, are 
shown in Table 2.  
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Table 2. The weighted responses on the importance of the phases of the management process of project 
risk as perceived by the respondents, in a declining order of importance 
 
Total 
weighted 
score 
calculated 
Declining 
order of 
importance 
The phases of the management process of project risk  
58 1 Risk identification  
55 2 Risk analysis  
55 2 Response strategies  
55 2 Monitor and control  
51 5 Risk prioritisation  
 
While the identification of risk is perceived to 
be the most important phase of the 
management process of project risk, the 
following three phases are equally important. 
They are the phases of risk analysis, response 
strategies, as well as monitor and control. It is 
interesting to notice that the first four phases in 
the declining order of importance are also in a 
logical sequence. The prioritisation of risk is 
considered by the respondents to be the phase 
of the management process which is least 
important.  
 
5.2 The duration of the phases of 
the management process of project 
risk  
 
The duration of the five phases of the 
management process of project risk is 
addressed in Table 3.  
 
 
Table 3. The duration in total working days (not necessarily on a continuous basis) spent on the phases 
of the management process of project risk, as perceived by the respondents 
 
The phases of the manage-ment 
process of project risk  
Less than 
1 day 
1 to 3 
days 
4 to 6 
days 
7 to 9 
days 
More 
than 9 
days 
Risk identification  1 6 2 2 1 
Risk analysis  2 5 1 3 1 
Risk prioritisation  6 4  1 1 
Response strategies  4 5  1 2 
Monitor and control  1 4 3 1 2 
Note: One of the respondents did not provide answers to all the alternatives.  
 
The responses of the 11 respondents who 
provided answers to all the alternatives accor-
ding to Table 3 were weighted as discussed 
previously, and the weighted responses are 
shown in Table 4. It should be kept in mind 
that “more than 9 days” has a score of five, 
while “less than 1 day” has a score of only 
one.  
 
Table 4. Weighted responses on the duration in total working days (not necessarily on a continuous basis) 
spent on the phases of the management process of project risk, in a declining order of duration 
 
Total 
weighted 
score 
calculated 
Declining 
order of 
duration 
The phases of the management process of project risk. 
32 1 Monitor and control  
31 2 Risk identification  
31 2 Risk analysis  
27 4 Response strategies  
22 5 Risk prioritisation  
Note: As one of the respondents did not provide answers to all the alternatives of Table 3, the  weighted responses are 
based on the answers of the 11 companies who did answer all the  alternatives.  
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The monitor and control phase has the highest 
weighted score and thus receives the most 
working days. Risk identification and risk 
analysis are the phases which receive the 
second most working days according to the 
respondents. It should be mentioned that the 
prioritisation of risks receives the lowest 
number of working days which corresponds 
with the results of Table 2 where this 
particular phase of the management process 
was also considered by the respondents to be 
the phase which is least important. It is 
interesting to note that the response strategies 
phase receives less working days than risk 
analysis as well as monitor and control, even 
though these phases are ranked as equally 
important in Table 2.  
 
5.3 The frequency of the re-
evaluation of the phases of the 
management process of project risk  
 
The frequency with which the respondents re-
evaluate the phases of the management process 
of project risk is provided in Table 5.  
 
Table 5. The responses on the frequency of the re-evaluation of the phases of the management process of 
project risk, as perceived by the respondents 
 
The phases of the 
management process of 
project risk  
Always Very often Sometimes Seldom Never 
Risk identification  4 7 1   
Risk analysis  4 4 3 1  
Risk prioritisation  2 3 5 2  
Response strategies  3 6 3   
Monitor and control  5 3 3   
Note:  One of the respondents did not provide answers to all the alternatives. 
 
Eleven respondents provided answers to all the 
alternatives which appear in the preceding 
table. These responses were weighted as 
described previously and the weighted 
responses are depicted in Table 6.  
 
Table 6. Weighted responses on the frequency of the re-evaluation of the phases of the management 
process of project risk, in a declining order of frequency 
 
Total 
weighted 
score 
calculated 
Declining 
order of 
frequency 
The phases of the management process of project risk. 
47 1 Risk identification  
46 2 Monitor and control  
44 3 Response strategies  
43 4 Risk analysis  
37 5 Risk prioritisation  
Note:  As one of the respondents did not provide answers to all the alternatives of Table 5, the weighted responses are 
based on the answers of the 11 companies who did answer all the alternatives.  
 
It is important to notice that the first as well as 
the final phase of the management process of 
project risk are most frequently re-evaluated, 
while the response strategies and risk analysis 
are also frequently re-assessed. It seems that 
risk prioritisation is not so often re-evaluated 
as the other four phases of the management 
process of project risk. As risk identification is 
the particular phase which is most frequently 
re-assessed, it is appropriate that the 
techniques which are applied in this phase 
receive due attention in the next section.  
 
5.4 The techniques used to 
identify possible project risks  
 
As it is important to identify project risks, the 
following table shows how frequently the 
techniques are used.  
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Table 7. The responses on the frequency of the techniques used to identify possible project risks, as 
perceived by the respondents 
 
Techniques Always Very often Sometimes Seldom Never 
HAZOP (Hazard and 
Operability studies) 
2 2 3  5 
FMECA (Failure Mode and 
Effects Critical Analysis) 
1 2 2 2 5 
Delphi technique 2 3 5  2 
Brainstorming  5 7    
Documentation review 4 7 1   
WBS (Work Breakdown 
Structure) 
2 3 3  3 
Gap analysis 2 5 2 1 2 
SWOT analysis 5 3 3 1  
Fault Tree analysis 1  6 3 2 
Event Tree analysis 1  5 4 2 
Note:  One of the respondents did not provide answers to all the alternatives. 
 
The responses of the 11 respondents who 
answered all the alternatives of the preceding 
table, were consequently weighted by using 
the weights that were previously discussed. 
The weighted responses appear in Table 8.  
 
 
Table 8. Weighted responses on the frequency of the techniques used to identify possible project risk, in a 
declining order of frequency 
 
Total 
weighted 
score 
calculated 
Declining 
order of 
frequency 
The techniques used to identify possible project risk  
48 1 Brainstorming 
47 2 Documentation review 
44 3 SWOT analysis 
36 4 Gap analysis 
35 5 Delphi technique  
34 6 WBS (Work Breakdown Structure) 
31 7 HAZOP (Hazard and operability studies) 
28 8 Fault Tree analysis 
27 9 FMECA (Failure Mode and Effects Critical Analysis) 
27 9 Event tree analysis 
Note:  As one of the respondents did not provide answers to all the alternatives of Table 7, the weighted 
responses are based on the answers of the 11 companies who did answer all the alternatives. 
 
According to the preceding table, 
Brainstorming is the technique most often 
used to identify project risk. As Brainstorming 
is applied in a group context, it is time 
consuming, but a variety of risks can evolve 
due to the contribution of the different project 
members, higher level of management and 
other stakeholders. By re-examining available 
documentation concerning various functional 
areas in an enterprise, the application of the 
Documentation review has the ability to draw 
attention to a range of areas and activities of 
concern. The technique which is third in line 
concerning the frequency used to identify 
project risks, is the SWOT analysis. This 
technique focuses on the strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats of an 
enterprise, where the weaknesses and threats 
should receive special attention.  
Although some of the techniques are used 
more often than others to identify project risks, 
it is important to notice that each one of the 10 
techniques are used by the market leaders of 
the South African business environment. The 
executive managers of the business community 
should therefore have adequate knowledge and 
skills to apply these 10 techniques, which 
should be to the benefit of the business 
community at large.  
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5.5 The techniques used to 
analyse possible project risks  
 
Enterprises can utilise various techniques to 
analyse project risks which were identified. 
Table 9 provides the responses on the 
frequency of the techniques used to analyse 
possible project risks, as perceived by the 
respondents.  
 
The responses were once again weighted to 
obtain a clear picture of the results. This was 
done as previously described. The weighted 
responses on the frequency of the techniques 
used to analyse possible project risks appear in 
the following table.  
 
 
It is clear from Table 10 that three techniques 
are almost equally popular in practice. They 
are the Risk Scales, Delphi technique and the 
Risk Mapping matrixes. Emphasis should 
therefore be placed on these three techniques 
when enterprises are analysing possible project 
risks.  
 
 
5.6 Response strategies used for 
handling project risks 
 
The final part of this research paper pays 
attention to the response strategies which are 
employed when enterprises are handling 
project risks. Table 11 contains the frequency 
of response strategies used by the respondents 
in connection with the handling of project 
risks.  
 
 
As previously discussed, the responses were 
weighted. The weighted responses on the 
frequency of the response strategies employed 
by the respondents when handling project 
risks, are depicted in the following table.  
Table 9. Responses on the frequency of the techniques used to analyse possible project risks, as perceived 
by the respondents 
 
Techniques Always Very often Sometimes Seldom Never 
Risk Scales 3 2 3 4  
Risk Mapping matrixes 2 3 3 4  
Delphi technique 2 3 5  2 
Influence diagrams 1 1 4 2 3 
Note:  One of the respondents did not provide answers to all the alternatives.  
Table 10. Weighted responses on the frequency of the techniques used to analyse possible project risks, in 
a declining order of frequency 
 
Total 
weighted 
score 
calculated 
Declining order 
of frequency 
The techniques used to analyse possible project risks  
35 1 Risk Scales 
35 1 Delphi technique 
34 3 Risk Mapping matrixes 
28 4 Influence diagrams 
Note:   As one of the respondents did not provide answers to all the alternatives of Table 9, the weighted 
responses are based on the answers of the 11 companies who did answer all the alternatives.  
 
Table 11. Responses on the frequency of the response strategies used when handling project risks, as 
perceived by the respondents 
 
Response strategies Always Very often Sometimes Seldom Never 
Risk avoidance 5 4 3   
Risk reduction 6 5 1   
Risk transfer 3 3 4 2  
Risk retention 1 4 4 2 1 
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It is not surprising that risk reduction is 
the response strategy that is most often used by 
the respondents when they are handling project 
risks. This is due to the fact that risk reduction 
strives to balance the extent of the risk with the 
anticipated benefits from the project, thus 
making an effort to mitigate the extent of the 
risk without losing the financial return on the 
project.  
It is, however, an unexpected finding that 
risk avoidance is applied more frequently than 
risk transfer and risk retention. By considering 
the chance to lose the financial benefits of a 
project due to an unacceptable risk, risk 
avoidance focuses the attention on the 
expected impact of risks which must be of an 
extreme nature.  
Although risk transfer does not seem to 
be utilised so frequently as risk reduction or 
risk avoidance, it represents a viable response 
strategy by either transferring the business 
activities or the adverse financial impact of the 
risks to other enterprises. These enterprises 
will then carry out the business activities or 
bear the detrimental financial impact of the 
risks while earning compensation for their 
business involvement.  
 
6. Conclusions  
 
The objective of this research embodies on the 
improvement of financial decision-making 
concerning the management process of project 
risk. The empirical survey was done in South 
Africa, and as this country is a developing 
country with an emerging market economy, 
the conclusions of this paper should also be 
valuable to enterprises in other developing 
countries. The findings of this research paper 
emphasise the following important 
conclusions:  
  
(1) The identification of risk is seen as 
the most important phase of the management 
process of project risk by the respondents, 
while the phases of risk analysis, response 
strategies, as well as monitor and control, are 
perceived to be equally important. Enterprises 
should benefit by viewing risk prioritisation in 
a more important light, as this phase is 
considered by the respondents to be least 
important.  
 
(2) The monitor and control phase has the 
highest weighted score and thus receives the 
most working days. Risk identification and risk 
analysis are the phases which receive the 
second most working days according to the 
respondents. It should be mentioned that the 
phases of response strategies and risk 
prioritisation do not receive equal attention 
from the respondents, which should be 
rectified as they are also vital phases in the 
management process of project risk.  
 
(3) It is important to notice that the first 
as well as the final phase of the management 
process of project risk, viz. risk identification 
as well as monitor and control, are most 
frequently re-evaluated, while the response 
strategies and risk analysis are also frequently 
re-assessed. It is clear that risk prioritisation is 
not so frequently re-evaluated as what it 
should be.  
 
(4) According to this research, 
Brainstorming, Documentation review and the 
SWOT analysis are the techniques most often 
used to identify project risk. It is, however, 
important to notice that each one of the 10 
techniques are to a certain extent applied by 
the respondents when identifying project risks. 
Knowledge and skills concerning these 
techniques should be valuable to executive 
managers of the business community.  
 
(5) Risk Scales, the Delphi technique and 
the Risk Mapping matrixes are the techniques 
most often used to analyse project risk. It is 
therefore recommended that emphasis should 
be placed on these techniques when enterprises 
are analysing possible project risk.  
 
(6) While it is not surprising that risk 
reduction is the response strategy that is most 
often used by the respondents when they are 
handling project risks, it is an unexpected 
finding that risk avoidance is applied more 
frequently than risk transfer or risk retention. 
Table 12. Weighted responses on the frequency of the response strategies used when handling project 
risks, in a declining order of frequency 
 
Total weighted 
score calculated 
Declining order of 
frequency 
The response strategies used when handling project risks  
53 1 Risk reduction 
50 2 Risk avoidance 
43 3 Risk transfer 
38 4 Risk retention 
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This focuses the attention on the anticipated 
impact of risks of such an extreme nature, that 
enterprises are considering the chance to lose 
the financial benefits of a project by avoiding 
the risks.  
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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on the voluntary disclosure in the 
annual reports of Malaysian listed firms. The result shows that there is an increase in the 
extent of voluntary disclosure in Malaysian listed firms over the eleven-year period from 1996 
to 2006. Ownership concentration consistently shows positive association with voluntary 
disclosure. Firms with higher foreign and institutional ownership have a significantly positive 
association with voluntary disclosure levels while firms with family ownership exhibit lower 
voluntary disclosure. Consistent with agency theory, different ownership structures have 
varied monitoring effects on agency costs and clearly influence firm’s disclosure practices. The 
findings provide insights to policy makers and regulators in their desire to increase 
transparency and accountability amidst the continual enhancement of corporate governance. 
The findings provide evidence that optimized ownership structure in any jurisdiction should 
be considered in any regulatory process that seeks to improve transparency.  
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1. Introduction 
 
There have been major changes taken place 
particularly in strengthening corporate 
governance, transparency and accountability 
over the last decade. These changes were 
largely brought about by the external shocks 
such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis and 
high profile corporate collapses. These 
external events have contributed to renewal of 
interest in improving corporate governance 
practices as a means to improve the quality and 
reliability of information disclosed in annual 
reports (Kulzick, 2004). Corporate voluntary 
disclosure and its determinants have received 
considerable attention in the accounting 
literature especially since the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. The dissemination of 
discretionary nature of information should 
reflect as closely as possible the economic 
reality of a firm’s business to stakeholders. 
Holland (1998) argues that corporate voluntary 
disclosure is associated with the desire to 
create favorable institutional and market states, 
with external benchmarks and pressures on 
firms for high quality communication.    
The Malaysian corporate sector has high 
level of ownership concentration (World Bank, 
2005; Mohd Sehat and Abdul Rahman, 2005; 
Abdul Samad, 2004). The revamped reporting 
and governance regimes over the years have 
improved Malaysian corporate transparency 
and accountability (World Bank 2005). 
However, like many Asian countries, 
Malaysian legal system is such that the rights 
of the minority shareholders are weak and 
regulatory enforcement environment is less 
stringent (Liew 2007). This may induce 
controlling owners to undertake value-
maximising behaviour at the expense of small 
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shareholders. Ramli (2010) finds the evidence 
of expropriation of minority shareholders by 
large shareholders in Malaysian listed firms. 
Internal governance mechanism is an 
important monitoring device but the 
persistently concentrated ownership structure 
in the hand of large shareholders could 
influence managerial disclosure decisions 
depending on efficient monitoring or 
entrenchment stances. Hence, the purpose of 
the study is to examine the impact of 
ownership structure on the extent of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of Malaysian 
listed firms. 
Many of the Malaysian listed firms tend 
to be ultimately controlled by the family 
members, foreigners or local-based 
institutional groups. The uniqueness of 
ownership structure in Malaysian corporate 
sector provides an interesting opportunity to 
empirically examine how corporate 
information disclosure is affected in this 
distinctive socio-economic environment. Prior 
research identifies ownership structure (either 
concentration or diffusion) and ownership 
identities (family, managerial, foreign, 
institutional or government controlled) as 
individual determinants of voluntary disclosure 
using a single regression formulation 
(Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Darus et al., 2008; 
Guan et al., 2007; Ghazali and Weetman, 
2006; Barako et al., 2006; Chau and Gray, 
2002; Eng and Mak, 2001). To extend these 
prior studies, this study decomposes ownership 
concentration into three mutually exclusive 
groups of family-controlled, foreign 
institutions-controlled and local institutions-
controlled; and recognizing the impact of 
different types of ownership within the 
concentrated ownership structure on voluntary 
disclosures.  
The context chosen for the study is the 
corporate disclosure environment in Malaysia 
at three key time periods of 1996, 2001 and 
2006. The earlier period 1996, taken as pre-
1997 Asian financial crisis, represents the 
period when Malaysia accounting environment 
was under the merit-based regulatory regime. 
The period 2001 is chosen to represent the 
phase with significant accounting and 
governance reforms implemented in the wake 
of the 1997 financial crisis. The latter 2006 
period reflects a phase of further regulatory 
initiatives adjustment to boost greater 
corporate transparency following the high 
profile international corporate collapses. These 
time periods are considered critical in terms of 
Malaysian regulatory and governance changes 
as a response to internal and external 
pressures. Little is known about the influence 
of ownership structure change in the midst of 
corporate governance change on voluntary 
disclosure. Hence, the longitudinal approach 
undertaken in this study allows the 
investigation of the voluntary disclosure 
practices in these key periods.  
Using a matched-sample of 100 
Malaysian listed firms from each of the three 
periods, the results show that there is an 
increase in corporate communication over the 
periods 1996-2006. Malaysian listed firms are 
disclosing greater information of discretionary 
nature in the post financial crisis period. 
Ownership concentration is found to be 
positively and significantly associated with the 
extent of voluntary disclosure in all three key 
time periods. While foreign ownership and 
institutional ownership are significant and 
positive predictors of the extent of voluntary 
disclosure, family-held firms are associated 
with lower voluntary disclosure. 
This study provides insights on the 
impact of ownership structure on voluntary 
disclosure amidst the strengthening of 
corporate governance from 1996 to 2006. The 
results shed light on the efficiency of block 
shareholders’ monitoring through greater 
information sharing. Despite the reforming 
efforts, the persistently high concentration of 
ownership over time continues yet in a climate 
of greater accountability and transparency. 
This result is important for Asian countries, 
especially for those firms with high ownership 
concentration. This study also enriches the 
voluntary disclosure literature by 
longitudinally investigating the association 
between voluntary disclosure, ownership 
concentration and different types of 
shareholdings within the concentrated 
ownership structure.  
The remainder of the paper is structured 
as follows. Section 2 introduces institutional 
background. Section 3 reviews literature to 
develop hypotheses. Section 4 describes the 
research approach. The key findings of the 
study are highlighted in Section 5 followed by 
concluding remarks in Section 6.  
 
2. Malaysian Institutional 
Framework 
 
The Companies Act 1965 provides the 
principal legislation governing corporate 
reporting in Malaysia. It recognises the 
importance of disclosure of financial 
information of a firm primarily for the benefit 
of its stakeholders (Rachagan et al., 2002). For 
instance, Section 169 of the Act requires all 
companies incorporated under the Act to 
furnish financial statements comprising profit 
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and loss accounts, balance sheet and directors’ 
reports. Section 166A mandates these accounts 
to be prepared and presented in accordance 
with accounting standards while Section 
169(14) specifies all companies need to 
comply with the disclosure requirements set 
out in the Ninth Schedule of the Act.  
Up until 1997, the corporate disclosure 
and reporting practices were largely based on 
the accounting standards adopted by the two 
accounting professional bodies, Malaysian 
Institute of Accountants and Malaysian 
Association of Certified Public Accountants. 
The merit-based regulatory regime (MBR) 
governed the financial reporting environment. 
Under such a regime, regulators decided on the 
propriety of firm transactions, while the 
management disclosed the information as 
required and was accountable to the regulators 
(Securities Commission 1999). Since the 
disclosure was arguably not user-oriented, the 
information flow under the MBR effectively 
lowered market incentives for greater 
disclosure (Cheng and Courtenay 2006; Tan 
and Chew 1996). 
The Malaysian accounting environment 
continued to evolve as the government 
announced the establishment of a new 
financial reporting regime in 1997. Under this 
new reporting regime, the Malaysian 
Accounting Standards Board (MASB) and the 
Financial Reporting Foundation (FRF) were 
established under the Financial Reporting Act 
1997 (FRA). The MASB is tasked with the 
role of developing and issuing accounting and 
financial reporting standards. The FRA is 
designed to address the weak enforcement by 
giving the force of law to the accounting 
standards. The new reporting framework 
heralded a new era for the nation’s accounting 
arena.  
Recognising the increasing importance of 
the Malaysian capital market as a place for 
raising funds for public companies, the 
Securities Commission embarked on the three-
phase 10  shift from the MBR towards the 
disclosure-based regime (DBR). The DBR 
entails the making of investment decision by 
each prospective investor based upon 
sufficient and accurate information provided. 
                                                           
10
  The shift to DBR took effect over a period 
of five years under three phases: phase one (1996-
1999): flexible MBR allowed with enhanced 
disclosure; phase two (1999-2000): hybrid MBR 
and DBR with further emphasis on disclosure 
enhancement; and phase three (2001-onwards): full 
DBR with high standards of disclosure (Securities 
Commission 1999). This three-phase shift augurs 
well for the selection of the three time periods 
(1996, 2001 and 2006) in this study. 
There is greater market incentive for enhanced 
disclosure (Cheng and Courtenay 2006). The 
final phase of the shift to DBR was achieved in 
2001 with full DBR focusing on requirements 
for higher standards of disclosure, due 
diligence and corporate governance.  
While the accounting landscape evolved, 
the 1997 East Asian financial crisis erupted 
and sent the nation to a state of shock. The 
crisis was regarded as the watershed event for 
corporate governance, disclosure and 
transparency in Malaysia. In recognition of the 
need to enhance the standards of corporate 
governance and corporate transparency, the 
High Level of Finance Committee on 
Corporate Governance in Malaysia strongly 
advocated systems for improved disclosure 
practices to be at the heart of establishing good 
corporate governance (Anwar and Tang 2003). 
The culminated efforts resulted in the eventual 
introduction of the Malaysian Code of 
Corporate Governance (MCCG) to the public 
in 2001. At the same time, the Bursa Malaysia 
Revamped Listing Requirement adopted the 
provisions of the Code. Yet, compliance with 
the Code is voluntary. As a self-regulatory 
mechanism to promote good corporate 
governance, implicitly, the MCCG aims to 
encourage disclosure by providing investors 
with timely and relevant information to 
facilitate investment decision making (Abdul 
Rahman 2006).  
Further, the incidents of corporate 
collapses generated huge controversies over 
corporate accounting practices and the quality 
of information disclosed to investors. High 
profile corporate failures focused attention on 
the importance of corporate disclosure in 
building and sustaining corporate credibility 
and investor confidence. This resulted in the 
establishment of a Taskforce on Corporate 
Disclosure Best Practices in October 2002 and 
the subsequent issue of guidance entitled “Best 
Practices in Corporate Disclosure” in August 
2004. Although these best practices are 
voluntary, Malaysian listed firms are highly 
encouraged to incorporate these guidelines into 
their own disclosure practices, with an aim to 
move beyond minimum disclosures (Bursa 
Malaysia 2004).  
The ‘global-shift’ move to external 
pressures for change is also evident in the 
accounting realm where all the country-
specific MASB accounting standards were 
aligned to International Financial Reporting 
Standards in 2006. The move represents a 
greater international convergence as not only 
does it aim to improve credibility of financial 
statements issued by Malaysian corporations, it 
maintains parity with countries that have 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 8, Issue 2, Winter 2011, Continued - 2 
 
 
299 
adopted the IFRSs (Malaysian Institute of 
Accountants 2005).  
Figure 1 depicts the key milestones in the 
development of the Malaysian accounting and 
governance landscape. Over the last fifteen 
years, considerable efforts have been initiated 
in enhancing corporate disclosure and 
transparency. Investors rely on information 
disclosed in annual reports as a key medium to 
evaluate their decisions and therefore, are 
concerned about the quality of information 
provided. The challenges for corporations and 
regulators are to continue to enhance the levels 
of transparency, governance and accountability 
in the Malaysian capital market. The 
development in the Malaysian accounting 
environment over the dynamic period from 
1996 till 2006, the focus of this study, is 
posited to have a substantial impact on a firm’s 
disclosure policy. 
 
 
 
 
  
  Periods 1996 2001 2006 
     
    Regime &    Merit-based regime,     Disclosure-based regime,  Bursa Malaysia’s  
new 
    Initiatives  old financial reporting MCCG, new MASB   transparency 
initiatives,  
 framework  financial reporting framework  IFRS alignment   
        
       
 
Figure 1. Accounting Regulatory Periods: 1996 to 2006 
 
3. Literature Review And 
Hypotheses Development 
 
Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency theory 
position is that when there is a separation of 
ownership and control of a firm, the potential 
for agency costs arises due to the conflict of 
interest arising from divergent goals between 
the contracting parties. The conflicting interest 
between managers and shareholders caused by 
differences in incentives and information 
asymmetry may reduce the value of firm. As a 
result, there is a need for control mechanisms 
to align the interests of managers and 
shareholders in order to resolve the agency 
problem. Patel et al. (2002) suggest that the 
agency problem could be mitigated by a 
vigilant board, timely and adequate disclosure 
of information, and transparent ownership 
clarifying the conflict of interests between 
shareholders and managers.  This study 
focusing on voluntary disclosure presents an 
excellent opportunity to apply this agency 
theoretical framework.  
Ownership structure is considered as 
having a strong influence on systems of 
corporate governance particularly in 
determining the nature of the agency problem. 
Within the context of corporate governance, 
ownership concentration and composition are 
two key aspects of ownership structure that 
affect the level of monitoring (Asian 
Development Bank, 2000).  
 
3.1 Ownership Concentration 
 
The degree of ownership concentration is an 
important determinant of the distribution of 
power within a firm (Thomsen and Pedersen, 
2000). The fundamental agency problem in 
highly concentrated firms is between 
controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders. Majority ownership is controlled 
by a small number of large, dominant 
shareholders who play an important role in 
monitoring management. There is a reduced 
agency problem in the highly concentrated 
firms because of the greater incentive 
alignment between owners and managers 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). According to the 
efficient-monitoring hypothesis, large block 
holders are better at monitoring management 
and thereby, reduce agency costs (La Porta et 
al., 2000; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).  
Just as ownership structure delineates a 
firm’s agency problem, it also impacts the 
firm’s reporting practices. Empirically, Birt et 
al. (2006) report that firms having a high level 
of shares owned by top 20 shareholders are 
more likely to disclose voluntary segment 
information in Australia. Luo et al. (2006) find 
that the existence of outside block ownership 
considerably increases corporate voluntary 
disclosure in Singapore. Recently, Jiang and 
Habib (2009) document the positive effect of 
ownership concentration on voluntary 
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disclosure in New Zealand firms. In Malaysia, 
Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) and Darus et al. 
(2008) report that firms with high proportion 
of outside share ownership tend to disclose 
more voluntary information in 2002 annual 
reports. Similarly, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) 
document a significant positive relationship 
between voluntary disclosure of Malaysian 
firms and the top ten shareholders in 1995 
annual reports. These findings suggest that 
large blockholders play monitoring 
management role in mitigating the agency 
problems inherent in a firm by influencing the 
voluntary disclosures practices.  
On the other hand, expropriation of 
minority shareholders’ wealth can become a 
concern when ownership is largely 
concentrated in the hands of large block 
holders. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La 
Porta et al. (1999) argue that high ownership 
concentration leads to conflicts of interest 
between large and small shareholders. In the 
context of disclosure, there is a likely effect of 
expropriating minority shareholders due to the 
information asymmetry between controlling 
(large block) and minority shareholders (Attig 
et al., 2006). Large block holders are likely to 
obscure and delay the disclosure of 
information to minority shareholders. Fan and 
Wong (2002) argue the entrenchment and the 
information effects and find that high 
ownership concentration weakens the 
informativeness of reported earnings to outside 
investors. Barako et al. (2006); Leung and 
Horwitz (2004) and Hossain et al. (1994) 
document a negative association between 
voluntary disclosure and ownership 
concentration. These studies suggest the 
entrenchment effect of large shareholdings in 
dominating managerial disclosure decisions.  
Yet again, there are studies that do not 
show any relation between ownership 
concentration and voluntary disclosure. 
Ghazali and Weetman (2006) reveal that 
ownership concentration is not statistically 
significant in explaining the variability of 
voluntary disclosure of Malaysian listed firms. 
Eng and Mak (2003) and Alsaeed (2005) find 
no significant association between the level of 
disclosure and blockholder ownership structure 
in Singapore and Saudi Arabian firms 
respectively. Clearly, previous empirical 
results on the association between voluntary 
disclosure and ownership concentration 
produced mixed results.  
Internal governance provides an 
important monitoring device and concentrated 
ownership structures could positively 
(negatively) affect voluntary disclosure 
practices depending on efficient monitoring 
(entrenchment) stances. Thus, it is 
hypothesised that the extent of voluntary 
disclosure is positively (negatively) associated 
with firms of higher ownership concentration.  
 
3.2 Classification of Ownership 
Types 
 
The identity of shareholders has implications 
for their objectives and the way they exercise 
their power, corporate strategy and 
performance (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). 
Studies have shown that disclosure incentives 
of firms are greatly influenced by the identity 
of ownership (Gelb, 2000; Lam et al., 1994; 
Smith, 1976). Although previous studies have 
addressed the various types of shareholders, 
this paper enriches the area by decomposing 
ownership concentration into three key groups 
namely, family controlled, local institutional 
group-controlled, and foreign institutional 
group-controlled. Such classification would 
allow the inference of the real differential 
impacts due to the disparity of monitoring 
costs and incentives of these different types of 
dominant shareholders. 
 
3.2.1 Family-controlled  
 
One of the distinctive types of Malaysian 
corporate ownership structure is the 
shareholdings by family members. Claessens 
et al. (2000) document that on average, 59% of 
public companies is owned and managed by 
family members. Similarly, the study by World 
Bank (2005) also provides similar evidence 
that about 67% of Malaysian firms is managed 
by the controlling family members. Firms with 
the concentrated family shareholdings have a 
better matching of the control rights of the 
dominant shareholder with its cashflow right. 
The information asymmetry and opportunistic 
behaviour should be minimized due to the fact 
that ownership and control still remain one and 
the same in family controlled firms. However, 
the dominant control gives the family power to 
seek private benefits at the expense of minority 
shareholders.  
In the context of disclosure, managers in 
the family-held firms may limit information 
disclosure to the public in order to prevent 
leakage of proprietary information to 
competitors as well as avoid unwanted 
political and social scrutiny. The unique family 
ownership generates low demand for adequate 
disclosure causing a threat to corporate 
transparency. A number of past disclosure 
studies reveal the low level of disclosure in 
family-controlled firms such as, Chau and 
Gray (2002) in Hong Kong and Singapore; Ho 
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and Wong (2001) in Hong Kong; Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002); Ghazali and Weetman (2006); 
and Darus et al. (2008) in Malaysia. All these 
findings show that the entrenched behaviour 
provides incentives to the controlling family 
owner to disclose less information. Thus, it is 
hypothesized that the extent of voluntary 
disclosure is negatively associated with a 
higher proportion of family ownership.  
 
3.2.2 Foreign Ownership 
 
Many of the multinational firms incorporated 
in Malaysia are subsidiaries of big 
conglomerate in foreign countries. According 
to Malaysia (1991), foreign ownership in 
Malaysia was dominant totaling about 62% in 
1969. However, a radical change affected by 
the nation economic policy resulted in the shift 
of ownership and control to the government-
linked companies, government-controlled trust 
funds or agencies (Azham, 2002). Foreign 
investment into Malaysia started to increase 
again in the early 1990s after the liberalization 
of capital flows (Suto, 2003). The Malaysian 
government has broadened equity policy for 
the manufacturing sector in respect of new 
investment, expansion and diversification 
effective July 1998, allowing foreign investors 
to own 100% equity (Malaysian Industrial 
Development Authority, 1998). The 
significance of foreign investment is again 
emphasised under the Securities Commission’s 
Capital Market Master Plan in 2001 (Securities 
Commission, 2005). Foreign equity ownership 
continues to play a crucial role in stimulating 
the economic growth of the company and the 
country. The presence of foreigners on board 
can influence the quality of information 
disclosure in order to meet foreign reporting 
requirements.  
Foreign owners’ presence in the company 
can influence corporate governance practices, 
which impacts significantly on firm’s 
disclosure decision. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) 
and Barako et al. (2006) find a significant 
positive association between voluntary 
disclosure and foreign ownership. This is in 
line with expectations and supports the 
argument that obtaining foreign funds means a 
greater need for disclosure to monitor actions 
by management. Given the increasing 
importance of foreign ownership in Malaysian 
corporate sector, this group of investors can 
influence corporate disclosure practices of 
listed firms. Thus, it is hypothesised that the 
extent of voluntary disclosure is positively 
associated with a higher proportion of foreign 
ownership.  
 
3.2.3 Institutional Ownership 
 
The changing Malaysian socio-economic 
environment witnessed the emergence of 
institutional investors like provident and 
pension funds, insurance companies, unit 
trusts, and government agencies. This category 
of investors is emerging and seen as an 
important group of agents in the market for 
corporate equity because of their ability to 
exert direct influence on management activities 
(Abdul Rahman, 2006). The importance of 
institutional investors in enhancing good 
corporate governance practices in Malaysia is 
recognised in Part 4 of the Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance.  
Substantial shareholdings by institutional 
investors help to create strong incentives to 
monitor corporate disclosure practices to 
reduce informational asymmetry (El-Gazzar, 
1998). Managers may voluntarily disclose 
information to meet the expectations of these 
large shareholders. Empirically, Bushee and 
Noe (2000) find a significant positive 
relationship between institutional 
shareholdings and corporate disclosure 
practices. However, based on a study of 
interim disclosure by Finnish firms, 
Schadewitz and Blevins (1998) report an 
inverse relationship between institutional 
ownership concentration and disclosure, 
whereas, McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) 
find weak support for the hypothesis that 
increased institutional ownership associated 
with voluntary disclosure practices. Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002) report no significant 
association between institutional investors and 
voluntary disclosure. Thus, notwithstanding 
the inconclusive findings, it is hypothesised 
that the extent of voluntary disclosure is 
positively associated with a higher proportion 
of institutional ownership.  
 
4. Research Methodology 
4.1 The Annual Report Sample 
 
The analysis covers three key time periods that 
are considered critical in terms of regulatory 
reforms in enhancing corporate transparency 
and accountability through corporate voluntary 
disclosure and ownership practices in 
Malaysia. These periods include 1996, 2001, 
and 2006. The sample for this study is selected 
from companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange (KLSE, the name was 
subsequently changed to Bursa Malaysia in 
2004). The criteria of sample firm selection 
are: (i) the availability of annual reports of 
firms for all the three periods; (ii) firms 
selected in 1996 must remain listed on the 
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stock exchange in the other two periods; and 
(iii) all banks, unit trust, insurance and finance 
companies are excluded from the study due to 
different regulatory requirements.  
Using 1996 as a base year, there were 
413 firms listed on the Main Board of the 
KLSE. Excluding the 32 firms listed in the 
finance sector, 40 firms newly listed in 1996 
and the 26 firms subsequently delisted and 
unavailability of annual reports; the sampling 
population consists of 315 firms. These firms 
are subject to stratified (by industry) random 
sample selection of 100 listed firms from the 
five industry groupings of 20 firms each. The 
final sample of one hundred firms selected in 
1996 represents 31.8% of the appropriate 
population. Guided by the criteria, the matched 
sample is selected for the latter two periods, 
giving rise to a total sample of 300 firm-year 
observations. Table 1 summarises the sampling 
procedure followed in this study.  
 
Table 1. Sample-Selection Procedures 
 
Description No. of listed firms 
Firms listed on the Main Board of the KLSE in 1996 413 
Less: Firms listed on the finance sector  (32) 
Less: Firms listed in 1996  (40) 
Less: Firms delisted and unavailability of annual reports (26) 
Number of firms available for sampling 315 
Number of firms in final sample in each period 100 
Percentage of firms from available population                                         31.8% 
Firms listed on Bursa Malaysia Stock Exchange in 1996 are used as a basis for sample selection. The final sample 
represents 31.8% of sampling population. 
 
4.2 Development and Scoring of 
Disclosure Checklist 
 
The extent of voluntary disclosure is measured 
using a comprehensive voluntary disclosure 
index (VDI) comprising 85 voluntary 
disclosure items. Items comprising VDI are 
derived from prior disclosure studies 
conducted in developing countries (eg. Ghazali 
and Weetman, 2006; Barako et al., 2006; Gul 
and Leung, 2004; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). 
The preliminary disclosure checklist undergoes 
a rigorous process of screening by two 
professional accountants who have specific 
knowledge and expertise of Malaysian 
accounting and disclosure practices. The 
process involves the checking of items of 
voluntary in nature and refining for 
appropriateness of each item in the Malaysian 
context. This results in the final validated 
instrument comprising 85 voluntary disclosure 
items. The instrument is used for capturing and 
measuring differences in disclosure practices 
among firms.  
Adopting Gray et al.’s (1992) approach, 
this study applies the unweighted scoring 
approach where an item scores 1 if disclosed 
and 0 if it is not, subject to the applicability of 
the item concerned. A more subjective 
weighted approach is not used because the 
focus of this study is not directed at a 
particular user group. Moreover, prior research 
has shown that unweighted and weighted 
approaches produce very similar results when 
there are a large number of items included 
(Beattie et al., 2004). The VDI, calculated for 
each firm in each period, is the ratio of actual 
disclosure for each firm and the maximum 
possible disclosure score for each firm.   
 
4.3 Independent and Control 
Predictors 
 
The independent variables examined in this 
study include: (i) the ownership concentration 
as the key variable of ownership structure; and 
(ii) the family; local-based institutions and 
foreign ownership as variables of ownership 
identities.  
Based on extant studies ((Liu and Sun, 
2010; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Chen and 
Jaggi, 2000), the following control variables 
are included: role duality, board independence, 
firm size and leverage in the statistical 
analysis. According to Karamanou and Vafeas 
(2005), board characteristics are associated 
with the quality of financial reporting. The 
strength of corporate governance structure may 
shape the firm’s ownership and control. In 
addition, firm size and leverage are included as 
these characteristics affect firm’s disclosure 
behaviour.  
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4.4 Regression Models 
 
Multiple regression models are utilized to 
examine the relationship between explanatory 
variables and voluntary disclosure. The first 
regression equation estimated is to test the 
association between the ownership 
concentration and voluntary disclosure index 
cross-sectionally in each period. 
 
 
VDIjt = β0 + β1OCONjt + β2RDUALjt + β3BINDjt + β4FSIZEjt +  
β5LEVjt + εjt                   (1) 
 
Equation (1) does not classify ownership into 
different classes to investigate the impact of 
each group on voluntary disclosure. By 
decomposing ownership concentration into 
different strands of ownership, Equation (2) is 
estimated to capture the effect of each type of 
controlling ownership on the extent of 
voluntary disclosure, as follows:  
  
VDIjt = β0 + β1FAMjt + β2FORjt + β3INSTjt + β4RDUALjt + β5BINDjt  + 
β6SIZEjt + β7LEVjt + εjt              (2) 
 
5. Results Analysis 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the 
voluntary disclosure index (dependent 
variable), independent and control variables 
for the 100 companies in each of the three 
periods. Over the eleven-year period, the mean 
voluntary disclosure index (VDI) has steadily 
increased from 23% in 1996 to 36% in 2006. 
There is wide variation in the voluntary 
disclosure score. The range of VDI in 1996 is 
from 5% to 55% in 1996, 11% to 65% in 2001, 
and 6% to 81% in 2006. The significant 
difference between voluntary disclosures is 
further supported by strong results obtained 
from the paired sample t-tests in each year of 
the study. As documented in Table 2, the 
increase in means of VDI between two periods 
(1996-2001, 2001-2006, 1996-2006) is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
largest increase in mean VDI occurs between 
1996 and 2001 (32%) with a more moderate 
increase of 12% between 2001 and 2006. Over 
the eleven-year study period, the increase in 
mean VDI between 1996 and 2006 is 48%. 
The result suggests that firms are disclosing far 
greater information of discretionary nature in 
the post financial crisis period (1996 and 2001) 
compared to the period of further regulatory 
initiatives amidst the high profile international 
corporate collapses (2001 and 2006).  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for all variables 
 
Panel A: 1996  
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
VDI 5.06 54.88 22.97 11.31 
OCON 24.40 88.15 61.87 14.91 
FAM 0.00 74.32 22.99 24.64 
FOR 0.50 87.12 23.75 22.91 
INST 0.00 85.46 18.50 21.52 
RDUAL 0.00 1.00 0.64 0.48 
BIND 0.00 1.00 0.37 0.48 
FSIZE 3.88 7.51 5.86 0.62 
LEV 0.05 0.89 0.41 0.21 
Panel B: 2001  
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
VDI 10.98 64.71 31.45 12.12 
OCON 17.89 90.7 58.47 18.71 
FAM 0.00 70.56 22.32 24.21 
FOR 0.00 76.05 16.32 20.69 
INST 0.44 88.30 21.54 23.56 
RDUAL 0.00 1.00 0.75 0.43 
BIND 0.00 1.00 0.66 0.48 
FSIZE 4.24 7.74 5.99 0.62 
LEV 0.00 1.03 0.39 0.24 
Panel C: 2006  
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
VDI 6.49 81.18 35.95 17.31 
OCON 22.10 90.42 60.86 15.14 
FAM 0.00 75.46 22.74 25.43 
FOR 0.00 76.57 18.30 20.93 
INST 0.00 89.85 19.58 23.70 
RDUAL 0.00 1.00 0.80 0.40 
BIND 0.00 1.00 0.91 0.29 
FSIZE 4.26 7.81 6.09 0.63 
LEV 0.00 1.61 0.43 0.27 
VDI is voluntary disclosure index for each sample firm; Ownership concentration, OCON is top 5 shareholder 
concentration; Family ownership, FAM is the proportion of family ownership within the top five shareholders to 
total shares outstanding; Foreign ownership, FOR is the proportion of foreign ownership within the top five 
shareholders to total shares outstanding; Institutional ownership, INST is the proportion of institutional ownership 
within the top five shareholders to total shares outstanding; Role Duality, RDUAL is coded one where the role of 
Chairman is independent of Chief Executive Officer, and zero otherwise; Board Independence, BIND is coded one 
where independent non-executive directors comprise at least one-third of the board membership, and zero 
otherwise; Firm size, FSIZE is natural log of total assets; and Leverage, LEV is the ratio of debt to equity. 
 
Table 3. Paired T-Tests 
 
 1996-2001 2001-2006 1996-2006 
Mean of paired differences 7.40 3.74 11.14 
% change Voluntary Disclosure Index  32.22 12.32 48.51 
Correlation 0.81* 0.82* 0.75* 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0 0 
df 99 99 99 
t-Stat -9.37 -4.39 -10.05 
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.000 0.000 0.000 
t Critical one-tail 1.66 1.66 1.66 
* significant at 0.01 levels (one-tailed tests). The t-statistic is derived using a paired sample t-test. The t-tests are 
performed to examine differences between the means of the voluntary disclosure index over the study period. The 
paired comparison t-tests are to determine whether the means of the distribution of differences in values of 
voluntary disclosure index is zero. 
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In addition, the descriptive results reported in 
Table 1 reveal that the average ownership 
concentrated in the hands of top five 
shareholders in 1996 is 62%. Despite the 
implementation of Malaysian Code of 
corporate governance and several regulatory 
initiatives to promote corporate transparency, 
the Malaysian corporate ownership structure 
remains highly concentrated where the average 
ownership concentration reported in 2001 and 
2006 is 58% and 61% respectively.  
In terms of ownership composition, the 
shareholdings held by family members are 
consistent with an average of 22% from 1996 
till 2006. Foreign ownership shrinks from 24% 
in 1996 to 18% in 2006. Local-based 
institutional investors hold an average of 18% 
of total equity in sample firms in 1996, 
increase to 21% in 2001 but register a slight 
decrease to 19% in 2006. The numerous 
governance and regulatory initiatives during 
the eleven-year period do not have any effect 
on changes in ownership structure. Instead, the 
proportion of ownership structure maintains 
over time yet in the climate of greater 
accountability and transparency.  
The Pearson’s product moment 
correlations between dependent and predictor 
variables are shown in Table 3. Correlation 
matrices indicate that ownership concentration 
is positively correlated with voluntary 
disclosure in all three study periods. Family 
ownership is negatively correlated with 
voluntary disclosure whilst foreign and 
institutional ownerships are positively 
correlated with voluntary disclosure in all the 
three periods. Correlation coefficients 
presented in Table 3 indicate that whilst there 
are a number of independent variables that are 
significantly correlated with each other, none 
of the coefficients are greater than 0.8. This 
suggests that multicollinearity is not a major 
problem in this study. 
Besides, the Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) is used to test the presence of 
multicollinearity in the regression model. The 
VIF figures (not reported in Table 4) of all the 
predictor variables are below 2.5. Hence, both 
correlation and VIF results support the absence 
of multicollinearity in these variables. 
 
Table 4. Pearson’s Product Moment Correlations 
 
1996 VDI OCON FAM FOR INST RDUAL BIND FSIZE LEV 
VDI 1.000         
OCON .327* 1.000        
FAM -.458* -.206** 1.000       
FOR .208** .225** -.379* 1.000      
INST .471* .415* -.408* -.190** 1.000     
RDUAL .081 .152 -.151 .150 .184** 1.000    
BIND -.010 .003 -.028 -.192** .160 .143 1.000   
FSIZE .566* .008 -.239* -.008 .397* .046 .015 1.000  
LEV -.119 -.171** -.011 .002 -.020 .032 -.151 .146 1.000 
2001          
VDI 1.000         
OCON .295* 1.000        
FAM -.373* -.133 1.000       
FOR .159 .335* -.289* 1.000      
INST .523* .435* -.479* -.117 1.000     
RDUAL .102 .190** -.307* .049 .326* 1.000    
BIND .204** .158 -.010 .101 .127 .122 1.000   
FSIZE .607* .073 -.175** -.122 .497* -.032 .128 1.000  
LEV -.016 -.376* -.151 -.146 .005 .177** -.097 .248* 1.000 
2006          
VDI 1.000         
OCON .307* 1.000        
FAM -.362* -.083 1.000       
FOR .202** .235* -.271* 1.000      
INST .559* .357* -.485* -.112 1.000     
RDUAL .174** .079 -.290* .013 .296* 1.000    
BIND .052 -.003 -.164 .145 .042 .017 1.000   
FSIZE .627* .034 -.076 .015 .498* -.044 -.025 1.000  
LEV -.012 -.359* -.059 -.056 -.056 .027 -.041 .153 1.000 
* p < 0.01, one-tailed; ** p < 0.05, one-tailed.  
VDI is voluntary disclosure index for each sample firm; Ownership concentration, OCON is top 5 shareholder 
concentration; Family ownership, FAM is the proportion of family ownership within the top five shareholders to 
total shares outstanding; Foreign ownership, FOR is the proportion of foreign ownership within the top five 
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shareholders to total shares outstanding; Institutional ownership, INST is the proportion of institutional ownership 
within the top five shareholders to total shares outstanding; Role Duality, RDUAL is coded one where the role of 
Chairman is independent of Chief Executive Officer, and zero otherwise; Board Independence, BIND is coded one 
where independent non-executive directors comprise at least one-third of the board membership, and zero 
otherwise; Firm size, FSIZE is natural log of total assets; and Leverage, LEV is the ratio of debt to equity. 
 
 
5.2 Regression Results 
 
The multiple regression results reported in 
Table 4 show the explanatory power of the 
ownership concentration and ownership 
identities for each period. The multiple 
regression models report significant F values 
(at the 1 percent level) for the level of 
voluntary disclosure in all periods. All 
reported adjusted R2 for both multiple 
regression models are over 40%, which 
suggest that a significant percentage of the 
variations in voluntary disclosure can be 
explained by the variations in the predictor 
variables.  
As reported in Table 4 Panel A, the 
ownership concentration (OCON) is found to 
be positively and significantly associated with 
the extent of voluntary disclosure in all three 
key time periods. The positive coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level in 
1996 and 2006 and the 5 percent level in 2001. 
The regression results show that companies 
with ownership concentrated in the top five 
shareholders disclose more in annual reports in 
all the periods under study, consistent with 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Birt et al. (2006) 
and Xiao and Yuan (2007). Thus, the positive 
hypothesis is supported throughout the eleven-
year period in this study. The findings imply 
that companies with concentrated ownership in 
the hands of large shareholders appears to be a 
more important monitoring tool to mitigate 
agency problems by influencing greater 
disclosure in annual reports. It may reflect a 
firm’s choice of governance and disclosure 
practices when investor protection is weak.  
The regression results of the 
decomposition of ownership concentration into 
family, foreign and institutional ownership are 
reported in Table 4 Panel B. Both foreign 
ownership (FOR) and institutional ownership 
(INST) are found to be significant predictors 
of the extent of voluntary disclosure in all 
three key time periods. The positive 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 5 
percent level.  The results suggest that firms 
with high proportions of ownership held by 
foreign and institutional investors disclose 
more voluntary information, thus the 
hypotheses are supported in all periods under 
the study. The findings imply that the 
monitoring roles of these shareholders in 
influencing managerial actions towards greater 
disclosure and transparency. The coefficients 
on family ownership (FAM) are negative and 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level in 
all the three periods under study. The results 
indicate that a high proportion of 
shareholdings held by family members is 
associated with lower voluntary disclosure. 
Hence, the hypothesis is supported. This 
implies that the agency issues arising from the 
expropriation by family-held firms are more 
prominent than the foreign and institutional 
shareholders. 
The study includes two board governance 
and two firm-specific variables as the control 
variables in the regression models. The results 
show that role duality and board independence 
are not significantly associated with voluntary 
disclosure in 1996 and 2001. Despite the 
emphasis on corporate governance in the wake 
of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 
eventual implementation of the Malaysian 
Code on Corporate Governance in 2001, the 
results suggest that these mechanisms show no 
influence on managerial disclosure decision. 
Nonetheless, role duality (R_DUAL) has 
significantly (at the 1 percent level) positive 
effect on the extent of voluntary disclosure in 
2006, suggesting that firms with a separate 
board Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 
tend to disclose more on a voluntary basis. 
Board independence (BIND) has no significant 
association with voluntary disclosure. Such 
findings are consistent with Cheung et al. 
(2010). 
Firm size (FSIZE) is positively and 
statistically significantly (at the 1% levels) 
associated with voluntary disclosure in all 
years. Firm size influencing the extent of 
voluntary disclosure has been well 
documented in previous studies. Large firms 
tend to disclose information more extensively 
because of the exposure to public scrutiny 
(Schipper 1981), the need to raise capital at the 
lower cost (Botosan 1997), and the need to 
minimize high agency cost typical in large 
companies (Watts and Zimmerman 1986). 
However, leverage lacks statistical significance 
in all years, suggesting that a company’s 
gearing status has no significant association 
with the extent of voluntary disclosure. The 
result is consistent with Akhtaruddin et al. 
(2009) and Ghazali and Weetman (2006). 
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5.3 Additional Analysis 
 
The preceding multiple regression analysis 
provided in models 1 and 2 assumes the 
exogenous determination of ownership 
structure variables. The endogeneity concern 
caused by unobservable firm-specific factors 
and omitted variables such as operational 
characteristics between firms may cause OLS 
estimates to be biased (Larcker et al. 2007). In 
a recent study, Andres (2008) maintains that 
ownership structure is endogenously 
determined by firm performance. A potential 
correlated omitted variable problem may occur 
where there are factors that may potentially 
affect ownership structure, and that may affect 
voluntary disclosure of information 
simultaneously (Karamanou and Vafeas 2005).  
The study attempts to control for the 
omitted variable problem by examining the 
association between the change in the levels of 
ownership structure and change in voluntary 
disclosure over the study period. This 
approach is appropriate since there is less 
likely to be a corresponding change in any 
potential omitted variable that is correlated 
with both the dependent and independent 
variables. Thus, an additional regression model 
(not shown for brevity) is estimated to 
examine whether changes in ownership 
structure are associated with changes in 
voluntary disclosure between pre- and post 
crisis (1996 and 2001); and (b) post crisis and 
Enron (2001 and 2006). 
The results (not shown for brevity) 
indicate that there is no significant association 
between the change in voluntary disclosure 
and the change in ownership concentration 
except for the change between 2001 and 2006 
when further regulatory initiatives were 
implemented following the rampant corporate 
collapses. The results could possibly due to 
small variation in ownership structure which is 
relatively minor between periods compared to 
the change in voluntary disclosure index. The 
results also show that there is a positive and 
statistically significant (at the 5% and 10% 
levels respectively) association between the 
change in voluntary disclosure and the change 
in foreign and institutional ownerships 
between 1996 and 2001. However, the changes 
in these variables are not significant predictors 
between 2001 and 2006. The change in family 
ownership variable lacks statistical 
significance. The change in voluntary 
disclosure is positively and statistically 
significantly associated with the change in firm 
size (at the 1% level) between 1996 and 2001, 
and between 2001 and 2006 but the change in 
leverage has no influence on the change of 
voluntary disclosure. 
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Table 5. Cross-Sectional Regression Results For Each Period 
 
 Panel A   1996 2001 2006 
Adjusted R²  41.9    42.4    48.5   
F statistic  15.295    15.589    19.638   
Significance  0.000*    0.000*    0.000*   
Variables 
Predicted 
sign Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig 
Intercept  -49.340 -5.483 0.000* -59.043 -5.622 0.000* -46.568 -3.005 0.000* 
OCON +/- 0.221 3.698 0.000* 0.129 2.011 0.023** 0.301 3.407 0.000* 
RDUAL + 0.506 0.275 0.392 3.108 1.209 0.115 7.675 2.482 0.007* 
BIND + -1.085 -0.593 0.278 2.098 0.933 0.176 3.851 0.896 0.187 
FSIZE + 10.600 7.561 0.000* 13.490 7.522 0.000* 17.052 8.565 0.000* 
LEV - -0.082 -0.923 0.178 -0.022 -0.236 0.407 -0.040 -0.440 0.330 
 Panel B   1996 2001 2006 
Adjusted R²  51.8    49.1    51.9   
F statistic  14.136    14.644    16.235   
Significance  0.000*    0.000*    0.000*   
Variables 
Predicted 
sign Beta t Sig Beta t Sig Beta t Sig 
Intercept  -22.695 -2.573 0.006* -40.565 -3.491 0.000* -56.469 -3.863 0.000* 
FAM - -0.083 -1.954 0.027** -0.087 -1.660 0.050** -0.102 -1.641 0.042** 
FOR + 0.093 2.117 0.018** 0.113 2.093 0.019** 0.139 2.175 0.016** 
INST + 0.137 2.758 0.003* 0.108 1.748 0.042** 0.153 1.986 0.025** 
RDUAL  -0.705 -0.395 0.347 0.565 0.218 0.414 3.860 1.193 0.018** 
BIND  -1.162 -0.653 0.257 2.187 1.027 0.153 0.096 0.023 0.491 
FSIZE + 8.117 5.571 0.000* 11.689 5.788 0.000* 14.180 5.881 0.000* 
LEV - -0.107 -1.308 0.271 -0.100 -1.082 0.141 -0.130 -1.114 0.134 
* p < 0.01, one-tailed; ** p < 0.05, one-tailed; and † p < 0.10, one-tailed 
Panel 1 shows the regression result of the key ownership concentration variable whilst the regression results for individual ownership types are shown in Panel 2. VDI is 
voluntary disclosure index for each sample firm; Ownership concentration, OCON is top 5 shareholder concentration; Family ownership, FAM is the proportion of family 
ownership within the top five shareholders to total shares outstanding; Foreign ownership, FOR is the proportion of foreign ownership within the top five shareholders to 
total shares outstanding; Institutional ownership, INST is the proportion of institutional ownership within the top five shareholders to total shares outstanding; Role Duality, 
RDUAL is coded one where the role of Chairman is independent of Chief Executive Officer, and zero otherwise; Board Independence, BIND is coded one where 
independent non-executive directors comprise at least one-third of the board membership, and zero otherwise; Firm size, FSIZE is natural log of total assets; and Leverage, 
LEV is the ratio of debt to equity. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
This paper has examined factors influencing the 
extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of 
companies listed on Bursa Malaysia from 1996 to 
2006. In the wake of the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis, numerous corporate governance and 
regulatory reforms have taken place during the 
eleven-year period to enhance corporate 
transparency and accountability. Yet, the 
proportions of ownership structure remain 
relatively unchanged over time. The empirical 
results of match-paired samples in each key time 
period show that the ownership concentration is 
consistently positively associated with voluntary 
disclosure. The positive association of ownership 
concentration may reflect the firms’ choice to 
disclose more information as a governance 
initiative to monitor managerial activities. This 
concurs with the theoretical argument that large, 
dominant shareholders are taking the efficient 
monitoring stance.  
Institutional and foreign owned firms have the 
motivation to disclose in excess of mandatory 
requirements. Consistent with the agency theory, 
institutional and foreign investors in a firm have a 
greater monitoring role in pushing firms to 
voluntarily disclose more information in annual 
reports. Such enhanced disclosure practice should 
be encouraged in order to attract funds from 
investors, both locally and abroad. Further, it is 
important that the management appreciates the 
importance of effective communication to the 
capital market especially its direct link to the 
reduction of cost of capital and subsequent 
increases in firm value and wealth creation for the 
shareholders. However, the findings also reveal that 
firms held by family members are reluctant to 
disclose information, reflecting the tradition of 
secrecy inherited from the past. Such firms are 
controlled by family members with very few 
foreign or local institutional investors, thus, the 
demand for information is less leading to lower 
level of disclosure.  
The two corporate governance variables (role 
duality and board independence) identified in 1996 
and 2001 are not significant, indicating the non-
importance of these variables as determinants of 
voluntary disclosure. The earlier implementation of 
the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance in 
2001 could possibly have no same effect in 
changing the attitudes of Malaysian listed firms 
towards more voluntary information disclosure at 
the point of regulatory change. Despite of the 
various governance and regulatory initiatives 
adjustment after 2001, board independence remains 
to be a non-significant predictor in 2006 except role 
duality. This implies that not all corporate 
governance mechanisms have the same effect on 
voluntary disclosure. The findings also cast the 
doubt on the ‘true’ independence of the board of 
Malaysian listed firms in determining corporate 
policies and practices to enhance corporate 
transparency. 
The study makes several contributions as 
follows. First, it strengthens the importance of 
separating ownership structure into various strands 
of ownership to infer the real impact of differential 
controlling properties on managerial disclosure 
decisions. Second, it sheds light on the efficiency 
of ownership concentration in terms of information 
disclosure and management monitoring in a 
country where investors protection is weak. Third, 
this study adds to the literature on the extent of 
corporate voluntary disclosure by examining the 
association between voluntary disclosure and 
ownership concentration and composition using 
matched sample over eleven-year period when 
regulatory and governance changes are eminent.  
The findings of the study have implications 
for disclosure policies and the governance 
initiatives. The results provide the evidence that 
ownership structure should be considered in any 
regulatory process that attempts to improve 
transparency. Multi-ownership and optimizing 
ownership structure, particularly with the 
shareholdings by foreign and institutional investors, 
need to be on the national reform agenda. The 
ownership concentration in external shareholders 
tends to provide a good monitoring mechanism to 
lessen the opportunity of expropriation and 
promote greater efficiency in information sharing. 
The family-controlled firms have little motivation 
to disclose information in excess of mandatory 
requirement. In view of the structural feature of the 
Malaysian stock market providing a countervailing 
force to the growing pressures for 
internationalization and global transparency, the 
findings provide important implications for 
regulators, investors and companies. The 
longitudinal findings can resonate in Asian 
countries where corporate ownership is 
characterized by concentrated structure. 
There are limitations in this study. First, the 
study draws conclusions about the extent of 
voluntary disclosure, not on its quality and 
informativeness of disclosure. Second, the 
voluntary disclosure index is calculated based on 
the researcher-constructed instrument. The index 
calculation can be affected if on the items of 
information selected are not voluntary in nature. 
Third, it focuses on one avenue of corporate 
disclosure via corporate annual reports. Future 
research could investigate the quality of voluntary 
disclosure and could possibly explore the extent to 
which firms voluntarily release information 
through other communication channels such as 
press release and the internet. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A financial crisis may originate from many factors, 
but ultimately it becomes the responsibility of the 
government and the central bank to manage and 
recover from the crisis. A poor performance by the 
central bank may often increase the length and 
severity of any crisis. An independent operation of 
central bank is mostly hindered by the political 
interference by the government. A government 
which does not allow higher central bank 
independence and governance (CBIG) interferes 
more in central banking activities. So, the central 
bank would perform poorly in any crisis situation 
as a political government would always try to 
follow its political agenda first. As a result, a 
government mostly fails to recover from the crisis 
and the need for an independent monetary authority 
intensifies. The primary objective of this paper is to 
identify whether the governments of the Asia 
Pacific countries allowed higher CBIG after 
experiencing the financial crisis in 1997, where 
poor CBIG was partly blamed for severity of the 
crisis. The secondary objective is to measure the 
impact of such CBIG changes on the 
macroeconomic indicators of the countries, such as 
inflation and economic growth. 
The paper’s main contributions include 
constructing CBIG index for 36 Asia Pacific 
countries. Asia Pacific was mostly overlooked in 
previous CBIG studies. This paper is an attempt to 
fill out that gap in the literature. Other contribution 
of this paper is that it has established a statistically 
robust relationship between Asian financial crisis 
and CBIG by confirming that CBIG has improved 
in the post crisis period. Such improvement has 
contributed to reduce inflation and increase 
economic growth. These outcomes should have 
significant policy implications and suggests 
possible directions for future improvements in 
CBIG. The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows: CBIG, macroeconomic performance and 
financial crisis in Section 2; while data and 
methodology is described in Section 3. Empirical 
results are presented in Section 4, and Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. CBIG, Macroeconomic 
Performance and Financial Crisis 
 
The main objective of any central bank is to 
maintain price stability as initially identified by 
Barro and Gordon (1983) in one of the seminal 
articles on CBIG literature; they argued that a 
central bank should have full control over inflation. 
It was further stressed by Bade and Parkin (1988) 
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and linked to CBIG that a central bank can only 
delivers low inflation when it is free from 
government influences. A central bank also plays 
an important role in maintaining financial stability 
by applying its various policy instruments. This 
role becomes even crucial when any financial crisis 
hits the economy. The level of CBIG attained by a 
central bank plays a key role both during its normal 
operations and any financial crisis. The following 
paragraphs explain the association of CBIG with 
price stability, economic growth and financial 
crisis, with specific reference to Asian financial 
crisis of 1997.   
It is very well established in the literature that 
CBIG and inflation has robust negative 
relationship. This view is supported by many 
studies (Grilli et al., 1991, Cukierman et al., 1992, 
Berger et al., 2001, Panagiotidis and Triampella, 
2006). This means that when CBIG increases, 
inflation decreases. Only a few studies however, 
questioned whether their outcomes were dependent 
upon the indicators selected for those studies 
(Posen, 1995, Fujiki, 1996, Eijffinger et al., 1997), 
or were genuine statistically valid results or was 
there a two-way causality between them 
(Cukierman et al., 1992). In case of two-way 
causality, less independence contributes to higher 
inflation. High inflation encourages the government 
to influence monetary policy. Governments may 
take advantage of such high inflation situation even 
if the central bank’s act does not allow them to do 
so. As most central banks are not completely 
independent, there is always some room for the 
executive branch to intervene, especially during 
high inflation periods. This in turn may induce a 
problem of two-way causality. 
The economic development is not one of the 
central bank objectives; however policies 
implemented by central bank may have remarkable 
impact on the economic growth of a country. 
Naturally, there is no clear cut relationship between 
CBIG and economic growth, nevertheless few 
studies have found a positive relationship (Fujiki, 
1996); some found a negative relationship (Fuhrer, 
1997); and others did not find any measurable 
impact on real economic performance (Grilli et al., 
1991, Alesina and Summers, 1993, Akhand, 1998, 
de Haan and Kooi, 2000). Few studies argued that 
even if there is a relationship, CBIG does not affect 
output growth (Jordan, 1998). The mixed results in 
the literature mean that there is no widely accepted 
standard relationship between CBIG and growth. 
CBIG may be helpful in explaining income 
inequalities among countries (Dolmas et al., 2000), 
but it can also reduce the scope for productivity 
enhancing public investment and so harm the future 
growth (Ismihan and Ozkan, 2004).  
The responsibility of a central bank increases 
when any economy faces financial crisis. It has to 
bring financial stability in addition to its primary 
objective of maintaining price stability. If a central 
bank has less CBIG then it is always difficult for it 
to take effective and impartial measures to guide 
the economy to a recovery. The Asian financial 
crisis in 1997 started as a currency crisis in a few 
countries; however, turned into a regional financial 
crisis. Few specific factors hindered the normal 
operations of central banks include: excessive 
interference by the government, the inability of the 
central bank to manage exchange rate system, 
connected lending in the banking system, poor 
regulation and supervision11 of financial institutions 
and the central bank’s inability to manage the 
overall situation.  
In an ideal situation, the exchange rates should 
be determined by the market forces not by the 
government or the central banks. In many countries 
in Asia, their central bank used to do this job. The 
pegged exchange rate systems in Thailand, 
Indonesia and Korea Republic had encouraged 
large external borrowing (Sugisaki, 1997). When 
crisis hit the economy, the central banks made 
additional foreign currency borrowing in an attempt 
to protect the domestic financial institutions and 
also the domestic currency (Krugman, 1998, 2000). 
The unsuccessful bid to protect the Thai Baht and 
domestic financial institutions costed the economy 
billions of dollars  (Swan, 1998). It was very 
doubtful in Thailand that whether the Bank of 
Thailand had much control over its losses when its 
decisions were essentially subject to persuasion 
from the government and the finance ministers 
(Swan, 1998). The President of Indonesia showed a 
continuing involvement in the loan decisions of 
both state-owned and private banks. Any financial 
regulators who attempted to enforce prudential 
rules on connected lending were removed including 
the head of the central bank in 1992 and the 
minister of finance in 1996 (Cole and Slade 1998). 
The central banks and the banking sectors in Asia 
were very much influenced not just by their 
government but also by the political parties (Nanto, 
1997). In Indonesia, for example the politically 
connected groups could and did escape supervision 
frequently in the 1990s (Ariff and Khalid, 2000).  
Higher CBIG should help a central bank to 
manage similar crisis situations better (Swan 1998). 
Managing inflation better would indicate the 
improvement of CBIG, as the former is considered 
a proxy of the latter (Cukierman et al., 1992). After 
this financial crisis many countries had amended 
their central bank acts in the Asia Pacific to make 
their central banks and other related agencies 
independent and unbiased; and to practice good 
governance and improved discipline in the financial 
                                                           
11
   In Asia, most of the central banks were responsible for 
supervision of financial institutions.  
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system. This study investigates the macroeconomic 
performance of the Asia Pacific countries in the pre 
and post financial crisis period; and the association 
of improved CBIG with such performances. The 
methodology to conduct such study is explained in 
the next section.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
 
This study constructs the CBIG index for fifteen 
years (1991-2005) to cover the pre and post 
financial crisis periods for 36 countries from five 
regions of the Asia Pacific (see Table 1). The 
sample consists of eight South Asian; seven South 
East Asian; seven East Asian; six Central Asian; 
and eight Pacific countries. The macroeconomic 
data, such as inflation and economic growth are 
sourced from the World Development Indicators of 
the World Bank and World Economic Outlook of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
 
3.2 Research Design 
 
The main components of research design include: 
the CBIG index construction; CBIG ranking; the 
statistical relationship between CBIG and 
macroeconomic performances; impact of financial 
crisis on CBIG and finally, the diagnostic, 
specification and robustness checks of the 
techniques applied.  
The CBIG index is constructed following the 
model designed by Ahsan et al. (2008). This index 
is very unique, as it addresses many of the 
problems present in previous indices. It has larger 
number of variables12 covering all aspects of CBIG; 
these variables are divided into sub groups to 
construct six sub-indices; the governance13aspect is 
added to this index to make it more comprehensive 
and robust. The total 26 variables in the model 
together form the overall index (See Appendix 1). 
The CBIG overall and sub-indices are utilised to 
rank 36 sample countries in five categories: CBIG 
(overall), CBIG (sub-indices), CBIG (year 2005), 
CBIG (year 1991-1992), and CBIG (overall)’s 
growth (See Table 2 to 5). While ranking are not a 
prerequisite to test the CBIG and macroeconomic 
performance relationship, they are nevertheless 
highly useful in understanding and justifying the 
results. Inflation and economic growth are applied 
to measure macroeconomic performance. A 
dummy is utilized to measure the impact of 
financial crisis on CBIG. 
                                                           
12
   The highest number of variables in any previous study 
was 16 (Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti 1992). 
13
   It refers to the absence of governance indicators in the 
previous indices as they focused on central bank 
independence (CBI) only.   
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Table 1. The Sample 
 
No. Countries Established Central bank names Income groups Data availability 
(1)     (2) (3)                  (4) (5) (6) 
1 Afghanistan 1939 Da Afghanistan Bank LI 2003-05 
2 Australia 1959 Reserve Bank of Australia HI 1991-05 
3 Azerbaijan 1991 National Bank of the Azerbaijan MI 1996-05 
4 Bangladesh 1971 Bangladesh Bank LI 1991-05 
5 Bhutan‡ 1982 Royal Monetary Authority of Bhutan LI 1991-05 
6 Cambodia 1955 National Bank of Cambodia LI 1992-05 
7 China 1948 People’s Bank of China MI 1995-05 
8 Fiji Islands 1973 Reserve Bank of Fiji MI 1991-05 
9 Hong Kong -SAR‡ 1993 Hong Kong Monetary Authority HI 1993-05 
10 India 1934 Reserve Bank of India LI 1991-05 
11 Indonesia 1953 Bank of Indonesia MI 1991-05 
12 Japan 1882 Bank of Japan HI 1991-05 
13 Kazakhstan 1993 National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan MI 1995-05 
14 Korea Rep. 1950 Bank of Korea HI 1991-05 
15 Kyrgyzstan 1992 National Bank of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan LI 1992-05 
16 Laos PDR 1990 Bank of the Laos PDR LI 1994-05 
17 Macao-SAR‡ 1989 Monetary Authority of Macao HI 1999-05 
18 Malaysia 1958 Bank Negara Malaysia MI 1991-05 
19 Maldives‡ 1981 Maldives Monetary Authority MI 1991-05 
20 Mongolia 1924 Bank of Mongolia LI 1991-05 
21 Nepal 1956 Nepal Rastra Bank LI 2002-05 
22 New Zealand 1934 Reserve Bank of New Zealand HI 1991-05 
23 Pakistan 1956 State Bank of Pakistan LI 1991-05 
24 Papua New Guinea  1973 Bank of Papua New Guinea LI 1991-05 
25 Philippines 1949 Central Bank of Philippines MI 1992-05 
26 Samoa 1974 Central Bank of Samoa MI 1991-05 
27 Solomon Islands 1976 Central Bank of Solomon Islands LI 1991-05 
28 Sri Lanka 1949 Central Bank of Sri Lanka MI 1991-05 
29 Taiwan 1923 Central Bank of China HI 1991-05 
30 Tajikistan 1991 National Bank of the Republic of Tajikistan LI 1996-05 
31 Thailand 1942 Bank of Thailand MI 1991-05 
32 Tonga 1988 National Reserve Bank of Tonga LI 1991-05 
33 Turkmenistan 1993 State Central Bank of Turkmenistan MI 1993-05 
34 Uzbekistan 1995 Central Bank of Uzbekistan LI 1995-05 
35 Vanuatu 1980 Reserve Bank of Vanuatu LI 1991-05 
36 Vietnam 1976 State Bank of Vietnam LI 1991-05 
Notes: LI=Low-income, MI=Middle-income, HI=High-income ‡Monetary Authority (MA). 
^Few countries lack full 15 years data, such as the central Asian countries Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan as they started operating since mid 1990s. Afghanistan has a new central bank act implemented in 2003 and 
there is no record of any previous central banking operation. Few other countries replaced or amended their acts (e.g. Nepal 
in 2002; China in 1995; Macao-SAR in 1999; Hong Kong-SAR in 1993; and Laos PDR in 1994); and previous acts were not 
available for evaluation.  
Source: Authors’ compilation 
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3.3 Index construction 
 
A common and standard procedure followed across 
all countries to construct this index. The major 
sources of data are the central bank acts and 
research publications. Each of the 26 variables in 
the index has multiple alternative outcomes, which 
are ranked and coded in descending order as shown 
in Appendix 1. The variables are equally weighted 
to construct the sub-indices and the overall index. 
The value of the each index ranges between 0 and 
1. Differing weights might have been used but 
Factor Analysis failed to identify any meaningful 
relative weighting. So, they were set as equal to 
minimize any subjective decision.  
 
3.3.1 Subjectivity 
 
The robustness of the CBIG index is as important 
as for the statistical techniques. The central 
difficulty in measuring CBIG is to quantify legal 
information (Alesina and Summers, 1993). Even a 
systematic and careful procedure involve many 
awkward judgments to be made (Cukierman et al., 
1992, Forder, 1999). This paper applied content 
validity and reliability tests to address such 
subjectivity. 
The content validity (also known as logical 
validity) refers to the extent a measure represents 
all facets of a given concept. One of the widely 
used methods of Lawshe (1975) for gauging 
agreement among experts regarding essentiality of 
a particular item, calculated by equation (2). 
Several CBIG expert’s opinions (various 
conference delegates, formal discussants, session 
chairs and conference judges) were collected to 
conduct this test (See Table 6).  
 
 
2
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−
=
                                                                                            (2) 
 
Where, CVR = Content validity ratio, ne = Number 
of panellist indicating “essential”, N = Total 
number of panellist. 
The reliability tests applied here include test 
of stability (test-retest) and internal consistency 
(Cronbach alpha). The test of stability (test-retest) 
determines the reliability in measuring the same 
variable repeatedly under the same conditions and 
then calculating the variability of the resulting 
measures applying equation (3). The Testscore(1) 
is the first test score of the 26 variables to construct 
the index in 2008. The same index was constructed 
again in 2009 to identify any deviations from its 
previous construction, indicated by Testscore(2). 
Out of the 26 variables only two variables were 
slightly deviated from their original scoring. Such 
deviations were adjusted to correct the index. 
 
( )
( )1
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retestTest =−                                                                                 (3) 
 
As the six sub-indices have different 
numbers of variables, the alpha level comparison is 
not appropriate for such indices (Santos, 1999). 
The test-retest method was applied to the sub-
indices only while Cronbach alpha for the overall 
index applying equation (4) in SPSS (See Table 7). 
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   Where, N = The number of items, ( )iY2σ∑ = The sum of item variance, x2σ  =The variance of the total 
composite. 
 
3.4 Establishing Statistical 
Relationship 
 
The estimation-effect test for panel (pooled) data 
used the Hausman (1978) test to decide between 
fixed-effect and random-effect of pool estimation. 
It identified the fixed-effect as the better estimation 
method, but one of the drawbacks of fixed 
estimation method is that it does not produce robust 
results in a invariable data set (Wooldridge, 2003). 
So, the fixed effect may not be the appropriate 
method here as the central bank acts do not change 
frequently, so as the indices. The Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) model was 
therefore applied to test the relationship between 
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CBIG indices, inflation and economic growth. The 
FGLS produces better results in a sample of diverse 
country-specific characteristics, such as the sample 
of this paper (see column 5 of Table 1); and it also 
corrects for cross-section hetroskedasticity 
(Nowak-Lehmann et al., 2007).  
Out of the two major macroeconomic 
performance indicators, inflation is considered as 
the proxy of actual CBIG (Cukierman et al., 1992). 
The reason is that when a central bank is 
independent it can successfully control the price 
stability and reduce inflation. In contrast, low 
CBIG indicates to high government intervention, so 
government would fulfill its political and election 
winning agenda first even at the cost of economic 
and price stability.   
In addition to testing inflation (See Table 8 
and 9) and economic growth (See Table 10) with 
CBIG, several refined samples were utilized to 
measure the robustness of the main findings. The 
overall index and inflation were tested in four other 
refined samples: countries with central banks only; 
ones with monetary authorities only; inflation 
targeting countries only; and finally replacing 
Asian financial crisis 1997 dummy with Asian 
financial crisis 2000 dummy in columns 2, 3, 4 and 
5 of Table 9 respectively.  
The relationship of financial crisis with 
inflation and economic growth were tested by 
equations (5) to (8). In equation (5) the dependent 
variables is the transformed inflation (YDtk); the 
independent variables include Asian financial crisis 
dummy (ASCRIStk); CBIG indices (CBIGitk), real 
interest rate (RInttk), low-income countries dummy 
(LICtk), where low-income countries = 1 and 
medium and high = 0; and finally money supply 
growth (MoneyGtk). Two Asian financial crisis 
dummies were utilised to improve the robustness of 
the impact of the crisis. The first dummy covered 
pre-crisis period as 1991-1997 and post-crisis 
period as 1998-2005. The second dummy identified 
an alternative post-crisis period of 2000-2005 
considering the fact that the crisis was not over 
immediately after a year rather might have taken 
few years to settle.  
 
YDtk = βo + β1CBIGitk + β2ASCRIStk + β3 LICtk + β4MoneyGtk + β5RInttk + εtk 
 
(5) 
 
The relationship between CBIG and inflation 
may have two-way causality. This is because 
higher inflation may make it easier for the 
government to influence monetary policy even 
where the central bank charter does not allow this 
(Cukierman et al., 1992). A simple Granger 
causality test is therefore applied here as expressed 
by equations (6-7). 
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Where, CBIGOALL = CBIG (Overall) index, 
YD= Transformed inflation, YDt-1 = Lag of 
Transformed inflation and εt = ut = error term. The 
equation (6) shows the relationship that CBIG 
(overall) Granger cause inflation and equation (7) 
explains that inflation Granger cause CBIG 
(overall).   
In equation (8), the dependent variable is the 
annual growth rate of GDP at market rate (EcoG); 
the independent variables include Asian financial 
crisis dummy (ASCRIStk)  where pre-crisis period 
is 1991-1997 and post-crisis period is 1998-2005; 
CBIG indices (CBIGitk), low–income countries 
dummy (LICtk), where low-income countries = 1 
and medium and high = 0; high–income countries 
dummy (HICtk), where high-income countries = 1 
and low and medium = 0; terms of trade (TOTtk); 
initial GDP (INGDPtk), initial primary school 
enrolment (IPSEtk), and initial secondary school 
enrolment (ISCEtk). 
 
EcoGtk = βo + β1CBIGitk + β2ASCRIS1997tk + β3LICtk + β4HICtk  
 
+ β5INGDPtk + β6TOTtk + β7IPSEtk +  β8ISCEtk + εtk  (8) 
 
 
The diagnostics tests for these analyses include stationarity14 check by Augmented Dickey-
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Fuller (ADF) test; multi-collinearity was avoided 
by keeping highly correlated variables in separate 
regression models. Hetroskedasticity is addressed 
by applying robust standard error method. So, the 
covariance matrix was corrected via the White’s 
(1980) correction test. The annual inflation (pi) 
figures were converted to transformed 
inflation 15 (YD) to ameliorate potential 
hetroskedasticity problem (Cukierman et al., 1992, 
de Haan and Kooi, 2000, Ja'come and Va'zquez, 
2005); finally, autocorrelation among the error 
terms were examined by the Wooldridge (2002) 
test. 
 
4. CBIG Index rankings 
 
The CBIG (overall) and CBIG growth rankings are 
presented by Figure 1 and 2. The overall, growth 
and sub-indices ranking for year 1991-2005; year 
2005; and years 1991-92 are also shown in Table 2 
to 5. The numbers in the brackets indicate the 
ranking of the central banks. 
The average CBIG (overall) ranking indicates 
that the two Pacific countries Australia and New 
Zealand; and the Central Asian country Kazakhstan 
are clearly at the top three positions in Figure 1 and 
column 2 of Table 2. The other Pacific countries 
Fiji, PNG, Samoa, Solomon Island, Tonga and 
Vanuatu are well below in the ranking. All Central 
Asian countries, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have 
high level of CBIG except for Azerbaijan. These 
countries are relatively new but allowed a high 
level of CBIG to their central banks from the 
beginning of their operations. The South Asian 
country Afghanistan is the most surprise inclusion 
in the fourth position. This high ranking is due to 
its newly formulated central bank act in 2003, 
which supports higher independence in all its 
operations. Nepal, Sri Lanka and India are also in 
prominent positions, higher than many South East, 
East and Pacific countries, but Pakistan, Bhutan 
and Bangladesh hold low positions in the ranking. 
Specially, Maldives is lowest in the South Asia and 
second lowest among all Asia Pacific countries. 
Taiwan is at the fifth position and top among the 
East Asian countries. Korea Republic attained a 
commendable ninth position; but China, Mongolia, 
Japan, Macao, and Hong Kong are gradually 
positioned from the middle to the lower part of the 
Figure 1 and column 2 of Table 2. The Philippines 
of South-East Asia has attained sixth position in the 
Asia Pacific ranking and top in its region. Malaysia 
is second in the region but tenth in the Asia Pacific, 
but the ranking gradually declined for Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Thailand, Laos PDR and Vietnam. The 
two low ranked countries Laos PDR and Vietnam 
are also among the bottom three countries in the 
Asia Pacific (See column 2 of Table 2).  
Column 3 of Table 2 reflects the country’s 
CBIG position at the end of the sample period, 
2005. The top five positions are taken by countries 
from different regions. Central Asian country 
Kazakhstan topped the table improving from 
second (column 2) to first (column 1); however the 
two Pacific countries Australia and New Zealand 
maintained their leading positions. East Asian 
country Taiwan maintained its fifth position in both 
categories. Indonesia is a new inclusion here 
showing remarkable improvement from twenty 
second position (column 2) to third position 
(column 3). Afghanistan dropped from its fourth 
position to sixth place. Other rankings have also 
changed between columns 2 and 3 in Table 2.  
The 1991-92 CBIG ranking in column 4 of 
Table 2 shows New Zealand, Taiwan, Philippines, 
Australia and Malaysia in the top five positions. 11 
countries, however, are excluded here due to lack 
of data: the central Asian countries of Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan. Except Kyrgyzstan, most of them 
commenced operation since mid 1990s. The others 
were countries whose existing central banks acts 
were amended or introduced a new act (eg. 
Afghanistan, Nepal, China, Macao-SAR, Hong 
Kong-SAR and Laos PDR). The data (acts) of these 
countries were not found prior to those changes. 
These 11 countries exclusion improved the 
remaining country’s ranking temporarily (See 
column 4 of Table 2).  
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Table 2 CBIG (Overall) Ranking, 1991-2005* 
 
Country Average  
CBIG  
(overall) 
Year  
2005 
Year   
1991-92 
Average  
CBIG 
(overall)’s 
Growth 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Australia 0.8015 (1) 0.8269 (2) 0.7197 (4) 0.0103(13) 
Kazakhstan 0.8003 (2) 0.8377 (1) - 0.0116(12) 
New Zealand 0.7942 (3) 0.7942 (4) 0.7942 (1) 0.0000(30) 
Afghanistan 0.7496 (4) 0.7496 (6) - 0.0000(30) 
Taiwan 0.7442 (5) 0.7731 (5) 0.7397 (2) 0.0032(24) 
Philippines 0.7354 (6) 0.7453 (7) 0.7314 (3) 0.0015(27) 
Turkmenistan 0.7074 (7) 0.7244 (9) - 0.0069(19) 
Nepal 0.6972 (8) 0.6972 (11) - 0.0000(30) 
Korea Rep. 0.6852 (9) 0.7244 (9) 0.6356 (7) 0.0097(17) 
Malaysia 0.6841 (10) 0.6878 (13) 0.6878 (5) 0.0005(29) 
Tajikistan 0.6817 (11) 0.6873 (14) - 0.0098(16) 
Uzbekistan 0.6789 (12) 0.6789 (15) - 0.0000(30) 
Kyrgyzstan 0.6623 (13) 0.7370 (8) 0.5167 (10) 0.0304(8) 
Sri Lanka 0.6510 (14) 0.6714 (16) 0.6436 (6) 0.0031(25) 
India 0.6333 (15) 0.6378 (19) 0.6044 (8) 0.0042(23) 
China 0.6173 (16) 0.6446 (18) - 0.0055(21) 
Fiji 0.5928 (17) 0.5928 (22)  0.5928 (9) 0.0000(30) 
Mongolia 0.5865 (18) 0.6325 (21) 0.4500 (13) 0.0268(10) 
Cambodia 0.5692 (19) 0.6369 (20) 0.4000 (19) 0.0456(3) 
Azerbaijan 0.5637 (20) 0.6894 (12) -  0.0328(7) 
Japan 0.5483 (21) 0.6645 (17) 0.4156 (16) 0.0428(6) 
Indonesia 0.5468 (22) 0.8256 (3) 0.3143 (21) 0.1133(1) 
PNG 0.5091 (23) 0.7083 (10) 0.4072 (17) 0.0492(2) 
Pakistan 0.4947 (24) 0.5169 (24) 0.4892 (12) 0.0056(20) 
Vanuatu 0.4892 (25) 0.4929 (26) 0.4929 (11) 0.001(28) 
Solomon Islands 0.4469 (26) 0.4469 (28) 0.4469 (14) 0.0000(30) 
Samoa 0.4381 (27) 0.4381 (29) 0.4381 (15) 0.0000(30) 
Macao-SAR 0.4289 (28) 0.4289 (30) - 0.0000(30) 
Tonga 0.4164 (29) 0.4497 (27) 0.3942 (20) 0.0101(15) 
Bhutan 0.4014 (30) 0.4100 (31) 0.4008 (18) 0.0016(26) 
Thailand 0.4009 (31) 0.5261 (23) 0.3128 (22) 0.0435(5) 
Hong Kong-SAR 0.3605 (32) 0.3733 (32) - 0.0102(14) 
Bangladesh 0.3589 (33) 0.4958 (25) 0.3125 (23) 0.0440(4) 
Laos PDR 0.2687 (34) 0.2733 (33) - 0.0232(11) 
Maldives 0.2593 (35) 0.2667 (34) 0.2389 (24) 0.0083(18) 
Vietnam 0.1476 (36) 0.1742 (35) 0.1186 (25) 0.0297(9) 
Source: Author’s calculation 
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Figure 1. Average CBIG (overall) 1991-2005 
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Figure 2. CBIG (overall)  growth 1991-2005 
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Finally, column 5 of Table 2 examines each 
country’s overall improvement over the sample 
period. It compares each country’s starting and 
ending CBIG score and then ranks them. This 
produces some surprising outcomes as the top five 
countries (Indonesia, PNG, Cambodia, Bangladesh, 
and Thailand) are totally different from the 
previous categories. In contrast, only two countries 
(Kazakhstan and Australia) among the previously 
top five countries (based on average CBIG overall) 
showed moderate CBIG growth (twelfth and 
thirteenth respectively). It is worth noting that the 
top five here in column 5 are all low or middle 
income countries and some were severely affected 
by the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The latter 
could be one of the reasons behind such 
improvements.  
The overall index is the compilation of six 
sub-indices, so any change in the overall position 
indicates a corresponding change in the sub-
indices. The sub-indices ranking for entire sample 
period (1991-2005); year 2005 and years 1991-92 
are explained in Table 3 to 5.  These tables help to 
understand the specific strengths and weaknesses in 
each overall ranking.  
 
Table 3. CBIG Ranking, 1991-2005* 
 
Countries CBIG 
(Overall) 
CBIG 
(Leg) 
CBIG 
(Pol) 
CBIG 
(PStab) 
CBIG 
(Forx) 
CBIG 
(MonPol) 
CBIG 
(AccTrans) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Australia 0.8015 (1) 0.5067(4) 1.0000(1) 0.9410(2) 0.6667(3) 0.8330(4) 0.8620(2) 
Kazakhstan 0.8003 (2) 0.3624(12) 1.0000(1) 0.9390(3) 1.0000(1) 1.0000(1) 0.5000(17) 
New Zealand 0.7942 (3) 0.3200(16) 1.0000(1) 1.0000(1) 0.6667(3) 0.9170(2) 0.8620(2) 
Afghanistan 0.7496 (4) 0.3860(10) 1.0000(1) 0.5570(14) 1.0000(1) 1.0000(1) 0.5550(13) 
Taiwan 0.7442 (5) 0.5467(3) 1.0000(1) 0.8900(5) 0.3333(7) 1.0000(1) 0.6950(5) 
Philippines 0.7354 (6) 0.3600(13) 1.0000(1) 0.8900(5) 0.6667(3) 0.7220(8) 0.7740(3) 
Turkmenistan 0.7074 (7) 0.4000(8) 0.667(10) 0.7870(10) 1.0000(1) 0.8900(3) 0.5000(17) 
Nepal 0.6972 (8) 0.3200(16) 1.0000(1) 0.5570(14) 0.8333(2) 0.8900(3) 0.5830(11) 
Korea Rep. 0.6852 (9) 0.6000(1) 1.0000(1) 0.8440(9) 0.3333(7) 0.3880(21) 0.9450(1) 
Malaysia 0.6841 (10) 0.3200(16) 0.978(2) 0.8900(5) 0.6667(3) 0.5830(12) 0.6670(6) 
Tajikistan 0.6817 (11) 0.2320(20) 0.8900(7) 0.8570(8) 1.0000(1) 0.5000(14) 0.6120(7) 
Uzbekistan 0.6789 (12) 0.3520(14) 1.0000(1) 1.0000(1) 0.6667(3) 0.4430(18) 0.6120(7) 
Kyrgyzstan 0.6623 (13) 0.4563(6) 1.0000(1) 0.8650(7) 0.3333(7) 0.7530(5) 0.5660(12) 
Sri Lanka 0.6510 (14) 0.3600(13) 1.0000(1) 0.5570(14) 0.6667(3) 0.7230(7) 0.5990(10) 
India 0.6333 (15) 0.4933(5) 1.0000(1) 0.8900(5) 0.3333(7) 0.5000(14) 0.5830(11) 
China 0.6173 (16) 0.2024(22) 0.667(10) 0.8900(5) 0.3333(7) 1.0000(1) 0.6120(7) 
Fiji 0.5928 (17) 0.2800(18) 1.0000(1) 0.5570(14) 0.6667(3) 0.3320(23) 0.7220(4) 
Mongolia 0.5865 (18) 0.4467(7) 0.9630(3) 0.8680(6) 0.3333(7) 0.4070(20) 0.5010(16) 
Cambodia 0.5692 (19) 0.3429(15) 0.8100(9) 0.4930(16) 0.4286(5) 0.7310(6) 0.6110(8) 
Azerbaijan 0.5637 (20) 0.2200(21) 1.0000(1) 0.9120(4) 0.3333(7) 0.4330(19) 0.4830(18) 
Japan 0.5483 (21) 0.5904(2) 0.9220(6) 0.5570(14) 0.0000(13) 0.6110(11) 0.6100(9) 
Indonesia 0.5468 (22) 0.3992(9) 0.5340(12) 0.7640(11) 0.3889(6) 0.6440(10) 0.5510(14) 
PNG 0.5091 (23) 0.3600(13) 0.9340(5) 0.2450(19) 0.6667(3) 0.4660(17) 0.3830(21) 
Pakistan 0.4947 (24) 0.2400(19) 0.9560(4) 0.7230(12) 0.2444(9) 0.4720(16) 0.3330(23) 
Vanuatu 0.4892 (25) 0.3740(11) 0.9780(2) 0.7230(12) 0.0000(13) 0.4430(18) 0.4170(19) 
Solomon 0.4469 (26) 0.3200(16) 1.0000(1) 0.3900(18) 0.0000(13) 0.5550(13) 0.4170(19) 
Samoa Islands 0.4381 (27) 0.2400(19) 1.0000(1) 0.5570(14) 0.0000(13) 0.4430(18) 0.3880(20) 
Macao-SAR 0.4289 (28) 0.1000(23) 0.8900(7) 0.5570(14) 0.5000(4) 0.1100(28) 0.4170(19) 
Tonga 0.4164 (29) 0.2800(18) 0.8900(7) 0.5570(14) 0.1333(11) 0.2220(27) 0.4170(19) 
Bhutan 0.4014 (30) 0.2400(19) 0.6100(11) 0.3900(18) 0.3333(7) 0.4980(15) 0.3370(22) 
Thailand 0.4009 (31) 0.1000(23) 0.8680(8) 0.6220(13) 0.2000(10) 0.3430(22) 0.272(026) 
Hong Kong-SAR 0.3605 (32) 0.1000(23) 0.6670(10) 0.2230(20) 0.0000(13) 0.6670(9) 0.5060(15) 
Bangladesh 0.3589 (33) 0.3147(17) 0.8680(8) 0.4330(17) 0.0667(12) 0.2610(26) 0.2110(27) 
Laos PDR 0.2687 (34) 0.3200(16) 0.0000(13) 0.3900(18) 0.3056(8) 0.3050(24) 0.2920(25) 
Maldives 0.2593 (35) 0.1000(23) 0.0000(13) 0.5120(15) 0.3333(7) 0.2770(25) 0.3330(23) 
Vietnam 0.1476 (36) 0.1000(23) 0.0000(13) 0.3900(18) 0.0000(13) 0.1000(29) 0.2960(24) 
Source: Author’s calculation 
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Table 4. CBIG Ranking, Year 2005 
 
Countries CBIG 
(Overall) 
CBIG 
(Leg) 
CBIG 
(Pol) 
CBIG 
(PStab) 
CBIG 
(Forx) 
CBIG 
(MonPol) 
CBIG 
(AccTrans) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Afghanistan 0.7496 (6) 0.3860 (11) 1.0000 (1) 0.5567 (4) 1.0000 (1) 1.0000 (1) 0.5550 (11) 
Australia 0.8269 (2) 0.6000 (4) 1.0000 (1) 1.0000 (1) 0.6667 (3) 0.8333 (5) 0.8617 (2) 
Azerbaijan 0.6894 (12) 0.2200 (20) 1.0000 (1) 1.0000 (1) 0.3333 (5) 0.8333 (5) 0.7500 (5) 
Bangladesh 0.4958 (25) 0.2800 (17) 1.0000 (1) 0.5567 (4) 0.3333 (5) 0.4167 (16) 0.3883 (15) 
Bhutan 0.4100 (31) 0.2400 (18) 0.6100 (4) 0.3900 (5) 0.3333 (5) 0.4983 (13) 0.3883 (15) 
Cambodia 0.6369 (20) 0.3200 (16) 1.0000 (1) 0.5567 (4) 0.3333 (5) 0.8900 (3) 0.7217 (6) 
China 0.6446 (18) 0.3660 (13) 0.6667 (3) 0.8900 (2) 0.3333 (5) 1.0000 (1) 0.6117 (9) 
Fiji 0.5928 (22) 0.2800 (17) 1.0000 (1) 0.5567 (4) 0.6667 (3) 0.3317 (18) 0.7217 (6) 
Hong Kong 0.3733 (32) 0.1000 (21) 0.6667 (3) 0.2233 (6) 0.0000 (6) 0.6667 (9) 0.5833 (10) 
India 0.6378 (19) 0.5200 (17) 1.0000 (1) 0.8900 (2) 0.3333 (5) 0.5000 (12) 0.5833 (10) 
Indonesia 0.8256 (3) 0.4520 (9) 0.8900 (2) 1.0000 (1) 0.8333 (2) 1.0000 (1) 0.7783 (4) 
Japan 0.6645 (17) 0.6520 (3) 1.0000 (1) 0.5567 (4) 0.0000 (6) 1.0000 (1) 0.7783 (4) 
Kazakhstan 0.8377 (1) 0.5260 (6) 1.0000 (1) 1.0000 (1) 1.0000 (1) 1.0000 (1) 0.5000 (13) 
Korea Rep. 0.7244 (9) 0.6800 (2) 1.0000 (1) 1.0000 (1) 0.3333 (5) 0.3883 (17) 0.9450 (1) 
Kyrgyzstan 0.7370 (8) 0.5320 (5) 1.0000 (1) 1.0000 (1) 0.3333 (5) 0.8617 (4) 0.6950 (7) 
Laos 0.2733 (33) 0.3200 (16) 0.0000 (5) 0.3900 (5) 0.3333 (5) 0.3050 (19) 0.2917 (17) 
Macao 0.4289 (30) 0.1000 (21) 0.8900 (2) 0.5567 (4) 0.5000 (4) 0.1100 (23) 0.4167 (14) 
Malaysia 0.6878 (13) 0.3200 (16) 1.0000 (1) 0.8900 (2) 0.6667 (3) 0.5833 (10) 0.6667 (8) 
Maldives 0.2667 (34) 0.1000 (21) 0.0000 (5) 0.5567 (4) 0.3333 (5) 0.2767 (20) 0.3333 (16) 
Mongolia 0.6325 (21) 0.4600 (8) 1.0000 (1) 0.8900 (2) 0.3333 (5) 0.5833 (10) 0.5283 (12) 
Nepal 0.6972 (11) 0.3200 (16) 1.0000 (1) 0.5567 (4) 0.8333 (2) 0.8900 (3) 0.5833 (10) 
New Zealand 0.7942 (4) 0.3200 (16) 1.0000 (1) 1.0000 (1) 0.6667 (3) 0.9167 (2) 0.8617 (2) 
Pakistan 0.5169 (24) 0.2400 (18) 1.0000 (1) 0.7233 (3) 0.3333 (5) 0.4717 (14) 0.3333 (16) 
Philippines 0.7453 (7) 0.3600 (14) 1.0000 (1) 0.8900 (2) 0.6667 (3) 0.7217 (8) 0.8333 (3) 
PNG 0.7083 (10) 0.3600 (14) 1.0000 (1) 0.8900 (2) 0.6667 (3) 0.7500 (6) 0.5833 (10) 
Samoa 0.4381 (29) 0.2400 (18) 1.0000 (1) 0.5567 (4) 0.0000 (6) 0.4433 (15) 0.3883 (15) 
Solomon 0.4469 (28) 0.3200 (16) 1.0000 (1) 0.3900 (5) 0.0000 (6) 0.5550 (11) 0.4167 (14) 
Sri Lanka 0.6714 (16) 0.3600 (14) 1.0000 (1) 0.5567 (4) 0.6667 (3) 0.7233 (7) 0.7217 (6) 
Taiwan 0.7731 (5) 0.7200 (1) 1.0000 (1) 0.8900 (2) 0.3333 (5) 1.0000 (1) 0.6950 (7) 
Tajikistan 0.6873 (14) 0.2320 (19) 0.8900 (2) 0.8900 (2) 0.0000 (6) 0.5000 (12) 0.6117 (9) 
Thailand 0.5261 (23) 0.1000 (21) 0.8900 (2) 0.8900 (2) 0.3333 (5) 0.4433 (15) 0.5000 (13) 
Tonga 0.4497 (27) 0.2800 (17) 0.8900 (2) 0.5567 (4) 0.3333 (5) 0.2217 (21) 0.4167 (14) 
Turkmenistan 0.7244 (9) 0.4000 (10) 0.6667 (3) 0.8900 (2) 1.0000 (1) 0.8900 (3) 0.5000 (13) 
Uzbekistan 0.6789 (15) 0.3520 (15) 1.0000 (1) 1.0000 (1) 0.6667 (3) 0.4433 (15) 0.6117 (9) 
Vanuatu 0.4929 (26) 0.3740 (12) 1.0000 (1) 0.7233 (3) 0.0000 (6) 0.4433 (15) 0.4167 (14) 
Vietnam 0.1742 (35) 0.1000 (21) 0.0000 (5) 0.3900 (5) 0.0000 (6) 0.1667 (22) 0.3883 (15) 
Source: Author’s calculation  
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Table 5. CBIG Ranking, Year 1991-92 
 
Countries CBIG 
(Overall) 
CBIG 
(Leg) 
CBIG 
(Pol) 
CBIG 
(PStab) 
CBIG 
(Forx) 
CBIG 
(MonPol) 
CBIG 
(AccTrans) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
New Zealand 0.7942 (1) 0.3200 (8) 1.0000 (1) 1.0000 (1) 0.6667 (1) 0.9167 (2) 0.8617 (2) 
Taiwan 0.7397 (2) 0.5200 (1) 1.0000 (1) 0.8900 (2) 0.3333 (2) 1.0000 (1) 0.6950 (5) 
Philippines 0.7314 (3) 0.3600 (7) 1.0000 (1) 0.8900 (2) 0.6667 (1) 0.7217 (5) 0.7500 (3) 
Australia 0.7197 (4) 0.4000 (4) 1.0000 (1) 0.5567 (5) 0.6667 (1) 0.8333 (3) 0.8617 (2) 
Malaysia 0.6878 (5) 0.3200 (8) 1.0000 (1) 0.8900 (2) 0.6667 (1) 0.5833 (6) 0.6667 (6) 
Sri Lanka 0.6436 (6) 0.3600 (7) 1.0000 (1) 0.5567 (5) 0.6667 (1) 0.7233 (4) 0.5550 (8) 
Korea Rep. 0.6356 (7) 0.4800 (2) 1.0000 (1) 0.6667 (4) 0.3333 (2) 0.3883 (13) 0.9450 (1) 
India 0.6044 (8) 0.3200 (8) 1.0000 (1) 0.8900 (2) 0.3333 (2) 0.5000 (9) 0.5833 (7) 
Fiji 0.5928 (9) 0.2800 (9) 1.0000 (1) 0.5567 (5) 0.6667 (1) 0.3317 (15) 0.7217 (4) 
Kyrgyzstan 0.5167 (10) 0.3200 (8) 1.0000 (1) 0.5567 (5) 0.3333 (2) 0.5567 (7) 0.3333 (12) 
Vanuatu 0.4929 (11) 0.3740 (6) 1.0000 (1) 0.7233 (3) 0.0000 (4) 0.4433 (12) 0.4167 (10) 
Pakistan 0.4892 (12) 0.2400 (10) 1.0000 (1) 0.7233 (3) 0.1667 (3) 0.4717 (11) 0.3333 (12) 
Mongolia 0.4500 (13) 0.4200 (3) 0.8900 (2) 0.5567 (5) 0.3333 (2) 0.0550 (19) 0.4450 (9) 
Solomon 0.4469 (14) 0.3200 (8) 1.0000 (1) 0.3900 (7) 0.0000 (4) 0.5550 (8) 0.4167 (10) 
Samoa 0.4381 (15) 0.2400 (10) 1.0000 (1) 0.5567 (5) 0.0000 (4) 0.4433 (12) 0.3883 (11) 
Japan 0.4156 (16) 0.5200 (1) 0.8333 (3) 0.5567 (5) 0.0000 (4) 0.1667 (18) 0.4167 (10) 
PNG 0.4072 (17) 0.3600 (7) 0.8900 (2) 0.0000 (10) 0.6667 (1) 0.2767 (16) 0.2500 (13) 
Bhutan 0.4008 (18) 0.2400 (10) 0.6100 (4) 0.3900 (7) 0.3333 (2) 0.4983 (10) 0.3333 (12) 
Cambodia 0.4000 (19) 0.4000 (4) 0.3333 (5) 0.3333 (8) 0.6667 (1) 0.3333 (14) 0.3333 (12) 
Tonga 0.3942 (20) 0.2800 (9) 0.8900 (2) 0.5567 (5) 0.0000 (4) 0.2217 (17) 0.4167 (10) 
Indonesia 0.3143 (21) 0.3860 (5) 0.2233 (6) 0.5567 (5) 0.0000 (4) 0.3317 (15) 0.3883 (11) 
Thailand 0.3128 (22) 0.1000 (11) 0.8900 (2) 0.4433 (6) 0.0000 (4) 0.2767 (16) 0.1667 (14) 
Bangladesh 0.3125 (23) 0.3200 (8) 0.8900 (2) 0.2767 (9) 0.0000 (4) 0.2217 (17) 0.1667 (14) 
Maldives 0.2389 (24) 0.1000 (11) 0.0000 (7) 0.3900 (7) 0.3333 (2) 0.2767 (16) 0.3333 (12) 
Vietnam 0.1186 (25) 0.1000 (11) 0.0000 (7) 0.3900 (7) 0.0000 (4) 0.0550 (19) 0.1667 (14) 
Afghanistan - - - - - - - 
Azerbaijan - - - - - - - 
China - - - - - - - 
Hong Kong - - - - - - - 
Kazakhstan - - - - - - - 
Laos - - - - - - - 
Macao - - - - - - - 
Nepal - - - - - - - 
Tajikistan - - - - - - - 
Turkmenistan - - - - - - - 
Uzbekistan - - - - - - - 
     Source: Author’s calculation  
 
The acceptability of these rankings very 
much depends on the validity and reliability of the 
indices. The content validity ratios (CVR) of all 
indices are much higher than that of required table 
value. The CVR requirement is inversely related to 
number of panellists consulted. The required CVR 
value for 40 16  panellist is 0.29, whereas the 
minimum CVR achieved here is 0.73 (column 5 of 
Table 6) when the number of panellists for CBIG 
index is much higher (56) than the table value. So, 
the CVR demonstrates very high content validity 
for CBIG indices.  
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Table 6. Content Validity Ratio (CVR) 
 
CBIG  indices Agreed as “essential”(ne) Partially agreed Total (N) CVR 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CBIGLeg 56 9 65 0.73 
CBIGPol  56 7 63 0.77 
CBIGPStab 56 2 58 0.93 
CBIGForx 56 3 59 0.90 
CBIGMonPol 56 2 58 0.93 
CBIGAccTrns 56 2 58 0.93 
CBIGOverall 56 9 65 0.73 
Notes: Agreed as “essential” (ne) calculates the number of experts fully agree about all 26 variables of 
the index (column 2). Partially agreed means few experts had some suggestions for shifting a particular 
variable to another sub-indices but not disagreeing its essentiality in the CBIG index (column 3). Total 
(N) defines the total number of experts considered for this analysis (column 4). 
Source: Author’s calculation  
 
The reliability of CBIG indices is also very 
high. The two lowest reliability (test re-test) scores 
is 0.80 and 0.83 for CBIG (legal) and CBIG 
(accountability and transparency) respectively. 
CBIG (political), CBIG (price stability objectives), 
CBIG (exchange rate policy) and CBIG (monetary 
policy and deficit financing) indices have 100% 
(1.00) reliability (column 4). The overall reliability 
of 0.88 also shows a high level of reliability 
(column 5); normally an Cronbach alpha value of 
0.60 or 0.70 is considered as acceptable (Santos, 
1999). High content validity and reliability suggest 
that the constructed index has very low level of 
subjectivity problems.  
 
 
Table 7. Reliability Ratio 
 
Reliability CBIG indices Testscore(1) 
(2008) 
Testscore(2) 
(2009) (Test-retest) (Cronbach  Alpha) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CBIGLeg 5 4 0.80 - 
CBIGPol  3 3 1.00 - 
CBIGPStab 3 3 1.00 - 
CBIGForx 3 3 1.00 - 
CBIGMonPol 6 6 1.00 - 
CBIGAccTrns 6 5 0.83 - 
CBIGOverall 26 24 - 0.88 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
4. 1 Statistical Relationship between 
CBIG, macroeconomic performances 
and Asian financial crisis 
 
The main finding is that the inflation (YD) has 
significantly declined in the post financial crisis 
period in the Asia Pacific. The Asian financial 
crisis dummy is highly significant (at 1%) in full 
sample (column 3 of Table 8); in inflation targeting 
countries 1991-2005 sample (column 4 of Table 9). 
This may suggest that central banks played an 
important role in the post-crisis inflation reduction 
as price stability is the primary duty of a central 
bank. This is an important finding as during the 
Asian financial crisis, the central banks were 
partially blamed for failing to manage inflation and 
for poor governance (Cole and Slade, 1998). 
Several Asian countries addressed this by 
amending central bank objectives to concentrate 
more on price stability as well as more 
independence and governance. These changes may 
have contributed to such reduction in inflation.  
The adjusted R square value shows that 
21.62% of the variations in the regressand 
(inflation) are influenced by the regressor(s) in the 
full sample (column 3 of Table 8). The strength of 
the overall test is confirmed by a highly significant 
F statistics (at 1%). The results of other 
independent variables in equation (5) are presented 
in the following few paragraphs. These variables 
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include CBIG indices (CBIG), low-income country 
dummy (LIC), money supply growth (MoneyG) 
and finally, real interest rate (RInt).  
The inflation and CBIG (overall) index has 
showed a significant negative relationship. So, it 
means that increase in CBIG associates with 
significant decrease in inflation. This negative 
relationship was expected as a highly independent 
central bank controls inflation better (Cukierman et 
al., 1992). Such robust negative relationship is 
often attributed to a two-way causality between 
them (Cukierman et al., 1992). A Granger causality 
test of CBIG (overall) and inflation, however, finds 
no two-way causality rather finds CBIG (overall) 
only Granger cause inflation as reported in Table 
11. This view is supported by an earlier finding of 
Cukierman et al. (1992) where no two-way 
causality was found. The importance of this finding 
is that there are many developing countries in this 
sample which often experience high inflation, 
however this finding identified that increase in 
CBIG (overall) has contributed to reduction in 
inflation even in the developing countries of Asia 
Pacific; and that drop in inflation in the post 
financial crisis period is also highly significant.  
The income level dummy is positive and 
highly significant (at 1%). It means that the 
inflation in the low-income countries was higher 
than the middle and high-income ones. In general, 
the central banks in low-income countries with low 
CBIG appeared less successful in controlling 
inflation. This may reflect a politically motivated 
monetary policy where price stability was often 
sacrificed and lacked inflation targeting 
program 17 . Though, low-income countries had 
relatively higher inflation than middle- and high-
income countries, they did not affect the overall 
negative relationship between CBIG and inflation.  
Money supply growth (MoneyG) also 
showed a highly significant (at 1%) positive 
relationship with inflation. Money supply may be 
not the only determining influence on inflation but 
it is an important one (Kwon et al., 2006). This 
positive relationship reflects that the inflation 
would increase with any increase in the money 
supply.  
The real interest rate (RInt) in the equation 
has a negative and significant (at 10%) relationship 
with inflation. This finding is supported by 
Cukierman et al. (1993). This suggests that the real 
return to savers in short-term financial assets 
remains below its competitive equilibrium level 
due to government regulation and periodic inflation 
surprises. As the majority of the lower CBIG 
countries in the Asia Pacific are low or middle 
income countries, this negative relationship also 
may be an indicator of financial repression which 
reduces as the CBIG increases (Cukierman et al., 
1993).  
The relationship between inflation and CBIG 
(sub-indices) resembles the same findings with 
CBIG (overall). All these indices have inherent 
significant (at 1%) negative relationship with 
inflation as documented in column 2 of Table 8. 
The Asian financial crisis dummy is highly 
significant (at 1%) and negative, manifesting that 
the increase in CBIG (sub-indices) associates with 
the decline in inflation in the post crisis period. The 
negative relationship between inflation and CBIG 
(sub-indices) are also evident here except for CBIG 
(exchange rate policy) (column 7 Table 8). Similar 
significant relationship was found in other refined 
samples (See Table 9). Inflation has significantly 
(at 10%) dropped in central banks only sample 
(column 2); (at 1%) in inflation targeting countries 
(column 4) and (at 1%); and (at 1%) in full sample 
with modified Asian financial crisis dummy 
(column 5 of Table 9). The test for monetary 
authorities only sample was not valid as shown by 
the F statistics; however the F statistics for other 
three samples were highly significant (at 1%). The 
adjusted R square values are high, indicating the 
robustness of the tests. The other independent 
variables in the tests produce similar results to the 
main findings in Table 8 with slight variations. 
Finding similar results in the full sample (Table 8) 
and other refined samples (Table 9) reaffirms that 
the increase in CBIG is significantly associated 
with the decline in inflation in the post crisis 
period. 
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Table 8. Relationship between CBIG (overall and sub-indices), Inflation and Asian Financial Crisis (Full Sample) 
 
Inflation (Dependent) 
Each index 
separately with no 
control variable 
 
Overall Legal Political Price stability 
objectives 
Exchange rate  
Policy 
Monetary 
policy  
and deficit 
financing 
Accountability 
and  
transparency 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Constant  25.37418*** 34.49707*** 33.73735*** 36.41818*** 50.35067*** 32.58630*** 33.23121*** 
CBIG (Overall) index -8.307*** -2.339457**       
CBIG (Legal) Index -5.8699***  -2.494412**      
CBIG (Political) Index -9.1998***   -2.714846***     
CBIG (Price Stability Objectives) Index -6.859***    -2.751916***    
CBIG (Exchange Rate Policy) Index 8.901***     3.910446***   
CBIG (Monetary policy and Deficit Financing) Index -7.428***      -3.118792***  
CBIG (Accountability and Transparency) Index -10.482***       -3.394781*** 
Asian Financial Crisis 1997 Dummy  -3.065404*** -2.117949** -3.337324*** -2.768304*** -3.573754*** -3.865378*** -2.589082*** 
Low Income Countries (LIC) Dummy  7.329980*** 12.08869*** 7.903171*** 5.908732*** 5.512593*** 10.88538*** 8.561846*** 
Money Supply Growth (%)  4.256754*** 4.691939*** 3.652903*** 5.820067*** 4.816202*** 4.706254*** 5.033637** 
Real Interest Rate (%)  -2.583928** -2.122368** -1.447246    -1.587437 -1.380546 -2.562314** -1.748485* 
Adj. R2  0.216231 0.224090 0.178031 0.182160 0.161124 0.289978 0.241913 
F- Statistics 0.00000*** 0.00000*** 0.00000*** 0.00000*** 0.00000*** 0.00000*** 0.00000*** 0.00000*** 
   Note: Eviews has dropped 6 countries for insufficient data, resulting a sample size of 30. 
  “***”, “**” and “*” denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
Table 9. Relationship between CBIG, Inflation and Asian Financial Crisis (Refined Sample) 
 
CBIG Proxy (Dependent) Central Banks only Monetary Authorities only Inflation Targeting (1991-2005) Asian Crisis 2000 Dummy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 43.73136*** -0.171212 22.90940*** 42.75564*** 
CBIG (Overall) index -2.203861** 3.267626*** -1.890924* -2.437294** 
Asian Financial Crisis Dummy -1.872647* 0.841723 -5.322290*** -2.780040*** 
Income Level Dummy -2.618961*** -2.792801*** 0.676403 -2.136269** 
Money Supply Growth (%) -12.81738*** -0.361612 -7.857482*** -12.51945*** 
Real Interest Rate (%) 4.593763*** -1.730870* 2.075176** 4.408823*** 
Adj. R2 0.2674 0.078571 0.358021 0.29964 
F- Statistics 0.0000*** 0.125563 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Cross Section 26 4 13 30 
 “***”, “**” and “*” denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculation  
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Table 10. Relationship between CBIG, Economic Growth and Asian Financial Crisis 
 
Variables Overall Legal Political Price stability 
objectives 
Exchange rate  
Policy 
Monetary 
policy  
and deficit 
financing 
Accountability 
and  
transparency 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Per Capita GDP Growth  (Dependent) t-Stat t-Stat t-Stat t-Stat t-Stat t-Stat t-Stat 
Constant -0.434308 0.851520 1.095489 0.158540 0.851616 -0.691449 0.094162 
CBIG (Overall) index 1.841839*       
CBIG (Legal) Index  0.080220      
CBIG (Political) Index   -0.385620     
CBIG (Price Stability Objectives) Index    2.352049**    
CBIG (Exchange Rate Policy) Index     2.468920**   
CBIG (Monetary policy and Deficit Financing) Index      4.249247***  
CBIG (Accountability and Transparency) Index       1.743108* 
Asian Financial Crisis 1997 Dummy -1.222868 -0.936974 -0.905319 -1.212794 -1.142972 -1.185361 -1.192682 
Low Income Countries (LIC) Dummy -0.180236 -0.643161 -0.937760 -0.537527 0.260434 0.518448 0.460909 
High Income Countries (HIC) Dummy -1.996422** -2.481641** -2.714580* -1.268270 -0.755328 -2.925591*** -2.704717*** 
Initial GDP -0.942481 -0.734343 -0.867638 -0.974546 -0.020842 -0.877941 -0.864889 
Terms of Trade 2.613369*** 2.398287** 2.300198** 1.790612* 1.253552 2.451923** 2.546452** 
Initial Primary School Enrolment -0.100556 -1.106400 -1.298685 -0.478247 0.015641 -0.051631 -0.596976 
Initial Secondary School Enrolment  0.441018 1.648314* 1.834568* 0.586167 0.028624 1.143410 0.927086 
Adj. R2 0.092104 0.072608 0.071589 0.100957 0.090843 0.111636 0.084928 
F- Statistics 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
**,** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
Source: Author’s calculation  
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Table 11. Granger Causality Test 
 
 
The main finding between economic growth 
and Asian financial crisis dummy is insignificant 
across all indices (column 2 to 8 in Table 10). So, 
the economic growth in the post crisis period is not 
significantly different from that of the pre crisis 
period. The relationship between CBIG indices and 
economic growth shows that the overall index has 
significant (at 10%) positive relationship along 
with price stability objectives (at 5%); exchange 
rate policy (at 5%); monetary policy and deficit 
financing (at 1%); and finally accountability and 
transparency (at 10%) indices (columns 2, 5, 6, 7 
and 8 in Table 10). The high-income countries 
experience significantly lower economic growth 
than low- and middle-income countries. The low-
income countries did not achieve any significantly 
different economic growth either. The increase in 
the terms of trade cause significant increase in 
economic growth; but initial GDP, initial primary 
and secondary school enrolment had no significant 
impact on economic growth. The overall strength 
of the tests was explained by high F statistics (1%) 
and acceptable adjusted R square values. So, CBIG 
has contributed to some economic growth in the 
Asia pacific but not in the post crisis period.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper constructed and ranked the CBIG 
indices for 36 Asia Pacific countries applying a 
robust index model. The CBIG overall and sub-
indices portrayed the actual picture of CBIG of the 
region. The ranking in several refined samples 
highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of each 
central banks providing valuable information for 
policy makers for further improvements and 
modifications. The rankings also indicated that 
relatively low-income countries had improved their 
CBIG more than the others. Such evidences support 
the view that the central banks in the region which 
suffered from low independence and poor 
governance before the financial crisis had taken 
necessary steps to improve their status in the post 
crisis period. The statistical findings identified that 
the inflation had significantly declined in the post 
financial crisis period, however no significant 
changes found in the economic growth. The key 
findings also include that inflation and economic 
growth are negative and positively related to CBIG 
statuses of the countries respectively.  
This study provides several key contributions 
to the CBIG literature. This would be one of the 
leading studies to construct CBIG indices for Asia 
Pacific countries with such a comprehensive 
model. Such model explains six sub-indices to 
pinpoint specific areas of CBIG, while the overall 
index provides the overall picture. It would be also 
one of the first studies to measure the impact on 
inflation and economic growth in the post financial 
crisis period. 
This suggests that governments had realised 
that low CBIG was insufficient to manage the 
financial crisis and so had enhanced accordingly. 
Inflation and economic growth are important 
monetary policy tools and it is very crucial to 
identify their correct relationship with others, such 
as CBIG. These findings should help resolve any 
unclear direction of relationship evident in previous 
studies.  
Finally, the Asia Pacific was mostly 
overlooked in the previous works. Moreover, there 
were no works to check whether the CBIG had 
changed after experiencing such severe financial 
crisis in 1997. So, this adds to the CBIG literature 
as it adds the CBIG dataset constructed. 
 Null Hypothesis: Observations F-Statistic Prob.  
 CBIG (overall) does not Granger Cause Inflation (YD)  407  2.95023 0.0125 
 Inflation (YD) does not Granger Cause CBIG (overall)  0.33362 0.8925 
The null hypothesis for inflation (YD) does not Granger cause CBIG (overall) is not rejected but we do reject that 
CBIG (overall) does not Granger cause inflation (YD). This suggests that CBIG can affect on the inflation (YD), 
but the reverse is not true. So, two-way causality is not found in the Asia Pacific.   
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Appendix: 1 CBIG Index Format 
 
1. LEGAL (CBIGLeg) Coding 
a. Term of office of Governor / CEO (TOG)  
7 years or more 1.00 
6 years 0.80 
5 years 0.60 
4 years 0.40 
Below 4 years 0.20 
Not Mentioned 0.00 
b. Legal power to appoint Governor/ CEO (LPA)  
Board of the central bank 1.00 
Parliament/Legislature 0.67 
Government but need parliament consent 0.33 
Government/ Executives alone 0.00 
c. Legal power to Dismiss Governor/ CEO (LPD)  
No provision for dismissal 1.00 
Board of the central bank 0.67 
Parliament/Legislature or Government but approved by the parliament  0.33 
Government/ Executives alone 0.00 
d. Reappointment of Governor/ CEO (RAG)  
Yes, there is provision of reappointment 1.00 
Not mentioned  0.50 
No, provision 0.00 
e. Regulatory and supervisory power of central bank (RSC)  
Yes, completely separated 1.00 
Jointly done by central bank and other authorities  0.50 
No, only by central bank 0.00 
CBIGLeg =  w1TOG + w2LPA + w3LPD + w4RAG + w5RSC 
Where, w1= w2= w3= w4= w5 
2. POLITICAL (CBIGPol) Coding 
a. Turnover of Governor/CEO (TRG)  
Governor/CEO changed after 1 year or more of government’s change  1.00 
Governor/CEO within 1 year of government’s change 0.50 
Governor/CEO within 6 months of government’s change 0.00 
b. Members of the management board of central bank (CMB)  
Non-government persons  1.00 
Not mentioned government or non-government persons 0.67 
Government employees 0.33 
Government ministers  0.00 
c. Governor/CEO holds other office in the government (GOO)  
No, Governor/CEO does not  1.00 
Yes, but with prior permission from government  0.50 
Yes, always  0.00 
CBIGPol = w6TRG + w7CMB + w8GOO 
Where, w6= w7= w8.  
3. PRICE STABILITY OBJECTIVES (CBIGPStab) Coding 
a. The major objectives of the central bank (MOB)  
Price stability as the only objective of the bank 1.00 
Price stability is one objective with other compatible objectives 0.67 
No objectives stated in the bank charter 0.33 
Stated objectives do not include price stability 0.00 
b. Inflation targeting (INT)  
Independently by central bank 1.00 
Jointly with government  0.50 
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Not done by the central bank 0.00 
 
c. Interest rate controlling (INC)  
Independently by central bank 1.00 
Jointly with government 0.50 
Not done by the central bank 0.00 
CBIGPStab = w9MOB + w10INT + w11INC 
Where, w9= w10= w11 
4. EXCHANGE RATE POLICY (CBIGForx) Coding 
a. Foreign exchange market interventions  (FIN)  
By central Bank alone  1.00 
 Jointly with government 0.50 
By government only 0.00 
b. Foreign exchange market regulations (FMR)  
By central bank alone 1.00 
 Jointly with government 0.50 
By government only 0.00 
c. Foreign exchange borrowings (FBR)  
Central bank has a prominent role   1.00 
 Jointly with government 0.50 
By government alone 0.00 
CBIGForx = w12FIN + w13FMR + w14FBR 
Where, w12= w13= w14 
5. MONETARY POLICY AND DEFICIT FINANCING (CBIGMonPol) Coding 
a. Responsibility of monetary policy formulation (MPF)  
Central bank alone 1.00 
Central bank participates, but has little influence 0.67 
Central bank only advice government 0.33 
Central bank has no say 0.00 
b. The final word in resolution of conflict (FWC)  
The central bank, clearly defined in the law 1.00 
 A council of the central bank, executive branch, and legislative branch 0.50 
Government and Executive branch 0.00 
c. Lending to the government (PLN)  
I. Provision for lending  
Not permitted  1.00 
Permitted, but with strict limits (e.g. up to 15% of government revenue) 0.67 
Permitted, and the limits are loose (e.g. over 15% of government revenue) 0.33 
No legal limits on lending 0.00 
II. Terms of lending (TRL)  
Controlled by the central bank 1.00 
Specified by the central bank charter 0.67 
Agreed between the central bank and executive 0.33 
Decided by the executive branch alone 0.00 
III. Maturity of loans (MLN)  
Within 6 months 1.00 
Within 1 year 0.67 
More than 1 year 0.33 
Not mentioned in the law 0.00 
IV. Interest rates on loan  (INL)  
At market rates or above minimum rate 1.00 
Below market rate 0.67 
Interest rate is not mentioned 0.33 
No interest on government borrowing  0.00 
CBIGMonPol = w15MPF + w16FWC + w17PLN+ w18TRL + w19MLN + w20INL 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 8, Issue 2, Winter 2011, Continued - 2 
 
 
333 
 
Where, w15= w16= w17= w18= w19 = w20 
 
 
6. ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY (CBIGAcctrans) Coding 
a. Objectives of the central bank (WOB)  
I. Written objectives  
Mentioned in the law 1.00 
Not mentioned in the law but evident in other documents 0.50 
Not mentioned 0.00 
II. Clear priorities in objectives (COB)  
Priorities are distinct and easy to understand 1.00 
Priorities are there, but not distinctly presented 0.50 
No priorities 0.00 
b. Communication strategy  
I. Policy explanations provided for public (PEP)  
Regularly communicated to public 1.00 
Occasionally communicated to public 0.50 
Not communicated at all 0.00 
II. Publication of minutes of Board meeting (PMN)  
Minutes are published publicly 1.00 
Minutes are kept but not published 0.50 
Nothing mentioned 0.00 
c. Accountability of the Governor/ CEO (ACG)  
 
Board of central bank 1.00 
 
Parliament 0.67 
Parliament and government  0.33 
Government only 0.00 
d. Audit of central bank (ADC)  
 
External auditor 1.00 
Internal auditor 0.50 
Nothing mentioned 0.00 
 CBIGAccTrans = w21WOB + w22COB + w23PEP + w24PMN + w25ACG + w26ADC 
Where, w21= w22= w23= w24= w25= w26. 
CBIGOverall =  w1CBIGLeg + w2CBIGPol + w3CBIGPStab + w4CBIGForx +w5CBIGMonPol + 
w6CBIGAccTrans 
Where, w1= 5/26; w 2=3/26; w3=3/26; w4=3/26; w5=6/26; w6= 6/26. 
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